Source: The Moscow Times
Gubernatorial RouletteThe long New Year’s holiday is a perfect time for the authorities to announce controversial and unpopular decisions. The Kremlin usually uses this trick to avoid unwanted criticism and debate. While most of the country was celebrating and few were following political developments, President Dmitry Medvedev announced his gubernatorial “nominations” (read: appointments) for six regions — something that he probably should have done in September or October.
Medvedev reappointed the incumbent governors in the Kurgan region and Marii-El republic and named new governors to the Volgograd region and the Komi republic.
But by far the most controversial appointments were in the Altai republic and the Primorye region. In 2005, Primorye Governor Sergei Darkin became the first governor to be appointed after then-President Vladimir Putin annulled direct elections following the 2004 Beslan attack. In 2005, Darkin appeared to be one of the more “authoritarian” regional heads because of his past criminal activity. Now, after the authorities conducted a search of Darkin’s residence in May and many of his associates have been arrested, the situation has not improved. Yet the Kremlin has once again placed its trust in Darkin.
Similarly, Medvedev has reappointed Altai’s governor, former federal inspector Alexander Berdnikov — despite his involvement in a high-profile scandal over the illegal hunting of endangered sheep in the republic and a related helicopter crash in early January 2009 in which Alexander Kosopkin, the Kremlin’s envoy to the State Duma, was killed.
These examples may prove that the current system is designed to sideline strong governors while keeping afloat those who are more dependent on the Kremlin — in part because they could face serious criminal charges if they don’t toe the Kremlin line.
At the same time, the heads of the Komi and Volgograd regions are shining examples of Medvedev’s generation. They are from the “Golden 100” presidential cadre reserve, both were previously deputy governors and therefore members of the local establishment, and both came to politics from business relatively recently. This could very well be a new Kremlin model for filling gubernatorial posts with members of the local political elite.
But looking for a pattern to this process is like trying to figure out how to win Russian roulette. There are far too many unpredictable forces and factors at work, and it is never clear in advance which ones will play the decisive role.
What’s more, the Kremlin has repeatedly manipulated the number of terms that governors are allowed to serve. This was exploited in 2004, when Putin coerced governors into rejecting the existing system of direct elections. At the time, most governors were nearing the end of their legal term limits and were therefore willing to embrace the idea of being appointed from Moscow to remain in office.
Several weeks ago, Medvedev announced that he would like to see governors serving no more than three terms — certainly a long time in office. But to be on the safe side, he left open the option of governors serving a fourth term — “in exceptional cases.”