Ariel (Eli) Levite, Toby Dalton
{
"authors": [
"Ariel (Eli) Levite"
],
"type": "legacyinthemedia",
"centerAffiliationAll": "dc",
"centers": [
"Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
"Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center"
],
"collections": [
"Iranian Proliferation",
"U.S. Nuclear Policy"
],
"englishNewsletterAll": "ctw",
"nonEnglishNewsletterAll": "",
"primaryCenter": "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
"programAffiliation": "NPP",
"programs": [
"Nuclear Policy"
],
"projects": [],
"regions": [
"North America",
"United States",
"Middle East",
"Iran"
],
"topics": [
"Political Reform",
"Nuclear Policy",
"Arms Control"
]
}Source: Getty
The Negotiations on Iran’s Nuclear Program
If the parties’ opening positions are used as benchmarks, the parameters of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action favor Iran. If the deal is seen through the lenses of their strategic objectives, the picture is far more nuanced.
Source: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
The ink has barely dried on the recent “Parameters” for a “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action” (JCPOA), which itself is merely another interim step en route to a fully-fledged comprehensive agreement that may or may not be reached by the end of June and which, furthermore, even if concluded could (certainly if judged in light of the previous agreements with Iran) significantly deviate from its current composition. Already, predictably conflicting narratives between Iran and the US have emerged on what was agreed upon in Lausanne, raising serious questions whether the parameters of the deal as described will survive the ongoing negotiations. Under these circumstances it is challenging to provide a definitive assessment of the agreement in hand.
Nevertheless, how does it look? In our judgment a great deal depends on one’s vantage point. If one is persuaded that the agreement averted imminent Iranian nuclearization and that such prospect would have inevitably unleashed war with Iran, then almost any deal seems preferable. If on the other hand you believe that Iran was not about to resume its pre-2003 Manhattan -type nuclear weapons program and war was a remote prospect, then time need not have been of the essence for the P-5, which in turn casts the achieved outcome in much less favorable light the outcome achieved.This article was published in full in the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs.
About the Author
Senior Fellow, Nuclear Policy Program, Technology and International Affairs Program
Levite was the principal deputy director general for policy at the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission from 2002 to 2007.
- Demystifying the Nuclear ThresholdPaper
- Promoting Responsible Nuclear Energy Conduct: An Agenda for International CooperationArticle
Ariel (Eli) Levite, Toby Dalton
Recent Work
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
More Work from Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- The U.S. and China Need an AI Hotline. Here’s How to Build It.Commentary
It should address the shortcomings of previous crisis communication efforts and adapt to the demands of frontier AI.
Lucy Luo
- Leaving Russian-Speakers Without Representation Is a Risk for LatviaCommentary
If the Russian-speaking community in Latvia cannot articulate their interests without being seen as disloyal, they could end up embracing a pro-Kremlin agenda.
Sergejs Potapkins
- The UN Isn’t Declining. It’s Decomposing.Commentary
Washington’s decision to support some UN functions while letting others wither is pulling the organization apart at the seams.
Stewart Patrick, Theodore Zaritsky
- 2026 Carnegie California AI SurveyPaper
While there are notable demographic, economic, and geographic divides over AI, there is also substantial alignment between Republicans and Democrats.
- +2
Ian Klaus, Mark Baldassare, Rachel George, …
- Putin Has Been a Hindrance, Not a Help, to United Russia’s Election CampaignCommentary
Russia’s ruling party would have benefited from Putin appearing as its distant patron, but as an active frontman imposing his views on the public, he has done nothing but harm both the party’s election campaign and the ruling system overall.
Andrey Pertsev