Source: Polit.ru
Russia's Foreign Policy: Modernize or MarginalizeRussia’s foreign policy is outdated, according to the distinguished foreign affairs analyst Dmitri Trenin. In the first part of this interview with polit.ru’s Boris Dolgin he argues that rather than focus on preserving Russia’s status as a great power, its aim should be modernization. Otherwise, great power or not, the country is doomed.
Boris Dolgin: The Russian government is always being accused of not having a sensible foreign policy.
Dmitri Trenin: It all depends on what you mean by a sensible foreign policy. The government has a perfectly sound grasp of its own interests, and at some level – that of Putin and Medvedev, I suppose – there’s an understanding of what Russia is. Well, at least they’re engaged with the subject. Many others care about nothing except those issues which relate directly to their personal relationships with particular people in power.
Right now, what passes for rationality has to do with thinking clearly about how to preserve the status quo for personal reasons. That’s the problem.
B.D. In other words, domestic politics controls foreign policy.
D.T. Domestic policy always comes first. It does not control it, but it is the basis of it. Foreign policy is based on domestic policy. It may enjoy a considerable degree of independence from it, but it has to be basically in tune with domestic policy.
This in turn corresponds to the interests of a certain section of the elite. In no way does it represent the interests of the nation as a whole, as I don’t think we can talk of such a thing as a nation in Russia yet. There’s this huge mass of people, the population, which is not yet aware of itself as citizens. So it’s too early to talk of the national interest in Russia yet. There are the interests of individuals, of corporations, groups and so on, but there is no national interest.
As for the elite, it is at once deeply divided, yet very egocentric. Since they’re all entirely preoccupied by their own interests, they can’t come together to create the kind of common space which is required to make a nation. In this sense, there’s still a kind of civil war going on, of a very mild, bloodless form, of course...
B.D. ... where each side appeals to “national interests”, but understands these in terms of their own interests.
D.T. Quite right. They’re both out to prove that the other side has no legitimacy. One side casts the others as usurpers, scrounging on the people. The other casts their opponents as fifth columnists, jackals who hang around certain embassies.
B.D. So there’s only way you can assess how sensible this foreign policy is and that is in the context of domestic policy.
Russia’s status as a ‘great power’
D.T. You can’t say that Russia behaves unpredictably, irrationally. Its policies make perfect sense in relation to the ideas of the leadership. But this brings us to another problem: Putin and Medvedev do have a foreign policy, but in my opinion it is a pretty traditional and outdated. It is based on the notion that status is the most important consideration in foreign policy. The country must achieve the status of a “great power”, it must maintain this status, advance it, etc.
B.D. In order then to convert this status into something else?
D.T. I don’t think so. It’s more or less a goal in itself. The Soviet Union used to have the mad aim of world revolution. Then it set itself the slightly less crazy, but completely unproductive task of fighting American imperialism during the cold war – it had to defend something and gain some ground. No one seriously thought that the red banner could be raised over the White House, but still this confrontation occupied all the available space.
Now, in my opinion, our foreign policy is at a stage when the most important thing is to prove oneself to be a great power. To gain recognition, to join this or that council, to be key player in the international oligarchy – one of a group of four, five or six. And for one’s sphere of influence – in the former Soviet Union and beyond – to be acknowledged.
B.D. Do you see any parallels between domestic and foreign policy? In domestic policy at the beginning of the 2000s, the ruling elite appeared to believe that in order to effect any plans or projects, it was necessary to strengthen power and ensure there were no counterbalances or threats in the way. Later, strengthening power became a goal in itself. But in foreign policy, all attempts to resolve particular issues only confirmed the feeling of having lost that valuable resource, status. So later the battle for status became a goal in itself.
D.T. Yes, I can see this parallel. The thing is that the main currency on both the domestic and foreign stage is that of power. This is very sad.
