Source: Middle East Economic Survey
Iranian‐American Relations Under The Early Obama A What are the choices available to U.S. President Obama’s administration to deal effectively with Iran’s nuclear policy?
The nuclear issue is really a symptom of the deep mistrust between the U.S. and Iran, not the underlying cause of tension. For this reason I don’t believe there exists a purely technical solution to this issue, it has to be part of a broader political accommodation whereby Washington reaches a modus-vivendi with Tehran, and Iran dials down its hostility toward Israel.
Everyone understands that for American and Iran to reach a political accommodation it will require a long, protracted diplomatic process. The problem is on the nuclear issue; the Obama team doesn’t have the political luxury of pursuing a long, protracted process. The Israelis, and congress, are already pushing the administration to put a time limit on nuclear negotiations with the Iranians, believing that Tehran wants a long, drawn out process simply so it can develop a nuclear weapon under the guise of negotiations.
Obviously, diplomacy is the only effective option the Obama administration has, but the devil is in the details. I think to come up with an effective policy it is first important to try and discern the impetus for Iran’s nuclear ambitions, i.e. what’s motivating them? Is it a desire to dominate the Middle East and threaten Israel? National pride? A sense of insecurity vis-à-vis the U.S.?
It’s surely a combination of several factors, but what we know for sure is that Tehran’s leadership, particularly Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, remains deeply mistrustful of U.S. intentions. He is convinced that Washington’s goals are not behavior change, but regime change. So if there is a way the Obama administration can take measures to allay Khamenei’s sense of mistrust and insecurity that could have an effect on Tehran’s nuclear disposition. A multi-lateral approach is essential.
I would also argue that there is a direct correlation between Iran’s nuclear ambitions and American’s opposition to Iran’s nuclear ambitions. I once mentioned to a former member of Iran’s nuclear negotiating team that I don’t think this nuclear program was ever so important to Iran, until it became so important to the United States. “That’s absolutely right,” he said.
So ironically, I think that if Washington can turn down the volume a bit, this could also have an impact on Tehran’s calculations. I think Obama’s team understands this as well. But again, there’s going to be a lot of political pressure on them to come down on hard on the Iranians. This is going to be difficult for them to reconcile.
How will Iran react to President Obama’s proposed “mutual respect” approach?
Iran’s reaction so far has been characteristically dissatisfied. During the Bush administration they consistently denounced the U.S. for not showing them proper respect, and now with Obama they say that simply speaking respectfully is insignificant, what’s important is to show concretely that U.S. policy has really changed.
At the moment, hardliners in Tehran who are not interested in having an amicable relationship with the United States have an inordinate amount of influence. Rather than strengthen these hardliners, Obama’s overtures will put pressure on them to justify their often gratuitous enmity toward the United States. Most Iranians---certainly the vast majority of the population but I would also argue the bulk of the political elite-- recognize that, in 2009, the “death to America” culture of 1979 is obsolete—it only prevents the country from fulfilling its enormous potential.
Whereas the Bush administration united Iran’s disparate political actors against a common external threat, the Obama administration, I believe, is going to accentuate the divisions and incongruities among Iran’s leadership.
What role can the EU play in resolving the Iranian-western conflict? Can a European policy emerge to bridge the gap?
The EU has a very important role to play, but I don’t think a separate and distinct European policy is helpful. In fact I think it could be profoundly unhelpful. Let me explain.
What’s absolutely critical is that the U.S. and the EU—and preferably Russia and China—address Iran with one voice. Tehran is highly adept at exploiting rifts in the international community, and the entire diplomatic approach will unravel if key countries approach Iran with divergent red lines.
I don’t mean to imply that Europe should simply defer to the U.S. on Iran policy. On the contrary I think European diplomats generally have a much better understanding of contemporary Iran than American diplomats, given the fact that Europe, unlike Washington, has diplomatic representation in Tehran. I have several European diplomat friends who have spent years living in Iran and speak fluent Persian.
The most effective role Europe can play is to work together with the U.S in shaping a realistic, coherent, multi-lateral diplomatic approach toward Iran. It’s in Europe’s interests to make sure there is no air between their position and that of the United States. I believe Iran will take them much more seriously if this is the case.
What impact would the Iranian presidential elections have on talks between Tehran and Washington, or would such a sensitive strategic matter remain the prerogative of the Islamic Revolution leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei?
A more moderate president in Tehran could certainly help to allay some of the tension that had cumulated during the Bush and Ahmadinejad eras. But in order for there to be a U.S.-Iran diplomatic breakthrough several things have to fall in place. First, there needs to be a President in Washington interested in reaching out to Tehran. We have that in President Obama.
Second, I believe we need a President in Tehran who meets two criteria: 1) He’s trusted by the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei; and 2) The United States can work with him. The problem with Mohammed Khatami was that he met the second criteria but not the first. The problem with Ahmadinejad is that he meets the first criteria but not the second.
