in the media

Unrest in Iran

As unrest continues throughout the Middle East, members of the Iranian parliament have called for the execution of leading opposition figures and concerns are growing that Iranian regime will impose a brutal crackdown on protesters.

published by
CNN
 on February 20, 2011

Source: CNN

 ZAKARIA: The scene this week in Iran's parliament was unlike any we've ever seen before. Lawmakers were chanting death threats to opposition leaders and to a former president of the Islamic Republic. "Death to Mousavi, Karroubi and Khatami," they said, Khatami being a former president. This was in reaction to a new round of protests against the government in Tehran. 

 So can Iran be another Egypt? Joining me now are two top experts on Iran, Karim Sadjadpour is an associate of the Carnegie Endowment and is of Iranian extraction. As is Hooman Majd, an author and a journalist who now lives in New York. 
 
Karim, what is your sense? Where is the green revolution that didn't quite work in 2009 today? 
 
SADJADPOUR: Fareed, there's an old maxim about analysts and authoritarian regimes. We say that's while these regimes are in power, their collapse seems inconceivable. But after they've collapsed, we say that it was inevitable. 
 
And I think, Iran Islamic Republic is somehow at the crossroads of that maxim. In a sense that right now, I don't see this regime on the verge of collapse. At the same time, I don't see this regime's viability in the future. And I think -- 
 
ZAKARIA: You mean in the long term sense? 
 
SADJADPOUR: In the long term sense as well. 
 
ZAKARIA: Well, how do you read what's going on over the last week or two? 
 
HOOMAN MAJD, AUTHOR, " THE AYATOLLAH BEGS TO DIFFER": I mean, first of all, I think we have to remember, I mean, I would agree and it's impossible to predict what the long-term future of Iran is. But I think the thing to remember about Iran today is the regime, (INAUDIBLE), the system, whatever you want to call it, has a lot of support. Still has a tremendous amount of support. 
 
ZAKARIA: Describe the support. 
 
MAJD: Well, the support is obviously among the (INAUDIBLE). I can't give you numbers. I have no idea what the numbers are, but it still has a tremendous amount of support, including President Ahmadinejad himself, who still has a tremendous amount of support. 
 
ZAKARIA: You think the regime has a lot less support than meets the eye? 
 
SADJADPOUR: Yes. I would disagree with Hooman's characteristic that it has tremendous support. I think there's a couple of barometers. If it did have a tremendous support, they would allow journalists like yourself to go there and report. It will allow other reporters to go there and see what's happening. And I think they would allow people to freely assemble and see what happens. 
 
But what I would say is this, I don't think that they have very wide support, but I think the support they have is deep, meaning they have people who are very willing to kill and potentially die on behalf of the regime. 
 
And I think that was one distinction between the Islamic Republic and Egypt's Mubarak, meaning, the breadth of their support I think is fairly similar, but I think far more Iranians are willing to die -- 
 
ZAKARIA: Why? Why is that? 
 
SADJADPOUR: Well, I think that, you know, it's easier to compel people to kill on behalf of Islam than it is to kill on behalf of retaining Mubarak republic. 
 
The other thing is, I don't think people in Iran necessarily wake up in the morning thinking about democracy and thinking about human rights and thinking about having a secular system. But they do wake up in the morning thinking about the economy. Younger generation thinks about employment opportunities, older generation thinks about economic dignity. 
 
And if -- if this regime -- this Islamic Republic didn't provide people political freedoms, didn't provide people social freedoms, but they delivered on the economy, then I would agree with Hooman that they would have tremendous support. 
 
But when you deny people social freedoms, you deny people of political freedoms and you terribly mismanaged the economy, I'm not sure really what redeeming qualities this regime has. 
 
ZAKARIA: Hooman, when you look at what happened in Egypt and how Ahmadinejad tried to take credit for it and talked about as an Islamic awakening of sorts. He must be embarrassed by these protests. This must be awkward. 
 
MAJD: I don't think he is. I don't think -- neither he nor the -- not the ayatollahs who have taken credit or have said that this is a, you know, a continuation of the Islamic revolution. No, because they realize in my -- the way I see it, they realized that whatever happens in Egypt, whatever happens is going to be beneficial to Iran and not beneficial to the United States -
 
ZAKARIA: Why? 
 
MAJD: -- in a long term. Because they feel that a democratic -- even if it's -- if it's a democracy like turkey, which is a best case scenario for -- as far as we are concerned or as far as Israel is concerned, that is still beneficial to Iran. Iran and Egypt have had very bad relations. No diplomatic relations for over 30 years. Practically enemies. 
 
And whatever happens, the will of the people and if the will of the people in Egypt is reflected in the leadership, then it's going to be beneficial. Maybe only marginally beneficial, but even that marginal benefit is something that they would take great pride in. And say, look, as we see, whether it's Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen, Bahrain, now we're seeing all (INAUDIBLE). 
 
ZAKARIA: Democratic Arab countries will be more pro-Iranian or (INAUDIBLE)? 
 
MAJD: Virtually, every one of them, except for Syria, is anti- Iraq right now and we have seen this in WikiLeaks and everything. So I don't think they're terribly concerned about, you know, protests in Tehran or, you know, I'm not saying they shouldn't be. I'm just saying they aren't terribly concerned about protests in Tehran or in another city or the Green Movement. And I do believe -
 
ZAKARIA: But you don't see this protest as spiraling at all? 
 
MAJD: I don't, right now, no. I don't -- I don't see that. I think that there's a -- there's real dilemma for the leaders of the Green Movement. And, you know, they said that this was -- and these protests were going to be in support of the Egyptian people. 
 
What they turned into, which is what the government had always said they were, was an anti-regime protest, not just anti-Ahmadinejad protest, anti-regime process. 
 
So you saw people like Muslim (INAUDIBLE) -- 
 
ZAKARIA: But what is wrong with having anti-regime -
 
ZAKARIA: -- (INAUDIBLE). The public says that -
 
MAJD: Absolutely. 
 
ZAKARIA: -- is, you know, they have the majority support. Why not let the minority -
 
MAJD: Absolutely. But the view of the -- of the people in power in Iran, is that at a time, when the National Security of Iran is threatened by Israel, is threatened by United States, when they're (INAUDIBLE) of war that the country should bond together. 
 
This is their view. 
 
ZAKARIA: This is -- right. 
 
MAJD: Yes. 
 
ZAKARIA: How would you respond finally this war? 
 
SADJADPOUR: What I would say, Fareed, is that the predominant narrative of the last three decades in the Middle East has been about Arabs being inspired by Iranian theocracy. Suddenly, that's been turned on his head. 
 
We're now talking about Iranian being inspired by potentially Arab democracy. And for me what's interesting is that, you know, I traveled a lot in the Arab world. I live in Beirut. I go frequently to Cairo. And whenever I go to the Arab World, I tell people I'm Iranian. They always start to praise Ahmadinejad. 
 
I think what we're seeing now is that Arab popular support, expressions of support for Iran are akin to Latin America populist support for Castro's Cuba in the '60s and '70s. European Intellectuals Popular Support for the Soviet Union in the 1950s. 
 
Iran is this defiant political order, which they admire from afar but which they don't wish upon themselves. 
 
ZAKARIA: On that note, Karim, Hooman, a fascinating discussion. We will of course follow it. 
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.