Security sector reform remains a crucial transitional issue for many Arab states. But amid rising terror threats, including the Islamic State and its affiliate groups operating across the region, the risk is that meaningful reform is delayed indefinitely.
For the region’s often bloated and corrupt security apparatuses, they must find a way to balance the dual challenge of maintaining order and reforming their worst excesses. Given that heavy-handed policing was a main grievance of the 2011 Arab uprisings, the failure to improve policing and security practices may again stir up discontent and jeopardize the long term stability of this region.
Four experts offer insights on security sector reform in various Arab states. Please join the discussion by sharing your own views in the comments section.
Bahrain’s Sectarian Police Force
Staci Strobl
Staci Strobl, associate professor and chair of the Criminal Justice department at the University of Wisconsin–Platteville.
The June 16 imprisonment of Bahraini opposition leader Sheikh Ali Salman, one of the main symbols of hope for the marginalized Shia, recently sparked a new round of nonviolent protests that drew thousands into the streets. Salman’s jailing last month has shown that policing in the tiny Gulf state continues to be heavy-handed, sectarian, and contrary to the government’s slick public relations machine that alleges otherwise.
In 2011, the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry found that police were responsible for deaths during the Arab uprisings, including five people who were killed by police torture. The regime responded by declaring a number of reforms, such as creating a Special Investigations Unit to address police abuses, establishing a police ombudsperson, reportedly bolstering community-oriented policing, and installing video cameras in interview rooms.
Yet most human rights groups and scholars following the reforms have concluded that they have been superficial or unfulfilled entirely. In addition, the proposed Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) regional police force is working closely with Bahraini Interior Minister Lieutenant-General Sheikh Rashid bin Abdulla Al Khalifa, interpreting its main mandate as combating internal terrorist threats in Bahrain—which often includes the political opposition. But such a regional force would more resolutely expand the powers of the GCC from being an alliance of countries focused on external security threats through its members’ military forces to having a civilian police force ready to put down member countries’ political oppositions on command. The precursor to this proposed force was the deployment of GCC militaries in Bahrain to squash anti-government demonstrations during the 2011 Arab uprisings.
Meanwhile, meaningful steps like increasing the scant representation of non-Sunni Bahrainis in the national police force have not been undertaken. Instead, many Shia officers have been dismissed since 2011 under dubious circumstances, and heavy-handed police responses to non-violent demonstrations have continued at a steady pace for over four years.
A recent Washington Post editorial correctly surmised that Bahraini leaders have “sized up the [political] situation with particular cynicism,” realizing that any U.S. calls for reform are mere lip service as long as the Obama administration remains more concerned about balancing Iranian influence and shoring up the support of Gulf Sunni monarchies in exchange for their cooperation fighting against the Islamic State. Unfortunately, the U.S. administration has lifted its weapons ban (which had been in place since 2011), even as it concedes that the human rights situation in Bahrain is less than adequate.
It is no surprise then that calls for the United States to hold the Bahraini police accountable, such as Human Rights First’s recommendations last winter for police reform, have fallen on deaf ears. These demands included U.S. pressure to release statistics on Sunni and Shia representation in the police force, a plan to recruit more non-Sunni officers, and a comprehensive joint-training program in human rights, which would bring in Shia community leaders as joint-trainers of the force.
Such joint training involves important work that aims to chip away at discriminatory police institutional culture and transform social attitudes among the broader public. Because policing is largely an order-maintenance function, popular notions about which social groups are dangerous are a huge factor in police decisionmaking. Even in countries considered to have a strong commitment to the rule of law—such as the United States—we see how police forces can become occupational, subcultural concentrates of larger, discriminatory attitudes in society, such as the pattern of racist policing in Ferguson, Missouri.
As I have argued elsewhere, Bahraini policing has long been characterized by politically sectarian policies and deployment strategies—with the police force serving as the enforcement arm of the state’s discriminatory notions of social and political order. More forcefully tying U.S.-provided equipment to a better human rights record is fundamental to solving Bahrain’s crisis, and U.S. pressure is desperately needed for Bahrain to initiate genuine police reform and counter a culture of Shia punishment.
