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IAEA Board Passes Resolution Calling on Russia to Leave Zaporizhzhia

IN THIS ISSUE: IAEA Board Passes Resolution Calling on Russia to Leave Zaporizhzhia, Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Reactors Won't Restart Until Russians Leave, its Operator Says, China Sees US Double Standard Over Stalled Iran Nuclear Deal, Israel Warns Over Iran Uranium Capability with Nuclear Talks at Halt, Will Putin, Losing Control in Ukraine, Reach for Nuclear Weapons?, Technology Acquisition and Arms

Published on September 16, 2022

IAEA Board Passes Resolution Calling on Russia to Leave Zaporizhzhia

Francois Murphy | Reuters

The U.N. nuclear watchdog's 35-nation Board of Governors on Thursday passed a resolution demanding that Russia end its occupation of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant in Ukraine. The resolution is the second on Russia's invasion of Ukraine passed by the International Atomic Energy Agency's board, and their content is very similar, though the first in March preceded Russian forces taking control of Zaporizhzhia, Europe's biggest nuclear power plant.

Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Reactors Won't Restart Until Russians Leave, its Operator Says

Kat Lonsdorf | NPR 

Ukrainian operators of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power station won't restart the plant until its occupying Russian forces leave the facility, the head of Ukraine's nuclear agency, Petro Kotin, tells NPR. Ukrainian workers powered down the war-damaged plant last weekend for safety reasons amid continued shelling. On Tuesday, workers finished restoring all three backup power lines — a sliver of good news at the plant that officials and energy experts have warned could face a catastrophe as fighting continues around it.

China Sees US Double Standard Over Stalled Iran Nuclear Deal

Jonathan Tirone | Bloomberg

China is warning that global rules prohibiting the spread of nuclear weapons are at risk because of different non-proliferation standards being applied to Iran and US allies…“In Iran, the fundamental point of the nuclear agreement was to limit the breakout time to a period of one year or longer,” Wang said in an interview, referring to the interval needed to enrich enough nuclear material for a potential weapon. “Yet in Australia they are talking about providing tons of weapons-grade material to a non-nuclear-weapons state. These exemptions risk collapsing the dam holding back proliferation.”

Israel Warns Over Iran Uranium Capability with Nuclear Talks at Halt

Patrick Wintour | The Guardian

Tensions around a breakdown in talks between Iran and the US over Tehran’s nuclear programme escalated on Monday when Israel’s defence minister, Benny Gantz, claimed that Iran would be able to produce enough enriched uranium to make three nuclear warheads within a few weeks. Gantz also revealed a map detailing 10 facilities in Syria allegedly being used to arm Iran and its proxies, including Hezbollah. He said the facilities represented a threat to Israel’s security.

Will Putin, Losing Control in Ukraine, Reach for Nuclear Weapons?

Brendan Cole | Newsweek

Ukraine's gains in its counteroffensive against Russia have raised questions over whether Vladimir Putin might turn to nuclear weapons in a desperate bid to wrest back the initiative following significant losses of troops, equipment and territory…"I think we are all concerned that if he is pushed to the edge, he might respond in what you would consider a horrific way, making use of a weapon of mass destruction," Rose Gottemoeller, NATO's deputy secretary general from 2016 to 2019, told Newsweek.

Technology Acquisition and Arms Control: Thinking Through the Hypersonic Weapons Debate

Carrie A. Lee | Texas National Security Review

Debates in the United States about hypersonic weapons today revolve around acquiring hypersonic missiles and pursuing arms control initiatives, but concern about a hypersonic gap is misplaced and indicates a misunderstanding about the strategic trade-offs and benefits associated with hypersonic technology. Similarly, arms control solutions proposed to date have not paid enough attention to the specifics of the weapons and their implications for strategic stability. Using hypersonic weapons as a case study, I outline a theoretical framework for making decisions about acquiring new technology and developing arms control proposals. Ultimately, I conclude that U.S. policy on the acquisition of hypersonic missile technology overstates the immediate need for these missiles, falls short on offering strategies that would discourage adversaries from developing such weapons, and under-emphasizes the importance of nonproliferation efforts

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.