Modernization as a goal
Russian foreign policy, in my opinion, should – and incidentally, there are also parallels with domestic policy here – have as its main goal the realization of what Mr. Medvedev is talking about a lot right now: the comprehensive modernization of the country. This is indeed the task. If this were posited as our main goal – as I’m certain it should be – our foreign policy would not be all about fighting for status, but fighting to attract the resources for modernizing the country.
I’m not saying that we should just forget about our status, ignore it. But the goal should not be to prove that we deserve to be called a great power, but to get the resources we need to modernize the country swiftly, extensively and effectively.
B.D. So the problem is not that foreign policy is in some way subordinate to domestic policy, but exactly what kind of domestic policy it is subordinated to?
D.T. Yes, of course. Some of my colleagues say that foreign policy is completely subordinate to domestic policy, but that is not true. There are great differences between foreign and domestic policy – the same players operate in quite different environments. But of course, everything flows from domestic policy. Foreign policy may be incorrect and suicidal because of delusions, wrong tactics and strategies, but it can’t consciously defy domestic policy.
What matters is the direction in which domestic policy and foreign policy are moving. For the time being, in my view, the main aim of both is to consolidate power. To maintain a monopoly on power in one sphere, and to keep up our place in the world oligarchy in the other.
Dealing with the legacy of empire
B.D. Why are the Russian leadership, and so many of the foreign affairs analysts, so obsessed with ‘geopolitical thinking’? Is it the best way of describing the situation today, or would some other approach work better?
D.T. In my view the liberal critics are very breezy in their attitude to the problems of the end of the empire. I disagree with them, and I argue with them. But I try to understand them too. On 17 March 1991, 76.4% voted for the Soviet Union, but by 17 December the Soviet Union no longer existed. At one time it did seem as if the past could just be cast off like that. This was thought to be quite normal, the way things should be. We would “brush its dust from our feet” and so on. In fact, the end of an empire is extremely difficult. It’s difficult for everyone.
Look at the British and French examples – if it doesn’t end as the result of a military defeat, an external force that destroys a crumbling empire, then the process is bound to go on for a long time, as is in our case too. But people gradually get used to this. Although events move in all sorts of directions, the main momentum is one of adaption to reality. This is human – we adapt to changing circumstances.
Obviously, people were afraid that if the state was not great, then it would not be a state at all. Because unlike in France or Britain there is no clear core to which the former colonizers can return. They were afraid that Russia would break up, and that there would be chaos.
B.D. That it would shrink to the size of the Principality of Muscovy?
D.T. Yes. And the problem is not just that it would split up, but that there would be a war between these parts; that there would be chaos and all kinds of serious problems. That was the one consideration. The second, the foreign policy concern was the fear that if the country was not a superpower, then it would be a dependent state.
In these circumstances, if you have not been integrated into any state, then some foreign leader will rule over you. No one wants this, especially not the elites. Perhaps it is not so important for ordinary citizens who rules over them, but the elite has a certain idea about itself and its role. Look at the Moldovan elites, for example, who do not want to join Romania. Many ordinary Romanian-speaking Moldovans wouldn’t mind this. Some would even welcome it. But the elite want to preserve their country, which is small but still their own.
Being a great power
And this is especially true in a country like ours, with its history and sense of identity. If we’re not a great power, does that mean we’ll become an American satrapy? No, we don’t want that. And if we don’t want that, it means we’ve got to be a great power. Then the whole business of upholding one’s strategic independence kicks in, and in circumstances when resources are very thin on the ground. If you’re not the Soviet Union, then you can’t compete on equal terms with America in the political or the military sphere – not to mention the economy and everything else. So what do you do?
It’s not easy. You start thinking about nuclear weapons, about alliances like BRIC. Russia’s the country that’s really interested in BRIC. No other country in the world thinks about BRIC much in the geopolitical sense. Because no one else is so preoccupied with maintaining their independence and freedom of action, and at the same time holding their own with the United States. That’s the task which the Russian elite took on itself. BRIC is one element of our attempt, along with nuclear weapons, to compensate for the disadvantageous asymmetry the Russian Federation found itself landed with after the collapse of the USSR.
