Verifying North Korea's Nuclear Programme: Technical Options and Policy Choices

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In The Media

Verifying North Korea's Nuclear Programme: Technical Options and Policy Choices

This paper, presented at the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management (INMM) 50th Annual Meeting, considers the challenges and policy choices associated with verifying a North Korean declaration about its past nuclear activities.

By James M. Acton

Published on Jul 12, 2009

Source: INMM Conference Paper

Verifying North Korea's Nuclear Programme: TechnicThis paper considers the challenges and policy choices associated with verifying a North Korean declaration about its past nuclear activities. In terms of the plutonium programme, there are two key choices facing policy makers. First, in light of North Korea’s reported statement that its October 2006 test involved only 2 kg of plutonium, is the IAEA’s standard definition of a significant quantity appropriate? Second, using open source information, this paper argues that the uncertainty in the material unaccounted for, σ(MUF), will be between 5 and 10 kg, depending on the degree of cooperation afforded by North Korea. In order to ensure that verification produces a conclusive answer, the magnitude of σ(MUF) will necessitate some combination of decreasing the detection probability and increasing the false alarm rate from their standard IAEA values, or adopting entirely different criteria against which to assess North Korean compliance. The paper also includes a discussion of the process for verifying the absence or existence of a clandestine uranium enrichment programme by formulating it as a Bayesian inference problem. This framework, together with an analysis of the politics of inspections at undeclared locations suggests that, unless detailed intelligence pinpointing the location of a clandestine centrifuge facility is available, inspection rights at undeclared facilities may be of limited utility.

About the Author

James M. Acton

Jessica T. Mathews Chair, Co-director, Nuclear Policy Program

Acton holds the Jessica T. Mathews Chair and is co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

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Nuclear Policy East Asia South Korea North Korea

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.

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