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James Schoff Previews Next Week’s Trump-Abe Summit

Carnegie Senior Fellow James Schoff looks ahead to U.S. President Donald Trump’s upcoming summit with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe next week in New York City.

Published on September 21, 2018

Where does the Trump-Abe relationship stand now? They seemed close at the start.

Abe actively embraced Trump from late 2016, which worked well at first. By acting as an early mentor, the Japanese prime minister offered something of value that Trump appreciated, soothing the worst of his tendencies vis-à-vis Japan. 

The pair worked closely to put economic pressure on North Korea, expand their countries’ security cooperation, and look for ways to increase U.S. exports to Japan. As a result, so far their alliance has more about continuity than change. 

What’s more, where there has been change, it has been positive from Abe’s perspective. The Trump administration’s tougher China policy—on trade, status of Taiwan, and in U.S. defense planning—has limited China’s regional power, which has opened up diplomatic opportunities for Japan. Next month, for example, Abe will make Japan’s first bilateral summit visit to Beijing in nearly seven years.

Why have there been recent reports of discord?

Trump’s behavior and policy choices have strained the U.S.-Japan relationship. Trump has repeatedly withdrawn from international agreements, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement, climate change, and the Iran nuclear deal. This undermines the international rules-based order, upon which mid-sized countries like Japan depend. 

Japan has also started to suffer from Trump’s imposition of tariffs on several countries (including Japan and other allies), and his cozier North Korea policy. Now Trump is threatening painful automobile tariffs that would hit Japan even harder.

What should we look for in their upcoming summit meeting in New York?

We can expect continued diplomatic restraint from Abe. He is likely to push for continued allied pressure on North Korea, and to propose a cooperative—though less confrontational—approach to squeezing China on trade reforms. Abe will also try to placate Trump’s trade balance demands by buying U.S. energy and defense equipment. 

But if Trump publicly shows impatience with Tokyo’s economic policy stiff-arm, and moves to impose auto tariffs or such, then we could see chillier U.S.-Japan relations than we have seen for over two decades.

Is this the start of a longer-term cooling in Japan’s relationship with the U.S.?

A question for Japan is whether Trump is a temporary blip in American politics, or a sign of a deeper shift. Trump’s continuous swirl of tweets hides a broader political turmoil in the U.S. It started before his presidency, and is likely to outlast it. This could change the alliance and—by extension—Japan’s national security strategy over the next decade or two. 

What is at the root of the problem?

Economic inequality in the U.S. is the highest among industrialized nations. Together with anxiety over globalization, technology, and demographics, it has buoyed the rise of previously fringe elements, who are suspicious of global entanglements. 

The global financial crisis of 2008 made this dynamic worse. Americans on the bottom half of the economic ladder saw their net worth slump to what it was 40 years ago, and have failed to recover. The U.S. and Japan still have a productive relationship, which has improved both countries’ security and wealth for more than 65 years. But a sustained shift in U.S. attitudes could threaten it.

What is likely to happen next?

The short-term prognosis is grim. Trump looks likely to expand his tariff campaign to lower the U.S. trade deficit, and make Japan a more prominent target. Trump tends to blame foreigners for America’s troubles—other countries and immigrants—while the U.S. political left attacks the rich and big corporations. Both sides made gains in the midterm election primary season, and neither supports liberalized trade and multilateralism.

But there is reason for optimism in the long run. Americans generally like Japan. There is no groundswell of public demand for a tougher trade relationship. In fact, a Gallup survey in 2018 showed Japan had a record-high favorability ratio of 87 percent in the U.S. 

Americans make up just a small percentage of an increasingly fragile and interconnected world, and that fact is becoming more obvious every year. If the “America First” experiment fails, U.S. domestic politics should correct itself and value alliances accordingly. Key questions are how long this might take and how patient can Japan be in the meantime. 

What does Japan want out of the relationship?

Japan’s main goals are to keep its strong security commitments from the U.S. and for continued U.S. support to a rules-based international order that prizes economic openness and global stability. No other country can help Japan as much as the U.S., so Abe will want to protect the relationship. He will need to be careful not to alienate Americans, even if he has to stand up to Trump to satisfy some small but growing domestic condemnation of Trump . Abe just won reelection to lead his party for another three years, so he has some political space to look beyond Trump and play a longer game.

At the same time, Tokyo needs to prepare for America’s political crisis to get worse. This could force changes to Japan’s foreign policy. Abe has options to cushion Japan from the U.S.’s political commotion, and to hedge in ways that protect Japan’s long-term relationship with the U.S.