Two failed attempts at ‘integration’
So what do we mean by “integration”? Two attempts at integration were made after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Firstly, integration with the West, then cooperation with the West – by Putin, after 11 September. Both were quite serious, even if they were naпve, insufficiently consistent, superficial, etc. None the less, they were serious. They were headed by the president, and they came from a large part of the elite, if not the whole elite. The intention was to integrate with the West under certain conditions. But these attempts failed. The second time this happened, under Putin, he was forced into asserting Russia’s position as an independent power, and formulating policy accordingly.
When Putin criticized America in Munich, his message was threefold. Firstly: you will accept us as we are – we will change, but not on your initiative and not under pressure from you. Secondly: you will treat us as equals: we understand that we have differing GDP, etc, but all in all we’re a power of comparable magnitude to you. And thirdly: if we’re going to cooperate, we’re going to do so on the basis of shared interests. We will not make adjustments to suit you – we will cooperate only in areas where our interests coincide. If they don’t coincide, we won’t cooperate.
This is Putin’s policy, which at the time I called a forced partnership. This policy was not accepted by Bush, and not because of any mistakes that Putin made, but because the former US administration was incapable of taking a wider and deeper view of the world.
B.D. Without becoming annoyed.
D.T. Yes. It was a narrow, gloomy, backward view of the world. Especially during President Bush’s first term. But now we see a different America, which can be dealt with on different terms. Which is in fact offering new terms itself.
Take Obama’s speech at the UN General Assembly. There he said that we acknowledge the reality. We will not take our democratic charter and establish our own order in every monastery. Let’s all live in our monasteries according to our own charters. We won’t answer for everything. Essentially, Obama is responding to each of Putin’s messages positively, not only in his words but in his actions. And quite an interesting situation is developing.
Not status, but modernization
B.D. Do you expect that there will be a third attempt to integrate or adjust, or arrange relations with the West generally, in the near future?
D.T. Not in the near future. I think the last two attempts have dampened the enthusiasm for integration. So if there is a third attempt, it will be different. The message will be something like this, I believe: firstly, unless we modernize, we will become marginalized. We have to choose between modernization or marginalization. I think this has already been accepted. Although there are some people who are waiting for oil prices to rise, for the days of golden oil kingdom to return, most sensible people, whatever their ideological hue, understand that without modernization, the country is done with. Great power or no, it will be doomed.
The second point is more complicated. We’re going to need outside resources if we’re going to modernize. In other words, it’s not going to be enough for Russia just to be part of the world economy and information space. We’re going to have to do more than just carry out modernization on that basis.
I think this is the real question at the moment. In my view, Putin – and I mention him because I consider him to be the ideologist, the conceptualist, and the real leader of the country – probably believes that the country can be modernized simply by being part of the world. Without Russia needing to attach itself to any specific countries or regions. In this sense, for him Europe, America, China, Japan, South Korea, or other countries may be partners or rivals, or partners and rivals at the same time – it’s all the same to him.
In the second part of this important interview with polit.ru’s Boris Dolgin, veteran foreign affairs analyst Dmitri Trenin outlines an optimistic vision of Russia’s future. The country’s foreign policy will change as Russia’s elite matures, he predicts. In time, that elite will need the rule of law and democratic values, he believes. And in order to modernize, it will look to Europe
Boris Dolgin: Putin may have no particular preferences, but where do you think Russia should be looking?
Dmitri Trenin: In my view, Russia is not going to be able to modernize unless it develops a very close relationship with the European Union. In economic, social, humanitarian and other aspects. It’s also going to have to cooperate with the United States when it comes to security matters, it’ll have to develop a real partnership, I mean, one worthy of the name. This doesn’t mean that we shouldn’t work with China, Japan, Korea, etc. But cooperation with Europe will be the engine of that process, from a humanitarian, economic and social point of view.
