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Major Powers Stopped Nuclear Tests in 1998. That Norm Is Now Under Threat

IN THIS ISSUE: Major Powers Stopped Nuclear Tests in 1998. That Norm Is Now Under Threat, Engineer Accused of Stealing Secret U.S. Government Tech Used to Detect Nuclear Missile Launches, South Korean President Reiterates that Seoul Will not Seek its Own Nuclear Deterrent, IAEA Chief to Visit Ukraine's Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Plant to Check Safety, European Scientists Set New Nuclear Fusion Energy Re

Published on February 8, 2024

Major Powers Stopped Nuclear Tests in 1998. That Norm Is Now Under Threat

JAMIE KWONG | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

The United States no longer conducts explosive nuclear tests, a practice that is not only provocative and potentially escalatory but also damaging to both human health and the environment. With the exception of North Korea, no nuclear-armed state has conducted a nuclear test since 1998. This restraint, however, may not continue for much longer: a recent setback for test-ban diplomacy and increase in testing talk could fuel a widespread return to nuclear testing. To avoid this outcome, nuclear-armed states should commit not to be the first to conduct nuclear explosive tests.

Engineer Accused of Stealing Secret U.S. Government Tech Used to Detect Nuclear Missile Launches

Rebecca Cohen and Andrew Blankstein | NBC

A former engineer was arrested on federal charges alleging he stole trade secret technology that was developed by the U.S. government to detect nuclear missile launches and to track ballistic and hypersonic missiles, the Justice Department announced Wednesday. Chenguang Gong, 57, of San Jose, California, was arrested Tuesday morning and charged with theft of trade secrets, the Justice Department said in a news release. Gong is a native of China and became a U.S. citizen in 2011, the Justice Department said.

South Korean President Reiterates that Seoul Will not Seek its Own Nuclear Deterrent

KIM TONG-HYUNG | Associated Press

South Korea’s President Yoon Suk Yeol reiterated that the country would not seek its own nuclear deterrent in the face of threats from nuclear-armed North Korea as he vowed further efforts to sharpen nuclear deterrence strategies with ally United States. In a pre-recorded interview with KBS television that aired Wednesday night, Yoon insisted that South Korea clearly has the technology to quickly acquire nuclear weapons capabilities if it ever decides to do so. But taking that step isn’t a realistic option as it would ruin a trade-dependent economy, he said.

IAEA Chief to Visit Ukraine's Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Plant to Check Safety

Pavel Polityuk | Reuters 

U.N. nuclear watchdog chief Rafael Grossi said he would visit the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant in Russian-occupied Ukraine on Wednesday to see if it can be run with a reduced number of staff and whether its years-old uranium fuel is safe. Russia gained control of Europe's largest nuclear power plant after launching a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in early 2022, and its six nuclear reactors are now idled.

European Scientists Set New Nuclear Fusion Energy Record

Tom Wilson | Financial Times 

European scientists have set a new record for the amount of energy generated from nuclear fusion, another sign of progress in a decades-long effort to produce power by harnessing the reaction that powers the sun. Researchers at the Joint European Torus facility outside Oxford generated 69 megajoules from a sustained fusion reaction lasting five seconds — enough energy to boil about 70 kettles — surpassing their previous record of 59 megajoules set in 2021.

Mind the Gap: 5 Debates to Address in the South Korea-US Deterrence Posture

Kyung-joo Jeon and Hanbyeol Sohn | The Diplomat

In 2023, the South Korea-U.S. alliance took a significant stride towards bolstering its deterrent posture against North Korean threats…Despite these efforts, a notable gap or divergence persists among decision-makers between and even within both countries concerning how to assess North Korean threats and how to respond to them. This article seeks to delve into five key debates that hinder the achievement of an allied integrated approach in dealing with these grave threats.

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.