What should Japan do to protect its interests? 

To some extent, Japan has already been taking steps over the past decade to adjust to China’s growing strength and influence—and America’s relative decline. It has made an effort to strengthen friendships with other like-minded countries, while also trying to bolster U.S.-Japan bilateral security cooperation. There will be a greater sense of urgency in Tokyo to move forward on both of these fronts.

To offset the impact of Trump’s policies, Abe went ahead with a revised TPP agreement, without the U.S. on board (the so-called TPP-11). Japan also worked quickly with the European Union (EU) to revive negotiations on a Japan-EU economic partnership, signing a deal in July 2018. 

How will Japan’s sidestepping approach affect U.S. businesses?

These two moves are bad news for U.S. businesses and certain states, because they give other countries a competitive advantage. U.S. beef exporters, for example, will face a Japanese import tariff 20 percent higher than their Australian competitors in America’s largest beef export market. Similarly, U.S. auto exporters will see a 10 percent price disadvantage against their Japanese rivals in the European market.

As these tariff reductions begin, the political pressure on Trump will increase. The folly of his trade policy may be more apparent to a wider portion of American voters. It helps that this trade disadvantage is caused by the U.S. government passing up an opportunity, rather than by retaliatory tariffs by Japan. If the United States chooses to reenter these deals, the problems would be fixed. Japan’s restraint, instead of retaliation, could prove important, as a way to minimize damage to the alliance in the medium term. 
 

Could Japan have a role in smoothing the populist backlash in other countries?

Japan has a few options. One is to strengthen multilateral cooperation to hold high standards for cyber security and counter so-called ‘fake news’ or state-sponsored disinformation campaigns. Japan’s role as host of the G20 in 2019 could be a chance to call for more transparency and accountability in these areas. 

Japan could also work with other countries to ensure financial stability during market failures. Japan and its neighbors were active on this front after the Asian Financial Crisis, but Asia-centric crisis mitigation planning weakened since then, because of diplomatic tensions over history and territory disputes. It is time to invest more regional effort on this issue, in case the U.S. is less willing or able to take the lead.  

Another important step is to keep putting effort into people-to-people relations and business-to-business relations between the U.S. and Japan. Japan’s hefty direct investment in the U.S., and friendliness in international affairs, has had a significant effect on U.S. public attitudes towards Japan since the 1980s and 1990s. Japan is the largest foreign employer in the U.S. for manufacturing, and the second-largest overall behind Great Britain. U.S. polls show high levels of respect and affinity for Japan. 

From the other side, U.S. investment in Japan and contributions by U.S. military service members stationed in Japan have had a similar impact. These relationships strengthen the alliance’s resilience at the grass roots level, and counteract Trump’s criticism about America’s overseas alliances. They help to neutralize the politics of fear. It is important to continue investing in each other, and to make sure people know about the alliance’s security and diplomatic activities.

Why isn’t Japan experiencing the political turmoil that we see in the U.S. and Europe? 

Overall, Japan is less susceptible to populist pressures. The reasons include less acute economic inequality, a consistently low unemployment rate, little immigration and ethnic diversity, and an economic model that relies heavily on free-flowing international trade. 

Japan experienced a short bout of political change a decade ago, when voters gave the long-term opposition parties a chance to govern after mounting disappointment with the ruling elites, but that experiment did not go well. As a result, Abe was able to rally his party back into power. He is now poised to become Japan’s longest-serving prime minister. Once ridiculed for having a revolving door of prime ministers and cabinet shake-ups, Japan is now a pillar of political stability in Asia among America’s allies. 

What does this mean for the alliance?

Polls in Japan show continued strong support for alliance with the United States, but trust in Trump personally is very low. This could damage the broader bilateral relationship if “America First” attitudes prevail in the Republican Party and beyond Trump’s administration. 

One consequential impact could be less tolerance for U.S. military bases and forward deployed troops in Japan. This is more likely to happen if the U.S. removes some forces from South Korea as a result of current diplomacy with the North, or demands more funding from Seoul for U.S. bases. Japan hosts the largest array of U.S. military power overseas, including America’s only forward-deployed aircraft carrier battle group. U.S. bureaucrats and members of Congress generally appreciate the amount of support Japan provides to U.S. forces there, and they will fight to keep stable the current mutually beneficial arrangement. But this will be an issue to watch closely if Trump’s trade and foreign policy becomes more confrontational with Japan.   

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.