Cooperating with the United States would mean demilitarizing the mindset, modernizing our foreign policy thinking. As long as the USA is seen as a likely opponent, there can be no modernization. That’s obvious. And at the moment part of the Russian elite has got problems with that.
And if we are talking about Europe, I should say that I believe that it’s pointless our setting ourselves the task of joining the European Union...
B.D. Because they won’t accept us?
D.T. Firstly, they wouldn’t let us in, and they’re right about that – in their place I wouldn’t either. It would destroy the entire structure, and create enormous distortions, imbalances, etc. Europe would not be able to manage it. Secondly, I don’t think Russia needs that.
Russia has many interests of its own which it needs to pursue more actively. For Russia, a more comfortable position would be that of a very close ally, a very close partner integrated into everything apart from institutions. The statement of the former chairman of the European Commission Romano Prodi that we would share everything apart from institutions is, I think, a very good description of the prospects of Russian-European integration. The same goes for the United States – no formal union is necessary, no membership in NATO. We should not make an enemy out of China, and for the Chinese the expansion of NATO into Russia would feel like a threat. Neither the West nor Russia would gain by that.
B.D. How should we deal with the fear of isolation?
D.T. I don’t think that we would feel isolated if we had a close relationship with Europe, if we enjoyed everything but shared institutions – open Schengen zone, a common economic space, a free trade zone, a real energy partnership which could become the equivalent of the European Association of Coal and Steel. We’ve got a lot in common with Europe. We could coordinate our foreign policy in some areas, and a great deal more. But we’d live in different houses. I think that’s important. When people live in the same apartment, relations between them are often worse than when they visit one another.
The same goes for the United States. In my opinion, we can maintain respectful, equal relations outside an alliance. If Russia joined NATO, it would start to break it up from inside too. Demands would be made of Russia which could not be satisfied within the alliance. That’s completely unnecessary.
B.D. But demands are already being made of Russia. Only from the outside.
D.T. Yes, but from the outside it’s much easier to accept than from the inside. It does not break the rules of NATO, it does not cause disorder. Russia does something, and NATO reacts by saying something. The problem is, though, that when Russia sits down to talks with members of the alliance, rather than with NATO as an organization, different countries may have different positions.
B.D. And this is divisive. Like in the European Union.
D.T. It does not cause division in the European Union, it exploits the divisions within the EU. Everyone exploits this, the US no less than Russia, only no one talks about this – not publicly, at least. As for the divisions in NATO, the idea of Old Europe and New Europe was not invented by Russia, and it wasn’t directly to do with Russia. And that was a more serious crisis than any that has been connected with Russia. I can’t remember a crisis concerning Russia which has been as painful and difficult for NATO as the 2003 crisis over the war in Iraq. The fact that NATO countries have different interests, and accordingly different positions – that’s normal. When there’s a military threat, it brings them together, of course. But when there’s no military threat, when they can relax and announce their position at the top of one’s voice, it’s very different.
Iran and sanctions
B.D. In Kommersant recently you wrote a column about the possibility that the US and Russia might exchange unilateral steps, but in areas where their interests coincide. Do you believe that Iran could take a serious part in this exchange? Are the interests reconcilable?
D.T. The unilateral steps I described there are really trifling. They are symbols, PR, but necessary PR, because it is vital to demonstrate visibly, seriously, that something is changing on this front. It’s important for Iran, too. I wrote about the need to coordinate strategy on Iran. What do I mean by this? Not to respond to America on Iran would mean ruining the cooperation that has begun, ruining the chance we’ve got right now, one which is potentially extremely advantageous for Russia, in respect of the goals I mentioned – modernization and the demilitarization of relations with the US.
But it would be wrong to concentrate just on whether or not Russia should join the sanctions regime, because the sanctions approach has no strategy behind it.
B.D. There is no mechanism behind it.
D.T. For a start, there’s no mechanism. It’s also unclear what our game plan is. What are these sanctions for? To make sure that these mullahs will never come to an agreement? To bully them and provoke a revolution in Iran? What is our plan? There’s no plan at all.
