Three years of war have taken an enormous toll on Ukraine. Journalists have been chronicling daily the wanton destruction of human lives, housing, and infrastructure. What is often overlooked, however, is the conflict’s devastating impact on the Black Sea. The war has accelerated the degradation of the marine environment, a long-standing issue in this part of Europe. And the war is posing new risks, which will persist for decades. Cleaning up the Black Sea should be an urgent priority for the EU and countries in the region.
In mid-December 2024, there was a reminder of the conflict’s environmental cost. Two Russian oil tankers, Volgoneft-212 and Volgoneft-239, were hit by a heavy storm in the Kerch Strait, which connects the Black Sea with the Sea of Azov. Volgoneft-212 sank, releasing some 4,300 metric tons of mazut oil. Volgoneft-239 ran aground and leaked at least 2,000 tons of the same substance. Mazut, a low-quality heating fuel and a by-product from refining crude oil, has high viscosity and forms tar-like slicks that float on the water. It is highly toxic for marine life, particularly mammals and birds, and can contaminate food chains over a long time.
Because of its thickness, mazut is also notoriously difficult to clean up, as the methods that are applied to conventional oil spills do a poor job in tackling it. Much of the work has to be done literally by hand. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s personal intervention and the state of emergency that was declared in the coastal parts of Russia’s Krasnodar region, and then in Crimea, helped mobilize teams of responders and volunteers. But it is far from clear how much of an impact they have had.
How is this accident at sea connected to the war? After all, it was one of the Black Sea’s notorious winter storms, not the Ukrainian military, that caused it. Both vessels were part of Russia’s so-called shadow fleet, which ships crude oil and oil products in defiance of the oil price cap imposed by the EU and the G7. Many ships that take part in this trade are in substandard condition. As a report by the European Parliamentary Research Service put it, the shadow fleet includes “aging and poorly maintained vessels that operate with minimal regard to the regulations [and] poses significant environmental, maritime safety, and security risks.”
Global shipping companies steer clear of Russian exports not only because of the cap of $60 per barrel on Russian crude but also because the West’s restrictions mean these firms cannot insure their cargo. Long story short, it was only a matter of time before the shadow fleet, a workaround Moscow devised, triggered an environmental disaster in the Black Sea, a prime route for Russia’s hydrocarbon exports.
Such spillages are just one among several risks associated with the war. Environmental degradation in the Ukrainian littoral and the rivers that flow into the Black Sea plays a huge role, too. The June 2023 breach of the Kakhovka Dam on the Dnipro River is a case in point. According to the journal Science, the subsequent flooding and spread of toxic substances dealt “a death blow to countless organisms adapted to brackish estuaries near the confluence of the Dnipro and the Black Sea.” Nearly half of the $14 billion of damage—an estimate by the Ukrainian authorities—is attributed to chemical pollution destroying ecosystems on shore and in the Black Sea.
The Kakhovka Dam breach was not a one-off event, either. Agricultural land in the coastal Kherson and Mykolaiv regions has been contaminated by munitions, fuel spills, shells, human remains, and, most importantly, land mines. Such contamination affects the Black Sea and all of the countries around it.
To be fair, environmental challenges predate the Russia-Ukraine war. They are, by and large, the result of rapid industrialization, large-scale agriculture, and littoral urbanization throughout the twentieth century. Industrial decay and poor governance in more recent times have added to the Black Sea’s woes. Geography complicates matters. The sea is the end point of five major rivers, including the Danube, the Dnipro, and the Dniester. They flush fertilizer runoff and other toxic material into the sea, damaging the marine ecosystem. On top of that, nearly 90 percent of Black Sea waters lack oxygen, in part because the Bosporus Strait limits circulation with the Mediterranean, with a negative effect on biodiversity.
The Black Sea is also confronted with the challenge of loose naval mines. This issue emerged early in the war as both Russia and Ukraine laid mines near the port of Odesa. Some of the devices in question surfaced in Bulgaria or Romania because of the Black Sea’s counterclockwise currents. Loose mines have caused headaches for maritime traffic as well. Since 2022, there have been five separate incidents with ships in Black Sea waters. That is why in January 2024, Türkiye, Romania, and Bulgaria adopted a joint plan to clear the sea of loose mines. The three countries’ defense ministers established a naval task force and a committee composed of their naval chiefs to oversee the operation. Once the war ends and naval traffic through the Turkish Straits resumes, in line with the Montreux Convention, the initiative could also bring in countries from outside the Black Sea.
The Turkish-Romanian-Bulgarian scheme underscores the fact that transnational threats, such as environmental degradation, require multilateral action. The EU, a champion of multilateralism, is already leading on the issue of Ukraine’s reconstruction. Any sensible strategy in this area has to cover the Black Sea, too. This is clearly in the interest not only of Kyiv but also, and even more so, of EU member states Bulgaria and Romania, which profit from coastal tourism. A Black Sea platform will need to involve Türkiye, a major local stakeholder, as well as Georgia, irrespective of current frictions between the EU and the governing Georgian Dream party. Together, stakeholders could engage in joint monitoring and risk assessment as well as pool resources to fight environmental degradation.
At the same time, one has to acknowledge the limits of such an initiative. Keeping Russia out—which would be likely in light of the standoff with the West—would leave a gap. Engaging the Russian authorities at a low, technical level might be possible at some point, but even that would not be feasible in the short run. On the upside, the EU could use a Black Sea initiative to reach out to Georgia’s Russia-occupied region of Abkhazia, a move consistent with Brussels’s policy of nonrecognition and engagement toward the territory.
A Black Sea environmental initiative would hardly be a novelty. In the early 1990s, local countries adopted the Bucharest Convention on protecting the Black Sea against pollution and established an intergovernmental commission. Some progress has been scored, but since the early 2010s the trajectory has been negative.
The war in Ukraine should serve as a catalyst for more robust action. Having the EU on board in a future Black Sea initiative could make a difference. Strong political and financial commitments from the union, its member states, and the likes of Georgia, Türkiye, and Ukraine would be essential.
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