Source: Asian Age
Pakistan's National SovereigntyAshley J. Tellis is an influential American foreign and international security policy expert, and is currently senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, DC. He has previously served as senior adviser to the US ambassador in New Delhi, and on the National Security Council staff as special assistant to the President and senior director for Strategic Planning and Southwest Asia. In this email interview with Anand K. Sahay, Dr Tellis does not visualise Pakistan making a fundamental break with the past although it is under international scrutiny after the death of Al Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden. “Even as you read this”, he says, “you can be certain that the ISI is reviewing its tradecraft, assessing its vulnerabilities, and moving and burying its assets more deeply than before. This is a cat and mouse game and the ISI is very good at playing it”.
Q. In Pakistan, people are raising questions about the breach of their sovereignty in the recent Abbottabad operation of the Americans. Why do you think they are not angry about the sheltering of Osama bin Laden by the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)?
A. The Pakistani concern about sovereignty is understandable, but curious. The essence of sovereignty is the ability of a state to maintain control over what is happening within its borders. If Pakistan truly did not know about Bin Laden’s presence in Abbottabad — as it has claimed — its claims about sovereignty are rendered suspect.
If some elements of the Pakistani state, in fact, sheltered Bin Laden, as is likely, then the issue is not sovereignty, but a violation of international responsibility. Thankfully, there are many thoughtful Pakistanis asking the right questions about their country’s role in the affair, but the danger is that they will be drowned out by the ghairat (pride) brigade.
Q. Conceptually, America was at war with Al Qaeda and its chief after September 11, 2001, but not with Pakistan, a valued “strategic ally”. Then, is there a justification for crossing into Pakistan territory without prior permission?
A. This is less a legal question than a political one. In an ideal world, the United States would have no reason to operate inside Pakistan at all because Islamabad, consistent with its international obligations and the responsibilities owed to the global coalition against terrorism, would police its own homeland and apprehend the terrorists who have enjoyed sanctuary within.
Since Pakistan has been either unable or unwilling to do this, the US has little choice but to protect its own security and look after its own interests — sometimes through the use of exceptional means as was demonstrated in the mission against Bin Laden.
Q. There has been no substantive official Indian reaction to the killing of Bin Laden. Some here believe that Bin Laden and Al Qaeda have to do with the US, not with us. Is such thinking sustainable?
A. I think the Indian reticence has more to do with international politics and not the factual question of whether Bin Laden was a threat to India. Most Government of India officials will admit that although Al Qaeda did not target India as a priority, the terrorist campaign that it launched spawned numerous terrorist affiliates that most certainly targeted India.
Clearly, Indian officials have heaved a sigh of relief that the US has taken Bin Laden down and they feel more than a little vindicated that the operation in Abbottabad corroborates what they have been saying all along: that Pakistan is terrorism-central. Because the world now recognises this so clearly, the Government of India does not need to make the point too vociferously.
Q. Should methods similar to those used against Bin Laden be applied to the Taliban leadership and other high-value international terrorists like Dawood Ibrahim?
A. While it would be great if the methods used against Bin Laden could be applied to the Quetta Shura, the fact is that it will be hard to replicate this achievement easily — and the Pakistani Army knows it. The operation against Bin Laden was extremely time consuming, highly resource intensive and extraordinarily risky. It is wonderful that we succeeded this time around, but one cannot count on such successes consistently.
Even as you read this, you can be certain that the ISI is reviewing its tradecraft, assessing its vulnerabilities and moving and burying its assets more deeply than before. This is a cat and mouse game and the ISI is very good at playing it.
While I think the US has exceptional special operations capabilities, the fact is that they are limited relative to the number of nasty targets out there — so they will be used sparingly and only when the stakes are high and success appears probable.
Q. “Justice has been done”, US President Barack Obama declared after Bin Laden’s death. Do you see a post-US Afghanistan in the foreseeable future?
A. No. The US will remain engaged in Afghanistan for a long time because the war there is not won, and while Bin Laden is dead, what he spawned there still lives.
Q. In American and Western calculations, more generally, there has been an implied centrality for Pakistan in a post-US Afghanistan. Was privileging Pakistan in setting the contours of a new Afghan politics valid, given Islamabad’s track record? Is it valid now when we know they sheltered Bin Laden?
A. I think Pakistan is central to success in Afghanistan because of political reality, not because of American preferences. Yet, the United States has not ceded to Pakistan control of the “end game” — a useful but inappropriate word — going forward. The Afghans would not stand for it, nor would India. And if, at least, those two countries demur, the policy would fail. The Obama administration understands this clearly.
Q. Should India remain engaged in Afghanistan? If so, what forms should this take?
A. India should remain engaged in Afghanistan as long as, and in whatever form, the Afghans desire it.
Q. Do you visualise Pakistan making a fundamental break with the past, now that it is under international scrutiny for housing Bin Laden?
A. No.
Q. After Abbottabad, do you think new forces might come into play that will help India extradite terrorists such as Dawood Ibrahim from Pakistan, and also those who were responsible for the 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks?
A. Unfortunately, no.
Q. After Abbottabad, what should India’s regional politics be for the AfPak zone?
A. The same as before. Work with the US and the government of Afghanistan to stand up a robust Afghan state that is capable of looking after itself and its own interests.