Atomic Inducements: The Case for “Buying Out” Nuclear Latency
Tristan Volpe
A storm is brewing over the spread of sensitive nuclear technology that will be hard for the United States to weather without an updated nonproliferation strategy. A handful of US allies in Northeast Asia and the Middle East have refused to foreclose the option to develop enrichment or reprocessing (ENR) facilities for civilian nuclear-energy programs. There is no legal prohibition on developing either technology under the terms of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), so long as the country permits international monitoring of peaceful use. Yet ENR technology can be used to produce the fissile material that forms the core of a nuclear weapon. The United States has therefore pursued additional measures over the decades to deny even its closest partners from surmounting this technical chokepoint to the bomb.
Westinghouse Files for Bankruptcy, In a Blow to Nuclear Power Industry
Steven Mufson | Washington Post
Westinghouse, one of the most storied names in the nuclear energy business, filed for bankruptcy Wednesday, dealing a blow to the future of the nuclear power industry and leaving questions about the fate of four reactors under construction in the United States. The filing also ends the marriage of Westinghouse and Toshiba. When the Japanese giant — maker of products such as medical devices and home appliances — bought the Westinghouse nuclear business in October 2006, it declared “the dawn of a new era for nuclear energy.” Together the companies would make a “powerful combination,” Toshiba said.
After Deployment: What? Russian Violations of the INF Treaty
Jon Wolfsthal
I was asked to address a series of questions regarding Russia’s violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces or INF Treaty, and I know my colleagues at the witness table will also provide their views on this issue. We were asked to assess: the significance of Russia’s violation of the INF Treaty; why Russia is violating the treaty and what they hope to gain; how the United States should respond to this violation including all of the tools at its disposal; what is the future of the INF Treaty and does it make sense for the United States to remain a party to this agreement; and how should Russia’s violation be seen given its belligerent behavior around the world. To help make my answers are clear as possible, I have framed my remarks within a set of guiding principles that I believe the United States should use as we decide how to manage the political, diplomatic and military consequences of Russia’s violation of the INF Treaty.
Heightened Activity at North Korea’s Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site
38 North
New commercial satellite imagery of the Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site from March 28 shows a heightened level of activity over the past few days. Despite the recent snowfall, there has been continued pumping of water out of the North Portal, presumably to keep the tunnels dry for communications and monitoring equipment; the removal of material (probably rubble) and dumping on the tailings pile immediately to the east of the portal; and the probable removal of one or more vehicles or equipment trailers from in front of the portal.
The Dragon at the NSG High Table
Smita Sharma | Hindu
India’s bid for NSG membership will continue to see hurdles, with China being vocal in its opposition. At the Carnegie Endowment International Nuclear Policy Conference in 2015, a polling question asked to the hall full of global diplomats and foreign policy experts was: “Is there a likelihood of more than 50% that by March 24, 2017, India will become a participant in the Nuclear Suppliers Group?”
India’s Nuclear Strategy: A Shift to Counterforce?
Rajesh Rajagopalan | Observer Research Foundation
Two close observers of Indian nuclear policy recently suggested that official thinking about India’s nuclear strategy may be moving in a radical new direction, towards a first-use or even a first-strike strategy. Until now, it had been assumed that Indian nuclear policy would be retaliatory rather than pre-emptive, and that it will be focused on countervalue (i.e., the adversary’s cities) rather than counterforce (the adversary’s nuclear forces) targets. For India, both a first-use and a first-strike strategy (and they are not the same) are the wrong choices for the simple reason that they will be ineffective in achieving either its wartime or deterrence requirements, in addition to embroiling India in an unnecessary nuclear arms race, and is likely to lead to dangerous crisis instability to boot. But, before considering these issues, an equally important question needs to be asked: how credible are the claims that Indian nuclear strategy may be changing?