The Future of the NPT: Should It be Enhanced, Changed or Replaced?

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In The Media

The Future of the NPT: Should It be Enhanced, Changed or Replaced?

Brazil's refusal to implement the Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement with the IAEA weakens the nonproliferation regime as a whole. Brazil should lead by example and sign and ratify the Protocol before the opening of the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

By Pierre Goldschmidt

Published on Oct 29, 2009

Source: Paper presented in Rio de Janeiro

The Future of the NPT: Should It be Enhanced, ChanSpeaking at an International Seminar jointly organized by the Nonproliferation for Global Security Foundation (NPSGlobal) and the Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI) in Rio de Janeiro on the future of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Pierre Goldschmidt said that the NPT should neither be changed nor replaced, but fully implemented and enforced. The nonproliferation regime will only be effective if the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Secretariat is able to promptly detect undeclared nuclear material and activities; if cases of non-compliance are duly reported to the IAEA Board of Directors and the UN Security Council; and if the Security Council acts effectively when a non-compliant state does not fully cooperate with the IAEA. Goldschmidt insists that the IAEA must use its legal authority to conduct “special inspections” to verify the possible existence of undeclared activities in states, such as Syria, that deny IAEA access to suspect locations. He also recommends that all IAEA member states be requested to provide to the Secretariat relevant information on the export and import of specified equipment as well as on export denials, and makes concrete proposals on how to respond to cases of non-compliance and withdrawal from the NPT.

Brazil’s refusal to implement the Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement with the IAEA weakens the nonproliferation regime as a whole and blocks the Nuclear Suppliers Group from making the Additional Protocol an export condition for sensitive nuclear fuel cycle-related activities. Moreover, a PhD thesis recently published in Brazil on numerical simulations of thermonuclear detonations and ensuing statements by high-ranking Brazilian officials about lending support to the development of nuclear weapons have been particularly worrisome. As a great nation and a key member of the IAEA, Brazil should lead by example and comply with IAEA General Conference resolutions by signing and ratifying the IAEA’s Additional Protocol, hopefully before the opening of the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

Additional resources from the seminar are now available at the NPSGlobal website.

About the Author

Pierre Goldschmidt

Former Nonresident Senior Associate, Nuclear Policy Program

Goldschmidt was a nonresident senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment.

Recent Work

Article
A Realistic Approach Toward a Middle East Free of WMD
- Pierre Goldschmidt
Article
Serious Deficiencies Exposed by Latest IAEA Safeguards Implementation Report
- Pierre Goldschmidt

Nuclear Policy Nuclear Energy North America South America

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.

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