Lebanon’s Sensible Pilot Projects
Alan McCrum
Alan McCrum, senior associate at Siren Associates.
Despite ongoing changes in the state security structure, Lebanon has not engaged in an all-encompassing security sector reform. The absence of a functioning government has spawned a number of foreign donor initiatives in its place, but many of these programs overstate their objectives and are driven more by donor interests than those of the beneficiaries they are meant to serve.
There are, however, beacons of hope. The introduction of an Internal Security Forces (ISF) Code of Conduct, predicated on the standards of the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), is a significant development. So too is the establishment of a community-policing model in Ras Beirut, which has enabled local cultural change and greater levels of integrity, ownership, and officer initiative. This is demonstrated by arrests of individuals who blatantly tried to bribe Ras Beirut officers.1
The ISF has also introduced its first local policing analysis unit in Ras Beirut, developed by local officers and supported by a donor who worked collaboratively with the officers to help create ownership and pride. For the first time in the ISF’s history, formal selection and recruitment techniques were utilized to ensure merit-based selection—and team-based officer training then supported this. The early results have been extremely encouraging; in the first twelve months of the project the local crime rate was reduced by 40 percent, traffic violations decreased by 20 percent, and there was a substantial decrease in levels of “antisocial behavior.” The analysis unit identified key areas of learning and areas of weakness and good practice, and for the first time there was real internal collaboration.
The challenge ahead will be moving from this island of excellence to a center of excellence across Beirut and then throughout Lebanon. Much work needs to be done to consolidate and mainstream this new community policing philosophy. The effective use of community policing and community engagement, which is accepted broadly in the United Kingdom as a critical success factor in support of its counter-terrorism strategy (CONTEST), suggests that building and enhancing community policing should increase the resilience of communities to violent extremism, help prevent individuals from becoming “terrorists,” and develop the rule of law, all of which are critical to counterterrorism efforts.
Within security sector reform, it is important to recognize that counterterrorism, human rights, and community policing are not mutually exclusive. Counterterrorism measures need human rights standards to ensure that their implementation does not undermine their very purpose, which is to protect and maintain a democratic society. Fundamentally, security sector reform in Lebanon cannot solve many of the profound gaps in political legitimacy that lead to security deficits and to violence there, but it can make an important contribution to changing the behavior and attitudes about the relationship between power and people. To do so, at its core security sector reform must have principles of public legitimacy, accountability, and transparency. The aim now is to build on local measures—like those in Ras Beirut—that have already been proven successful.
1. Based on interviews conducted at the Ras Beirut police station.
Yemen’s Patronage Problem
Joana Cook
Joana Cook, PhD candidate in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London and editor-in-chief of its peer-reviewed blog and journal, Strife.
Yemen’s security sector, much like its political system, has historically reflected the niche interests of its ruling elite, thriving on a system of patronage and corruption. It has also been used to promote personal political agendas, most significantly that of former president Ali Abdullah Saleh. But the lack of independent government control over state security forces, which are now being used to advance the narrow interests of Saleh and the Houthis, is exacerbating the current conflict.
Security sector reform in Yemen is a long-term project that has not yet had the time or consensus to develop there. Historically, corruption has been rampant, particularly through the use of “ghost soldiers,” which often lined the pockets of unit commanders. Some estimates note that up to one-third of soldiers existed on paper only. There was also a lack of democratic oversight and civilian control of these forces, and units such as the Central Security Forces and the Counterterrorism Unit reported directly to the president, who would often use them to advance his own interests. Other problems included a lack of professionalization and unified command structure, a lack of separation between security agencies and political interests, and the use of the security forces to squash political dissent, as occurred during the 2011 protests.
In response to the 2011 unrest, the Gulf Cooperation Council established a Committee on Military Affairs for Achieving Security that same year. Subsequent UN Security Council resolutions, including UNSC 2014 (2011), called on the government to end the security forces’ attacks against civilians. Resolution 2051 (2012) emphasized restructuring the security and armed forces under a unified leadership, and reforming how senior appointments are made to the security sector and armed forces. The National Dialogue Conference, which commenced in March 2013, also had a working group dedicated to clarifying the role of security institutions within the state. Together, these measures emphasized a shift toward security policies that would be laid out by democratic leadership and would work in the interests of the population at large.
