Mattis Says Iran Nuclear Deal Includes ‘Robust’ Verification
IN THIS ISSUE: Mattis Says Iran Nuclear Deal Includes ‘Robust’ Verification, Macron Sees Trump Dropping Iran Nuclear Deal, Experts Doubt N. Korea Nuke Test Site Collapse Claims, Why the Missile Defense Review Is Taking So Long to Complete, Pentagon-run AI Center Coming, Hypersonics Work in Progress, Trump Doesn’t Like the Iran Deal’s Sunset Provisions. Here’s How to Fix That.
Mattis Says Iran Nuclear Deal Includes ‘Robust’ Verification
Robert Burns | Star Tribune
Defense Secretary Jim Mattis on Thursday emphasized the value of certain aspects of the Iran nuclear agreement, even as President Donald Trump considers pulling out of the 2015 deal, which he has attacked repeatedly and this week called ‘insane.’
Macron Sees Trump Dropping Iran Nuclear Deal
BBC News
Mr. Macron made changing the US president's mind on Iran a top priority for his visit but ended up admitting there was a ‘big risk’ Mr. Trump would abandon the deal. Mr. Trump has until 12 May to decide on the deal, which aimed to prevent Iran acquiring nuclear weapons.
Experts Doubt N. Korea Nuke Test Site Collapse Claims
AFP | MSN
Experts have cast doubt on Chinese scientists’ claims that North Korea’s main underground nuclear test site has been rendered unusable after collapsing due to a massive blast last year.
Why the Missile Defense Review Is Taking So Long to Complete
Aaron Mehta | Defense News
The Pentagon’s Missile Defense Review was supposed to be finished before the end of 2017. Then it was supposed to be complete by February. Now, it’s scheduled to come out in mid-May.
Pentagon-run AI Center Coming, Hypersonics Work in Progress
Paul Mcleary | Breaking Defense
The Pentagon wants its new AI center up and running in six months, but is taking a different track on directed energy and hypersonics, Deputy Defense Secretary Shanahan says.
Trump Doesn’t Like the Iran Deal’s Sunset Provisions. Here’s How to Fix That.
Dinshaw Mistry | Washington Post
In January, Trump warned that he could withdraw the United States from the agreement unless Congress and the United States’ European partners addressed important concerns. Those included his worries that Iran’s missile program was still underway — and more important, that restrictions on Iran’s ability to enrich uranium would expire within 10 to 15 years. Instead of canceling the agreement, the parties could extend it — so that Iran restricts enrichment for several years beyond the agreement’s sunset dates.
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