Possible Consequences with Iran

With the release of a new IAEA report on Iran, leaders of the world’s countries should examine the consequences of two possibilities: a war between Iran and the United States, or Iran turning into a small nuclear power. An alternative in which Tehran stops at the nuclear threshold seems less realistic at the moment.

published by
Kommersant
 on November 10, 2011

Source: Kommersant

Possible Consequences with IranIt is unlikely that any serious analysts think Iran’s nuclear program isn’t oriented toward at least giving Tehran the ability to manufacture a nuclear weapon. In principle, two options appear possible in the not-so-distant future: Iran, with a “bomb in the basement,” or stopping just half-a-step—for example six months—away from producing a nuclear weapon. In both cases, Iran would still possess medium-range missile systems and the ability to deliver a nuclear warhead to targets in the Middle East and a significant portion of Europe.

The real question facing the heads of the world powers is not what Iran is really doing, but instead, what to do with Iran. Barack Obama, in the very beginning of his presidential term, attempted to begin a dialogue with Tehran that did not work out due to insufficient determination on the part of Washington, political instability in Iran, and later an intense domestic political struggle in the Islamic Republic, which continues to this day. Conducting an operation that introduced the Stuxnet virus into Iranian computer systems—apparently from Israel and the United States—did buy the Americans some time, but that time has since run out.

America’s allies—Israel and Saudi Arabia—are increasingly pushing Washington to act decisively, as are Obama’s Republican critics, who are urging the president to use force. The U.S. administration, however, is not yet ready to make a decision to strike Iranian nuclear facilities. The White House understands what consequences a military strike would have on its own position in the region and on the international situation as a whole. Instead of bombs and cruise missiles, Washington is still emphasizing UN sanctions. The problem is that despite the new IAEA report, Russia and China will not support new sanctions, which means that there will be no UN resolution. Moscow and Beijing regard additional sanctions as paving the path to war.

The situation is clearly bad. Too many stakeholders are striving for war, despite the unlikelihood of it resolving the Iranian nuclear problem. Several players within Iran are also betting on a turn for the worse. At the same time, President Obama, while still resisting pressure from several directions, cannot allow Iran to become a de-facto nuclear power during his presidency. The current stir around the recently released report does not mean a war is imminent. It is still possible that Obama can avoid making the same kind of mistake, albeit a more serious one, that his predecessor, George Bush, did when invading Iraq. It is time, however, to seriously calculate the consequences of two possible variants: a war between the United States and Iran, or Iran turning into a small nuclear power. An alternative in which Iran stops within a half-step of the bomb in exchange for security guarantees and the normalization of relations with the West, at the moment, seems to be less realistic.

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