Uncertain Perspectives for the Syria Talks in Moscow

At first glance the main impetus for holding the negotiations is not a bad one. The meeting has two likely goals. On the one hand, the Russian authorities would like to make another attempt at launching dialogue between Damascus and its opponents. This is especially important now that the Syrian government and opposition forces both face the threat of the Islamic State (IS), but instead of joining to fight this arch-enemy they continue to weaken one another through continuous fighting. On the other hand, the Russians would like to resolve one of the main problems that has plagued negotiations between Damascus and the opposition: namely, the factionalism of the latter. It is not a coincidence that Moscow has arranged the talks in two stages: the dialogue between the Syrian government and its opponents will take place only on the meeting’s second day, while the first day will be devoted completely to consultations between different opposition groups in order to provide them with time to work out a joint position on the negotiations with Damascus. As stated in the Russian media, Moscow has already forwarded invitations to about thirty different people representing a variety of opposition forces. 

Yet, gathering the representatives of all non-jihadist groups of anti-Assad fighters in Moscow will probably remain a dream of the Russian government, and nothing more. Even the reserved blessing of the meeting by the Americans will not change this. Thus, while the representatives of the National Coordination Council and some other members of the moderate inner opposition are ready to participate in Moscow, the external opposition (most importantly, the National Coalition for Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces) has excluded the possibility of participation. Those who have decided to ignore the meeting in the Russian capital have a few motivations. First, as Khaled Khoja, head of the Syrian National Coalition, has said, contact between the different groups in the Syrian opposition has already been established, so there is no need to meet in Moscow to do this. Secondly, for the majority of the opposition it is still hard to recognize Assad as a legitimate participant to negotiations on Syria and its future. Thirdly, opposition members are confused by the fact that the Russian initiative seems an attempt to reset negotiations on Syria and start the discussion from scratch. According to Khoja’s predecessor, Hadi al-Bahra, participation in the Moscow meeting would mean that all previous agreements are put aside and any progress achieved is forgotten (although there is scant evidence of any such progress). Finally, the Russian government is considered to be involved in the conflict. As a result, members of the Syrian opposition raise the logical question as to whether Moscow will be able to arrange a comfortable negotiation environment for all participants, and not only for those representing Damascus? Moreover, as stated by a number of regional analysts, some parts of the opposition still believe that only a military solution in Syria is possible.

Official Damascus may also not be so keen on this meeting in Moscow. The reaction of Assad to the Russian initiative was relatively modest. He emphasized that the Syrian authorities welcome the Kremlin’s proposal and will definitely send their representatives. However, Assad said that Damascus will accept any outcome of Moscow’s meeting, including the negotiations’ failure. Moreover, he stated that the Syrian government’s delegation will come to Russia not in order to begin dialogue, but in order to understand whether starting a dialogue is generally possible. There are a number of reasons for Damascus to be reluctant about the outcome of talks. For now, its military forces remain quite effective. External intervention has been removed from the political agendas of the United States and the EU. Finally, the rise of IS compels some Western politicians to reconsider their vision of Assad and speak of Damascus as a partner in the anti-jihadist battle.

Does this all mean that the initiative of Moscow is futile? Obviously not. A bad peace is always better than a good quarrel, and in order to reach this peace the sides must talk. Moscow provides a space for the belligerents to see whether the gap between them can be bridged. Apart from that, the decision of the external opposition to ignore the meeting does not guarantee its complete failure. Sources in Moscow say that a number of members of the opposition inside Syria are planning to attend and that they may start dialogue with Damascus.