The major powers do indeed need to agree in order to solve the Iran problem. We must act in concert, but this united front needs to have a coherent strategy behind it. What strategy? To stimulate Iran, and not only positively, not just with a carrot, but with a stick too – through sanctions. But these sanctions need to be part of a game which the international community is playing with Iran. A game aimed not at humiliating Iran, forcing it to abandon its national interests, etc. On the contrary, the endgame should be that Iran is able to join the international community, but under certain conditions. These conditions may be extremely favorable for it, but it will have to give up one thing. It might decide not to do so fully. That which is prohibited should be subject to constant monitoring, and Iran will know that if the international community does not fulfill its promises, then it will be able to return to its weapons, and thereby ensure its security.
But if all goes well, Iran will have no reason to take that path, because it will receive a great deal of what it wants from the international community. It will have access to technology, to trade. It will have its debts unfrozen, it will finally gain diplomatic relations with the US. It will start transforming itself from being an outcast to a major regional player, and even, to some extent, a leader. For Iran, this is quite an interesting prospect. But if it wants it, Iran’s going to have to respond to the international community reciprocally. Again, no one should have to believe in anyone’s good will; everyone should be able to check everyone else, and if we get the combination of positive and negative stimuli right here, then I think it’ll work.
B.D. What will persuade Russia to pursue this course of action, rather than playing a zero sum game?
D.T. Firstly, the game is hardly worth the candle. Russia is only Iran’s 10th or 12th largest partner. It earns us very little money. Russia has sold Iran a certain amount of weapons. If it delivers more, it will lose incomparably more. Russia will lose out in diplomatic relations with America, Europe, etc.
So Russia has little to gain from holding out for a different scenario. If the idea is that it’s in our interests for the Americans to get up to their neck and come to grief – I won’t even dignify that with comment. If anyone believes that Russia gains from an increase in oil prices – a boom which will be followed at some point by a colossal fall in price – that’s not worthy of comment either. It is clear that at some time, when Iran is re-integrated into the international community, it will want the same things as Russia – western technology and western investments. And TU planes will be no more in demand in Iran than they are in Russia.
Yes, of course we can go all out for confrontation. But it’s pointless, whereas if we cooperate over Iran we’ll be able to make good progress with the United States. I don’t mean minor cooperation – like signing a resolution no one’s going to carry out, or something like that – but serious cooperation. If we really are potentially strategic partners, as we like to make out, then let’s sit down like serious partners, and discuss Iran, Afghanistan, etc like equals.
B.D. Do you think they understand that the imminent delivery of the S-300s may trigger preemptive military action? (ed: Russia has delayed 8 months in delivering a consignment of S-300 anti-aircraft missiles to Iran)
D.T. I don’t know. Probably, but that’s not the issue. The problem is that this would lead to a drastic deterioration in our relationship with the West. No amount of success on the Iranian front would compensate for that.
From consumers to democrats
B.D. The Russian leadership usually refers to our interests when describing the international situation. But there have been recent exceptions. For example, in an article in the Polish newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza, Putin talked about values and morality. Medvedev does too, from time to time. What is the role of values and interests in international politics, in your view?
D.T. I believe that international relations are based mainly on interests. I have no problem with that idea. But unless interests are rooted in values they run the risk of losing their bearings, their meaning.
B.D. Do you not see our foreign policy and that of Europe as being based on a misunderstanding, when it comes to values and interests?
D.T. Well, Europe is a unique phenomenon. If you look beyond the rhetoric, at the reality of their foreign policy, America and Russia are closer to one another than either is to Europe.
America and Europe do, of course, share the same language, the same terminology, they share the values of societies that are very advanced. Russian society is less well developed. It may have adopted the terminology, as Russia’s leaders did in the 1990s, but there’s a huge distance between that and really internalizing the values.