A number of important steps were also taken by President Abd Rabu Mansour Hadi to realign security institutions with transitional concerns. In April 2012, twenty of Saleh’s relatives were removed from senior security sector positions in a move to transfer the security leadership to democratic, as opposed to familial, control. In August 2012, the Republican Guard was reduced and a new military unit, the Presidential Protective Forces, was formed from reassigned units of the Republican Guard and commanded by relatives of Saleh. The Presidential Protection Forces came under the direct jurisdiction of the presidency, and its establishment transferred a unit away from Major-General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar and President Saleh’s son Ahmed—which helped to further minimize personal political control.
In December 2012, both the Republican Guard and the 1st Armored Division (Firqa) led by Ali Mohsen were fully disbanded so that forces could instead be organized on a regional basis. The Central Security Forces was renamed the Special Security Forces to try to distance itself from the previous unit, which had been controversial. An Inspector General’s Office was also established to address human rights, corruption, and police violations within the Ministry of Interior. However, renaming these institutions and replacing top leaders did not ultimately transfer troops’ and mid-level leadership’s loyalty and trust to the newly elected government. The security forces continue to be used to promote the narrow political interests of the ousted regime and its partners.
Far-reaching security sector reform—emphasizing civilian interests, policy-making control and oversight, the disengagement of security forces from personal political agendas, and the professionalization of forces—is integral to a lasting solution to Yemen’s current crisis. The draft constitution that was released in February 2015 provides a recognized framework to start from. Few other options exist for a country mired in an ongoing and bloody conflict.
Tunisia Postpones Security Sector Reform
Chahrazed Ben Hamida
Chahrazed Ben Hamida, a doctoral researcher at the University of Carthage-Tunisia and the University of Pierre Mendes-France. She is also vice president of the Tunisian Observatory on Comprehensive Security.
Security sector reform had formerly topped Tunisia’s list of priorities after the fall of the Ben Ali Regime. But a rise in the number of deadly terror attacks—the most recent being the June 26 attack on a tourist hotel in Sousse—has indefinitely delayed reform.
Amid calls to expedite the ratification of an anti-terror law and fortify the security forces, citizens now find themselves caught between the hammer of terrorism and the anvil of the police. Tunisians lack the guarantees necessary to successfully balance addressing terror threats with a respect for civil rights. Part of the issue stems from the common fallacy that reform is an institutional luxury available only in the absence of terror threats. But such a position neglects the fact that reform also includes the structural changes necessary to achieve security without limiting personal freedoms.
Strategic planning is essential in drafting, monitoring, and evaluating general security policies. This is more effective than taking impromptu or rash decisions in reaction to individual attacks. Following the Sousse attack, for example, a number of decisions were announced, including a review of licenses granted to some parties and associations, closing mosques that are outside the state’s control, and restricting youth under 35 years old from traveling to certain countries. These decrees revived the public’s concerns about the return of a police state. In addition, serious questions arose about their effectiveness in the absence of an integrated national policy to combat terrorism.
Today, despite the gloominess of Tunisia’s security landscape and the need to give priority to combatting terrorism, there is still hope for security sector reform in the country. Citizens show an increased willingness to pressure the government on the need to reform the security sector. This has been accomplished through establishing new practices such as the “citizen vigilance” initiative against police violations.
Since the outbreak of the revolution, most police abuses have been monitored and documented, the exposure of which has led public opinion to mobilize to hold Tunisian authorities accountable. For example, two police officers were charged and sentenced for the 2012 rape of a young woman after the case mobilized civil society. Similarly, several officers were recently dismissed from their posts after they used force to prevent citizens from visiting cafes and restaurants during daylight hours in Ramadan.
Though these are small measures, such practices show that Tunisians are still rejecting authoritarianism and questioning the security forces even while supporting their efforts to combat terrorism. But more explicit political will is still needed to achieve broader reforms.
* This article was translated from Arabic.
