Russia Suffers From a Security Deficit in Relations With NATO

Joint efforts by Russia and the EU, or Russia and NATO, to mediate specific regional conflicts could help build up the trust necessary to form a solid foundation for a new European security architecture.

published by
The Valdai Discussion Club
 on November 23, 2010

Source: The Valdai Discussion Club

Russia Suffers From a Security Deficit in RelationValdaiclub.com interview with Dmitri Trenin, director and chairman of the research council at the Carnegie Moscow Center, a subdivision of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
 
With the United States and Russia working to “reset” relations, do you think it’s possible, in a similar way, to reset relations between the post-Soviet countries and to reconfigure the roles of Russia and NATO in the European security architecture?
 
A reset in relations between post-Soviet republics has already begun. The reset announced by Russia and the United States was not a binding agreement like the START treaty – it was Barack Obama’s voluntary decision to abandon George W. Bush’s policy, which Moscow viewed as an attempt to oust Russia from its neighboring countries, to undermine Russian influence in post-Soviet republics. Therefore, I would say that situation has already been reset, and this has led to further positive changes.

The current U.S. administration has, in fact, halted NATO’s expansion and is not providing substantial military assistance or unqualified political support to Georgia. There are the fruits of the reset. Cooperation in the post-Soviet space has become a reality, for example in Kyrgyzstan.
 
As for the European security architecture – actually, I don’t like the term “architecture” here, because any piece of architecture must be built on a solid foundation. I believe that laying a solid foundation is more important than all the rhetoric about architecture. The foundation must be built on trust, and this is still missing in U.S.-Russian relations.

Moscow still has concerns over the United States’ long-term plans regarding Russia, such as the proposed missile defense system. Russia’s neighbors are also wary of its growing role in the region. Their fears are largely ungrounded, but they are a reality and have to be reckoned with. These, I believe, are the two central problems that prevent us from laying a foundation for a new European security architecture.
 
What are you views on NATO’s new path? How has the alliance’s attitude toward the Security Council and the UN as a whole changed? Has the new “comprehensive approach” smoothed over the controversy between NATO and the United Nations?
 
I believe NATO is once again trying to find its place in a rapidly changing world. It is trying to assure its members that they still need the alliance. NATO may have a confidence deficit now that the support of West European members for its operation in Afghanistan has waned. Therefore, NATO’s first priority is to find a new role for itself, and its second priority is to improve relations with Russia, as Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said.
 
NATO’s attitude toward the UN Security Council is largely shaped by Russia and China’s veto power. I don’t think anything has changed here. If there is a need, NATO is as prepared as ever to act on decisions of its member countries’ leaders. That is to say if an international conflict breaks out, NATO will act independently without waiting for UN approval and while ignoring a veto from Russia or China.
 
What do you think about the NATO-Russia Council’s role as a basic tool of cooperation and a safeguard of European and global security?
 
I do not think the NATO-Russia Council is a safeguard of global security, but it does play a global role. As for European security, the council does not reflect all countries with potential hotspots in Europe, especially considering the trust deficit between the partners. Russia suffers from a security deficit in relations with NATO and the United States; in a similar way, smaller countries in Eastern Europe have a security deficit in relations with Russia. There needs to be more trust.
 
New European and global challenges require new, effective tools to counter these threats. What kind of Russia-NATO partnership would most effectively resolve frozen territorial disputes between former Soviet countries?
 
Working together to achieve a peaceful settlement in Transnistria could mark the beginning of a true partnership. Joint efforts by Russia and the EU or Russia and NATO to mediate specific conflicts in the region could help build up mutual trust, which is the cornerstone of any partnership. Effective joint projects could bring our relations to a new level. We are already witnessing this kind of productive cooperation between Russia and NATO in Afghanistan. Similar efforts should be made in dealing with other shared problems.
 
Do you think it’s wise to pursue NATO-Russian cooperation on cyber security? How immanent is this threat at present?
 
This area of cooperation is not burdened by any Cold War-era experiences. If we do not start cooperating here, we might soon find ourselves opponents in cyber space, which would not be good at all. This problem is quite real and the threat is global, therefore everyone should be concerned. We should all cooperate to fight this threat.
 
Which of Russia’s strategies regarding NATO is the correct one?
 
I would like to emphasize two aspects of our strategy regarding NATO. The first is peace in Europe, because, despite all the rhetoric about strategic partnership and cooperation, Russia and the United States stopped just short of an open clash in the Black Sea two years ago. War could have broken out in the region. Peace can only be guaranteed by political efforts and negotiations between Russia and NATO. A security body should be formed with the participation of all European countries, especially those involved in frozen conflicts.

Second, NATO can play a role in reforming Russia’s army. When discussing modernization, we should not forget that it is not limited to optimization and rearming. It should also involve “modernizing” military personnel and changing their mentality, to escape the old confrontational clichés. NATO could be of help here, because they have had success organizing a next-generation army. Russia could learn from that experience. Joint military operations against piracy and other threats will promote NATO-Russia cooperation. By the way, I believe that the missile-defense issue has helped transform relations between Russia and the West from institutionalized hostility to real cooperation. This mechanism could also reassure our neighbors and avoid baseless panic in those countries.
 
Do you see Russia as a full member of the North Atlantic alliance in the medium term? 
 
No, I don’t. And there are two important reasons why I don’t. First, I do not expect Russia to join NATO, and second, I do not support this idea because Russia’s accession to the alliance would fuel tensions. These tensions won’t go away. They will come out at some other level.
 
NATO has an unofficial leader; for Russia to join NATO would mean to lose its strategic independence, which is highly important for our country. Since this is unacceptable, the inevitable haggling with the United States would continue, and this wouldn’t do anyone any good. Essentially Russia’s membership in NATO would turn the alliance into another OSCE with the same format of peaceful coexistence.
 
China would also be a problem, because Russia’s membership in NATO would seem to the Chinese like encirclement. This would inevitably cause tension in Russia-China relations, the last thing Russia needs, considering that the alliance would not be willing or able to protect the Russian-Chinese border. By joining NATO, Russia would be on a potential collision course with China, something Russia wouldn’t want to risk.
 
To summarize, Russia:
a) must maintain its strategic independence in any and all partnerships, be it with NATO or other partners;
b) must not turn NATO into another OSCE; and
c) shouldn’t provoke China.

This interview originally appeared on the Valdai Discussion Club site.

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.