Source: Al-Hayat

For the past two months, the marked increase in political contacts at senior level between key external powers generated relatively optimistic assessments of the potential for a diplomatic opening to end the Syrian conflict. But this was swiftly overshadowed when U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry expressed public concern in the first week of September over reports of increased Russian military assistance to the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Speculation continues over the possibility that Russia and Iran are reinforcing the regime in order to improve its bargaining position and to broker a deal that secures better terms for Assad. But even if this is true, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s frank pledge on September 15 that his country will continue “military-technical assistance” to Syria and Syrian opposition claims of an increased Iranian role in managing key bases in the regime’s main military and logistical complex east of Homs suggest that Russia and Iran are preparing for the long haul and will not soften their terms for a political deal.

For those who seek Assad’s departure, the hope that their existing approaches and levels of political or material investment are sufficient to ensure this outcome is naïve, if not deliberately self-deluding. Little seems to have changed in regime objectives and strategies, nor is likely to. Its object remains straightforward: survival. And although the regime has been forced into curbing offensive action and limiting its goals on most fronts, and accepted serious setbacks and significant contraction on some, the main elements of its strategy also seem unchanged. 

Much analysis of the regime’s prospects has focused on the military dimension, correctly identifying its combat manpower shortage as its Achilles’ Heel. But as significant is that the regime has not yet relinquished its insistence on retaining control of provincial administrative centers, which it uses to buttress its claim to represent all of Syria. No less importantly, these centers are a principal means of controlling the population, including in opposition areas, which depends on the government for necessary services and paperwork. 

Despite the loss of virtually the whole of Idlib province, starting with the fall of Idlib city last March and of the important Abu Dhour air base last week, the regime has managed to hold on to other provincial administrative centers despite an increasingly precarious position. Most notable are Daraa in the South, where the rebels recently acknowledged the failure of successive offensives since June to take the government part of the city, and Deir ez-Zor in the East, where the beleaguered regime garrison is still holding out against Islamic State forces. The regime still holds Soueida, where local resentment of regime policies has intensified following the murder on September 5 of Sheikh Wahid Bal’ous, who had formed a dissident Druze militia, while confident predictions by the Syrian opposition and local rebel groups of the imminent fall of the government-controlled parts of Aleppo have all too predictably dissipated. 

The regime also continues to back up its assertion of some semblance of government control by striving to maintain food and energy supply, especially to urban centers and other loyalist areas. It also continues to pay salaries, pensions, and other entitlements to state employees in most parts of the country, as a way of maintaining the regime’s claim to represent all Syrians. The regime policy of devolving economic subsistence to local actors so as to reduce the burden on central ministries has burdened the population to a severe degree, but persists. 

As in the military domain, the regime’s position has continued to erode as the collapse of economic production and the chipping away by the Islamic State at its energy supply reduce its disposable assets. But the regime war chest—based partly on key monopolies at home—continues to be complemented by external assistance—most recently the new $1 billion credit line approved by Iran in July. Together, direct and indirect financial subsidies and economic aid from Iran and Russia are doing just enough to maintain energy and food imports, or at least to slow their decline. This is illustrated by the Syrian Pound, which has weakened seriously since late 2014, but was still relatively stable at around SYPL300 to the dollar in early September 2015. If it is true that Russia and Iran are escalating military support to the regime, then this can only mean they have also decided to keep economic and financial assistance at a steady level in parallel, which is just as important to its survival. 

The regime’s dependence on its principal external backers has prompted speculation that they will push Assad to accept a deal that would limit his powers—not as much as the latest proposal by UN Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura, which would reduce them to largely ceremonial functions—but still enough to transform Syria’s conflict dynamics. The regime faces a delicate phase: its dependence on Russia and Iran may grant them more political leverage it would wish. To counter or pre-empt this, the regime must deliver better results on the battlefield. The arrival of new Russian equipment suggests that the Syrian army is still managing to train officers, non-commissioned officers, and technical crews to use and integrate it. And despite massive desertions and draft-dodging, which compelled Assad to acknowledge the shortage of combat manpower in July, the army still had 70,000 conscripts in its ranks in late 2014 according to an estimate by the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. Even if the army receives no more than 10 percent of its pre-crisis annual intake on an ongoing basis, that is still 25,000 men a year; not enough to replenish combat losses, but enough to buy time. 

None of this makes for a winning strategy. But it comes against a regional backdrop that may give the regime some slight hope that external pressure on it will ease. Turkey’s escalation against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party complicates its domestic politics and potentially limits its ability to persuade the U.S. to join it in action against the Assad regime; the Gulf Cooperation Council intervention in Yemen may similarly set limits on the ability of its member-states to invest more heavily in Syria; and in parallel the Baghdad government’s military campaign against the Islamic State in Iraq has yet to develop into a meaningful, overall counter-offensive, ensuring that combating the Islamic State remains the more urgent priority for the U.S. and its Western allies.

The Assad regime continues to hold on by the skin of its teeth. Impressive gains by the Army of Islam and other rebel groups on the outskirts of Damascus in mid-September underline how vulnerable it can be, but neither the regime nor its external backers appear to be reassessing their overall objectives or strategy fundamentally. They may believe they can afford not to. But the question is whether their opponents will now conduct their own strategic reassessment, and finally demonstrate the level of political resolve and material commitment needed to break Syria’s deadly conflict dynamic. They could do so by starting with concrete steps to impose a halt on the use of barrel bombs, chemical attacks, and the deliberate targeting of civilians in Syria, which may finally force a strategic reassessment on Russia and Iran, if not on the Assad regime.

This article has been originally published in Arabic in Al-Hayat.