Dmitri Trenin
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21st Century Great Game as a New Normal
The 25-year-long quest for Russia's integration with the West is off. A new normalcy is setting between Russia and the West resembles the Russo-British Great Game of the 19th century—this time between America and Russia.
In my discussions about Russia and the West in London last week, a sense of the end of an era was palpable. The 25-year-long quest for Russia's integration with the West is off, at least for the foreseeable future, everyone agreed. Russia is pivoting to itself, to its partners in Eurasia, and to Asia. Ukraine symbolizes the new period of intense rivalry between Russia and the West.
Interestingly, this conclusion is accompanied by some regret, but not too much alarm. While "Mr. Putin's motives and strategies" are often believed to be a mystery, there is no fear of an impending armed conflict involving Russia and the West. Ukraine is seen as remaining unstable for some time. Vladimir Putin has certainly won no friends in Western Europe, but a new cold war is not believed to be on the cards unless Russia goes on to destabilize the Baltics, which everyone, except the Balts themselves, thinks is a very long shot.
Appetite for Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova drawing closer to the EU is very light. The disappointment which followed the 2004 Orange revolution has made people more cautious. There is particularly little willingness to foot Ukraine's bills. And there is absolutely no support for Ukraine's NATO membership. The business community is concerned about the effect of the sanctions, but it also tends to be pragmatic. It is now time to buy, while the Russian stock is low.
Russia and Ukraine no longer dominate the foreign policy debate. Other issues have come to the fore, such as the rise of extremists in Iraq and Syria, and most recently Britain's relations with the European Union. This does not suggest that things will get back to where they were between Russia and the West, but rather that a new normalcy is setting in, which will probably resemble the Russo-British Great Game of the 19th century—this time between America and Russia, and under conditions of globalization—than the 20th century Cold War between communism and capitalism.
About the Author
Former Director, Carnegie Moscow Center
Trenin was director of the Carnegie Moscow Center from 2008 to early 2022.
- Mapping Russia’s New Approach to the Post-Soviet SpaceCommentary
- What a Week of Talks Between Russia and the West RevealedCommentary
Dmitri Trenin
Recent Work
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
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