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Source: Getty

In The Media
Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center

United Russia's Primaries

The regional primaries for the State Duma elections in December demonstrate a growing intra-party democracy and political competition that will likely aid United Russia in holding onto its Duma majority, although it will not solve the problem of United Russia’s declining legitimacy.

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By Nikolay Petrov
Published on Jul 19, 2011

Source: The Moscow Times

United Russia's PrimariesRussia’s primaries in the regions will start this week, with Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s All-Russia People’s Front dominating the political landscape. The ruling party’s list of candidates for State Duma elections in December will be based on the results of this initial stage of voting. The list of candidates for the primaries was developed at the local level, but the front’s federal coordinating council, headed by Deputy Prime Minister Vyacheslav Volodin and his staff, will formulate the final lists.

It would be an exaggeration to call these actual primaries. The process more closely resembles a series of opinion polls, with United Russia using the results to create its party lists for elections to the Duma, where the front’s candidates should receive one-fourth of the seats.

In reality, there is no obligation at all to base the final candidate lists on the results of the primaries. The front’s regional coordinating council will give final approval to a special list of authorized individuals from United Russia and nongovernmental organizations who will participate in the primaries.

After the primaries end on Aug. 11, the results will be sent to Moscow for fine-tuning, with regional United Russia conferences then choosing delegates to the party’s national congress and submitting their proposals for the list of candidates. At that point, Putin will make his changes to the list before submitting it to a United Russia national congress on Sept. 3-4 for confirmation.

But it is already apparent that many United Russia politicians will be culled from the lists. As far back as early May, it was known that incumbent deputies would only make it onto the lists if they had not outworn their popularity by serving three or more terms in the Duma, if they had not been involved in any public scandals, or if they had contributed to the advancement of the party in some way and had not simply used United Russia for personal gain.

Major personnel shifts have already taken place since the last elections, most notably among the corps of governors. The result is that a host of Duma deputies whose political fortunes were linked to former Mayor Yury Luzhkov and former Bashkortostan President Murtaza Rakhimov will also be absent from the upcoming elections. In Moscow, 10 of the 16 incumbent deputies will not participate in the primaries, and the same fate awaits about one-fourth of all incumbent United Russia deputies. Putin is determined to get rid of the party’s deadweight.

In the most troubled regions, United Russia is employing the tactic of heading party lists with deputy prime ministers or Putin-appointed ministers on whose coattails other candidates can ride and whose names elicit the least negative reaction among voters. At the same time, the number of regional leaders heading party lists in their own regions has dropped substantially.

Even in this Russian version of primaries in which Moscow remains the ultimate arbiter, it is possible to discern a certain growth of intra-party democracy and political competition. The problem is that however well these tactics might enable the ruling party to hold onto its Duma majority, they will not solve the problem of its declining legitimacy — an issue that will come to the fore after the new government is formed in 2012.

This article originally appeared in The Moscow Times.

About the Author

Nikolay Petrov

Former Scholar-in-Residence, Society and Regions Program, Moscow Center

Nikolay Petrov was the chair of the Carnegie Moscow Center’s Society and Regions Program. Until 2006, he also worked at the Institute of Geography at the Russian Academy of Sciences, where he started to work in 1982.

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Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.

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