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Indian Airstrikes in Pakistan: May 7, 2025

On May 7, 2025, between 1:05 and 1:30 a.m. (IST), airstrikes carried out by the Indian Air Force hit nine locations inside Pakistan and Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK). It was codenamed Operation Sindoor.

Published on May 7, 2025

On May 7, 2025, between 1:05 and 1:30 a.m. (IST), airstrikes carried out by the Indian Air Force hit nine locations inside Pakistan and Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK). It was codenamed Operation Sindoor. Significantly, this is the first time since 1971 that India struck across the international boundary (IB) or the settled and accepted border between India and Pakistan.

The strikes were conducted in retaliation for a terrorist attack that took place in Jammu and Kashmir’s Pahalgam on April 22, 2025, claiming the lives of twenty-five Indian tourists and one Nepali tourist. As Indian foreign secretary Vikram Misri made clear in a press briefing on the morning of May 7, the airstrikes were designed to “deter” and “pre-empt” more cross-border attacks that Indian intelligence considered “impending.” With this in mind, the objective of the air strikes was focused on “dismantling the terrorist infrastructure and disabling terrorists likely to be sent across to India.”

A Pakistan-based group known as The Resistance Front (TRF) claimed responsibility for the attacks in Pahalgam, and then withdrew the claim as Indian pressure on Pakistan mounted in the days that followed, according to reports. Interestingly, in 2019, the terrorist group the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) that claimed an attack on an Indian convoy later withdrew their claim. The TRF is widely considered to be an offshoot of the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), backed by the Pakistani state. The TRF has been added by India in the half-yearly reports to be designated in the United Nations 1267 committee. Pakistan has tried to stall these attempts.

This was the largest attack against civilians since the LeT’s attack in Mumbai in November 2008. In Pahalgam, five gunmen opened fire. The orchestration of the attack—close range encounters—was demonstrably designed to send a message through families who were made to watch these horrendous acts: that Jammu and Kashmir is not safe for tourists, the main economic earner for the state. Misri also said in his briefing, “The calculation, presumably, was that harming growth and development in the Union Territory would help keep it backward and create fertile ground for continued cross-border terrorism from Pakistan.” Further, the Indian Foreign Secretary underlined that the attack was intended to disturb Hindu-Muslim harmony. Eyewitness accounts of the attacks claimed that Hindus were singled out.

Since April 22, there has been widespread expectation that India will retaliate with military force. The Indian defence minister and other parts of the system had made this clear. Between April 22 and May 6, the Indian government took several measures to respond through diplomatic, hydraulic, and economic means. The Indus Water Treaty, signed by India and Pakistan in September 1960 and negotiated by the World Bank, was suspended by the Indian government. The Treaty partitions the water of six rivers that flow into the two countries. Accordingly, India was to “let flow the waters” of three “western rivers” into Pakistan for its “unrestricted use.”

Postal services to Pakistan were suspended. The Attari-Wagah border, the only legal land crossing (in Amritsar in Indian Punjab), was closed. Pakistani social media accounts were to be banned. Pakistani nationals were banned from exercising visa waivers available to citizens from South Asian countries wishing to enter India, and Pakistani nationals in India were ordered to leave within forty-eight hours. All visas issued to Pakistani nationals were deemed cancelled. Military advisors in the Pakistani High Commission in India were made persona non grata and given a week to leave the country, while India withdrew its own military advisors from Pakistan.

These measures, while severe in their own ways, were always thought to be precursors to a kinetic response, such as Operation Sindoor. Indian media claim that seventy terrorists have been killed. This is not verified. Pakistani military spokespersons have claimed that twenty-six civilians were killed and over forty were injured. What is significant is that the target list included major towns known to house terrorist organizations deep inside Pakistan, including in Lahore.

Unverified media reports suggest that members of the family of JeM chief Mazood Azhar were killed in the strikes on Bahawalpur. Fifteen Indian civilians have been killed and more than forty injured in the cross-LoC firing, according to reports, till the afternoon of May 7.

The situation is evolving. Importantly, India has, with precision, it would seem, attacked militant targets only. No Pakistani military targets have been reported to have been attacked. As Misri made clear in his briefing on the morning of May 7, the aim was to dismantle “terrorist infrastructure” and disable “terrorists likely to be sent across to India.”

