Source: Finnish Journal of Foreign Affairs

The upcoming parliamentary elections in Ukraine are important, especially in the context of the post-Soviet space, as they show how the system functions. Ukraine had free and fair elections in both 2005 and 2010 and this fall Ukrainians will go to the polls yet again. However, with the overall democratic decline that has taken place over the last two years, these elections—irrespective of the results—are unlikely to change the course of affairs. The stakes for the current president are high. Losing power now will likely spell defeat in the presidential election in 2015. While observing the elections in Ukraine is important, the key question is what comes after them. The answer to this question does not look promising.

Pre-election Games

Ukrainian parliamentary elections are scheduled for October 28. They will be held according to the new electoral law adopted in November 2011. This brings back the mixed system, with 50 percent of the parliament being elected via party lists and the remaining half through single mandates. The law also bans party blocks and raises the electoral threshold from 3 to 5 percent.

Unlike local elections in 2010, where the rules were changed just weeks before the vote, this law was adopted well in advance. Those primarily affected by the changes—the opposition—managed to recover. After a long period of mutual distrust, Yulia Tymoshenko’s Batkivschyna (Fatherland) party and Arsenii Yatsenyuk’s Front zmin (Front of Change) party merged. With Tymoshenko in prison, Yatsenyuk has taken the lead.

While there could be many justifications for adopting this law, not least of which is the Venice Commission’s endless calls for electoral reform, the current draft has one clear rationale. President Yanukovych wants to cement his position in Ukraine. The electoral law is merely another means of achieving this—along with amendments to the constitution redistributing power from the parliament to the president, and reforms that subordinated the judiciary to the presidential administration.

The new law clearly favors those with the money and administrative resources—the president’s Party of Regions (PoR). However, the law does not guarantee the  result of the elections. To obtain a majority, the PoR will either have to buy voters, or simply coerce the results. The bribery of voters has already begun. The government is paying for a number of social initiatives that the president announced before the elections. So-called “independent” candidates are distributing food parcels to potential supporters.

The current administration is using other means to influence the results. The Constitutional Court, which is controlled by the presidential administration, was used to limit the chances of the opposition by banning one candidate from running either on a party list or in a district. The court also banned the holders of Ukrainian passports abroad—who tend to support the Orange politicians—from voting for single mandate candidates.

When dividing the country into districts, Ukraine’s central electoral committee did not always follow the logic of administrative maps. Some districts reflect the areas where certain businessmen—who also happen to be running for parliament—have factories, and hence, grateful voters.

Lastly, the authorities started attacks on independent media. The leadership of the TVi television channel and Levyi Bereg, an internet newspaper, have both faced charges from the prosecutor-general’s office in the past months.

The Uncertainty of Results

The results of this year’s elections remain unclear. Forty-five percent of Ukrainians are still undecided about whom to cast their vote for. Some may stay home, recent polls indicating that 46 percent of Ukrainians do not believe in elections as an effective instrument.¹

Some undecided voters may opt for one of the smaller parties, such as Vitali Klitchko’s Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reform (UDAR) party and Natalia Korolevska’s “Ukraina–vpered!” (“Ukraine – Forward”), this campaign’s newcomers. Both claim to be new generation parties, running against the PoR and the old opposition. However, their agendas remain unclear and the latter is rumored to be a creation of the presidential administration supported by PoR MP and oligarch Rinat Akhmetov.

The elections’ frontrunners—the PoR and Batkivschyna—may draw up to 20 percent of their votes from their base constituencies according to polls by the Kyiv-based Razumkov centre. Support for the PoR will come from the east and south, and for Batkivschyna from the west and center of Ukraine.

According to the latest opinion polls, the united opposition is leading the PoR by between 1.5 and 5 percent. Yet, it is not clear if Batkivschyna will manage to capitalize on the merger of Tymoshenko and Yatseniuk’s supporters. The PoR has had problems with its base due to the inability of president Yanukovych to deliver on his 2010 promises. While traditional PoR voters are unlikely to support the old opposition, they may support the Communists or Natalia Korolevska’s party. This uncertainty raises the stakes for the PoR and may push the administration to resort to electoral fraud. Sixty-one percent of Ukrainian experts currently believe this will be the case.²

The results may also be affected by the state of economy and Yulia Tymoshenko. So far, the government has seemed to be careful to not rock the boat with the economy. Yet, this may prove difficult if the crisis deepens. Without the next tranche of support from the International Monetary Fund and with Russia likely to call in its loans, the authorities may face an unhappy electorate. While Tymoshenko enjoys little popular support—sympathy for her personally should not be confused with readiness to stand up against her prosecution—a worsening of her health or further criminal prosecutions against her may push undecided voters to support the opposition.

The post-elections rush

Sources within the current administration suggest that if the results go against the PoR, it will put pressure on opposition and single mandated MPs. The aim would be to get a constitutional majority to change the constitution and move the presidential elections to the parliament.

The united opposition is trying to prevent this. Party lists have been cleaned of potential turncoats. Batkivschyna members, including those running in the districts, swore loyalty at the last party congress. Yet, this may prove difficult to enforce, as there are no legal consequences for defectors.

According to the constitution, the parliament is basically irrelevant and the president calls the shots. Even if the opposition forms the majority, it will have difficulties overcoming the president’s veto or reversing constitutional, judicial, and other reforms that enabled the president to create a strong power vertical. The majority will not be able to influence the nominations of the prime minister and other government members.  The only viable power it will enjoy is the appointment of the chairman of the Accounting Chamber. In Ukrainian reality, however, this means almost nothing.

The attention will thus be set on the 2015 presidential elections that will either make or break Ukraine.

What does this mean for the EU?

For the EU, the Ukrainian parliamentary elections are one of three benchmarks for the normalization of relations with Kyiv. The other two being the release of imprisoned opposition leaders and their colleagues, and reform of the judiciary and constitution along the lines specified by the Council of Europe. The EU will have to admit one simple truth. The elections, even perfectly conducted, will not change Ukraine’s systemic error. A drastic change of the elite across the entire political spectrum is needed to set Ukraine on the right path. Whether the EU will be willing to admit that and assist this process remains an open question.

^{1 Democratic Initiative Foundation, “Election Campaign 2012: expectations and threats”, press release, July 30, 2012}

^{2 Ibid}

This article originally appeared in the Finnish Journal of Foreign Affairs.