We can talk about democracy as much as we like, but there’s not much demand in our country for democracy. We’ve got a lot of consumers now, and that’s a good thing. But these consumers haven’t yet become citizens. One day they will, I hope. But it’s going to take some time. When they do, then we can start talking about real democracy.
You could say that our country is authoritarian, because it is. It is mildly authoritarian. In politics, one group has a monopoly on power. But the people who really support this regime aren’t really interested in politics. They’re interested in the size of their salaries, what they can buy with their money, etc. This is normal. People have got the right to decide what interests them and what does not.
They did not bring communism down in order to establish democracy, but so that they could have food and freedom in their private lives – and they’ve got that, more or less. People got what they were fighting for.
B.D. How can you turn consumers into citizens? What is it going to take?
D.T. I think that the consumers need to get established. 15 years ago some of us were still unsure whether or not there was going to be a civil war, whether we might have to leave the country. Now that’s no longer an issue. There’s going to be no civil war, and no one’s going to have to leave the country – or you can if you like. You can live in Moscow, and you can live in Voronezh. Everyone can go where they like – that’s settled now. It’s no longer a question of ‘sauve qui peut’.
And once people settle down, they start trying to make things work. Look at the way the rich live in Moscow. It’s fairly normal, fairly like life in the West. They’ve got decent cars. I look at the cars parked in the courtyard of my completely non-elite building in the center of Moscow: they’ve changed a good deal over the last 15 years, and crisis or no, they go on changing. But once you leave your personal space, your house, you find yourself in a place which no one looks after. People regard that as the responsibility of various organizations, officials, councils, the building maintenance board, etc.
As long as you stay in your apartment it’s fine. But as soon as you go out onto the stairwell things aren’t so great. They may not be terrible, but they’re not great. Considering what people earn, and what they could do, it could be better. People aren’t getting their act together to improve things for everyone. Though in some respects this is starting to happen. People with cars – you know what a problem parking has become – don’t want just anyone to be able to park in the courtyard, and so they decide to get together and put up iron gates, so that only people with an electronic key can enter. That’s a small improvement for a small territory.
If you’ve got children – not a lot of those being born right now, but still – you don’t want alcoholics hanging around their playground. You try and get something done about that. And so on and so on.
The way I see it is that people who live in a place and have decided that they’re going to go on living there – in Moscow, Kostroma or wherever – are starting to want to do something to make it nicer.
No one is working on building democracy. Democracy grows out of a need, as I see it. You have to want to take part in a common cause. Democracy means a republic. As we do not have a republic, there’s no common cause – everyone sticks to their own private affairs – so we don’t feel much of a need for democracy. It’ll happen. I’m sure will in due course.
B.D. You mean the public will grow out of the private, from the ground up?
D.T. Yes. People have different kinds of interests too, not only playgrounds. People who’ve made fortunes, who’ve got factories, newspapers and ships. They’d like to hold on to their fortunes, to pass them on to their descendents. Then some group comes along that’s got connections with those who’ve got a monopoly on power and they try and take it away. And you start to resist. But you realize that resisting on your own is dangerous, pointless and useless. As an owner, you don’t think in terms of revolution, of using rocks as weapons, you think about the law. You want law in the country, for everything to be done according to the law. Things were very different when those fortunes were made. That was 20 years ago. That’s over now. From now people are going to want to start seeing that the law is upheld. I’m not saying that this will happen quickly, painlessly and easily, but I’m sure that’s the direction in which we need to be going.
Then, though this may not have been what they set out to do, those elites will start building a nation. It’ll come about as a by-product of their wanting to improve not literally the buildings they live in, but the social order, the common house of that elite. Whatever their taste or background, they’ll find they have interests that coincide. And that’s when a national elite will start to emerge, one whose interests are wider than those of a ruling bureaucracy governing a virtual, non-existent nation. One whose interests will be truly national.
We’ll have to wait until then to get a decent foreign policy, in my view.
Part 1 of this interview was originally published in openDemocracy.net
Part 2 of this interview was originally published in openDemocracy.net