The Indian government has initiated civil defence drills across the country, including pre-scheduled air sirens in schools, hospitals, and markets. This might be a way to communicate to Pakistan that India is prepared for any eventuality, possibly communicating that the escalation ladder is one that India is prepared to climb if it comes to it.

What is also clear is that the Indian establishment has learned lessons from the Balakot episode, as I elaborate at the end of this essay. Evidence of the attacks and the fact that they took place across the nine chosen locations has been aired. Video and satellite imagery have been declassified and aired at a press conference on the morning of May 7. Demonstrable evidence of the attacks was called into question in previous such actions, as also highlighted below. This time, nothing was left to chance or obscurity.

Background to Similar Action Since 2016

The Modi-led government has a clear playbook on responding to terrorist attacks on Indian soil.

In 2016, Pakistani terrorists attacked an Indian Army regiment in Uri, about ten kilometres from the Line of Control (LoC) between India and Pakistan. The Indian government retaliated by way of “surgical strikes”—ground incursions led by elite special force units between 1 and 3 kilometres inside PoK. At least seven forward operating bases or “launchpads” housed by militant groups were destroyed. The rationale for the strikes, much like those provided for Operation Sindoor, was premised on deterrence (in response to the attacks in Uri and Poonch) and preemption. In a press briefing after the strikes, Indian Director General of Military Operations (DGMO) said that this operation denied terrorists the ability to use launchpads “to carry out infiltration and terrorist strikes” in Jammu and Kashmir and other parts of the country. The DGMO concluded by stating that after the attack, he discussed the strikes with his counterpart in Pakistan. Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif denied that the attacks took place, thus managing calls for retaliation and escalation.

In 2019, an Indian paramilitary convoy was attacked in Pulwama, in Jammu and Kashmir, killing 40 personnel. The JeM based in Bahawalpur—one of the nine locations struck by India on May 7, 2025—initially claimed responsibility. India retaliated with air power, the first in response to a terrorist attack. Indeed, it was the first use of air power across the LoC against Pakistan since the 1971 War between the two countries. Missiles released from Indian jets from inside Indian territory hit “the biggest training camp” of the JeM in Balakot, a town in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in Pakistan. The then Indian foreign secretary, Vijay Gokhale, made a statement following the attacks: “A very large number” of trainers and commanders were “eliminated,” he underscored.

The location was significant as it was the first time India targeted a location outside of PoK. Matters escalated as the Pakistani air force crossed the LoC in what is known as the Rajouri sector. Two Indian Air Force MiGs were deployed, of which one was shot down. The pilot ejected and was detained on Pakistani soil, leading to an immediate de-escalation. The pilot was returned within forty-eight hours and the matter came to a close.

Takeaways on the May 7 Strikes

It was no surprise that the Indian Air Force was deployed, again, to strike inside Pakistan on the morning of May 7. As I understand it, at this time, the strikes were conducted from within Indian territory. What was surprising was the target list, which included the hideouts of three main terrorist groups based inside Pakistan: the LeT in Muridke (in Lahore), the JeM in Bahawalpur (in Punjab), and Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) based in PoK. The HM was born in 1989 and was designated as a “Foreign Terrorist Organisation” by the U.S. State Department.

This time, India was not only responding to the attacks in April 2025, but sending a clear kinetic message in response to terrorist attacks it has endured since 2001, when the Indian parliament was attacked, subsequently in 2008, 2016, and 2019. Indeed, a reel played at the government briefing this morning underlined this. It showed images of those targeted in India starting from 2001. Between the target sets and the communication around the same, the response early this morning was comprehensive. This was not about an eye for an eye. But an even clearer message than in 2016 and 2019, that India’s tolerance for terrorist attacks on Indian soil has been tested to its limit.

In 2016 and 2019, there were questions about whether India’s military response was real or as impactful as Indian officials claimed. Many across the world, including in security agencies, questioned whether or not the attack in Balakot in 2019 even happened. This time, the Indian government has declassified satellite and video imagery showing that the strikes took place in all nine locations. Nothing has been left to doubt. Foreign missions in India are being briefed in real time. How many terrorists were killed will depend on a bomb damage assessment (BDA) that will be difficult to verify.

I would imagine that these imperatives make it almost impossible for Pakistan to exercise restraint. Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif has made clear that India’s missile strikes were an “act of war” and that Pakistan would give a “befitting reply.” Beyond his bluster, what this actually means will become clearer in the very near future.

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.