I believe there are a few Iranian politicians who check both these boxes. The current mayor of Tehran, Ghalibaf is one example. Perhaps the speaker of the parliament, Ali Larijani is another. At the moment, however, neither of them are presidential candidates. The foreign policy platform of Mir Hossein Mousavi, the former Prime Minister who at the moment appears Ahmadinejad’s most formidable opponent, is still unclear.
Ultimately, every Iranian diplomat will tell you that the “relations with the United States” portfolio rests firmly in Khamenei’s hands. But Khamenei leads by consensus, he’s not an absolute dictator (though he’s closer than he’s ever been to being one).
I sometimes picture 15 bearded men sitting around a long table, with Khamenei seated at the head. During an Ahmadinejad presidency most if not all of these men share a similar anti-American, revolutionary Islamist disposition. They feed off one another and one-up each other with hostile rhetoric.
A more moderate president could change the makeup of who is sitting at that table. Instead of 15 hardline revolutionary voices, maybe you have 5 or 6 people now arguing for a different tack. Their impact might not be enormous, but it certainly is not negligible either.
Can Iran pursue its regional policies if the crude oil price remains at the current level of around $40/B, or even lower?
The contraction of oil prices is certainly painful for Iran, but Tehran was pursuing its current regional policies even in the 1990s when oil was at $10/barrel. So they will undoubtedly have enough in their coffers to continue funding groups like Hezbollah and Hamas.
One arena where their ambitions may be tempered is Iraq. I’ve been told they spent billions of dollars in Iraq over the last several years to try to influence political events there. They may have less money to throw around there now, and given Prime Minister Maliki’s seeming centralization of power, there ability to wield influence is less than what it was before.
Some sixty prominent Iranian economists have criticized the government for mismanaging the economy. Will the sharp fall in oil revenues prompt the government to heed their advice and take some corrective measures before the presidential elections in June?
I don’t think so. In the nearly 4 years that he’s been in office, Ahmadinejad has not given any indication that he is someone prone to reflection or receptive to outside ideas. These economists have been writing him for the last several years and I don’t think he’s taken into consideration any of their suggestions. He’s convinced of the righteousness of his own views.
What’s more, Ahmadinejad’s chief mission at the moment is not to fix the economy but to make sure he becomes president again. In some way these two priorities are mutually incompatible. For example, Iran has one of the highest inflation rates in the world right now, official 30 percent but unofficially much higher.
Rather than take measures to curtail inflation, Ahmadinejad is going to try and throw money at people in the provinces to make sure they turn out and vote for him (he knows the urban sophisticates in Tehran and elsewhere are not his constituents). Obviously this is only going to increase inflation. But again, his priority is not the long or even medium term health of the Iranian economy; his priority is to essentially bribe people to support him.
What’s unclear is how much access he has to the country’s purse strings to carry out such an approach. Theoretically the parliament is in control of the budget, and Larijani, being no fan of Ahmadinejad, will try to prevent him access to the funds. But the reality is that finances are incredibly nebulous in Iran, and if the leader decides he wants Ahmadinejad to serve a second-term, he can certainly make the funds available to him.
What Mr. Ahmadinejad’s re-election chances and what would be the impact of such a development on the probability of a U.S.-Iranian rapprochement?
I think we should use the term “election” loosely. Iran’s presidential elections are not as rigged as say Egypt’s, but they are certainly not free and fair. I would argue that in this particular election the will of Ayatollah Khamenei will figure more prominently than the will of the people.
He will indirectly, via the Guardian Council, limit the pool of candidates permitted to run. And in a country that lacks organized political parties with grassroots activity, the campaign role played by paramilitary and military organizations loyal to Khamenei could prove decisive. This is what helped propel Ahmadinejad’s 2005 victory.
There are also many allegations of improprieties that take place when it comes to ballot counting. One reformist politician, Ali Reza Alavi Tabar, said that if the reformists wanted to win this time they would need 5 million more votes than the conservatives to compensate for any improprieties.
Finally, it is difficult to gauge popular sentiment outside the capital. Though Tehran is the country’s political heart and soul, the low voter turnout among disaffected urban sophisticates in Tehran means they’re no longer making electoral decisions from the rest of the country. Ahmadinejad has understood this, making frequent visits to the provinces with promises of economic handouts.
Having said all of this, Iranian elections are notoriously unpredictable. Ahmadinejad looks like the front-runner at the moment, but I think his defeat is certainly within the realm of possibilities. If indeed he is chosen to serve a second term, I fear that Ahmadinejad’s continued presence would be an insurmountable obstacle to U.S.-Iran confidence building. As long as Ahmadinejad is president, I would put the chances of a U.S.-Iran rapprochement close to nil.