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Missiles, Preemption, and the Risk of Nuclear War on the Korean Peninsula

IN THIS ISSUE: Missiles, Preemption, and the Risk of Nuclear War on the Korean Peninsula , UN Watchdog’s Head in Russia to Discuss Safety of Ukrainian Nuclear Plant Caught in Crossfire, Foreign Ministry Shakes up Bureau Handling N.K. Nuclear Issue Amid Prolonged Impasse in Talks, Russian Nuclear Weapons, 2024, They Stood Sentry Over America's Nuclear Missile Arsenal. Many Worry It Gave Them Cancer

Published on March 7, 2024

Missiles, Preemption, and the Risk of Nuclear War on the Korean Peninsula 

Ankit Panda | Arms Control Today

North Korea’s adoption of such a fail-deadly posture for its nuclear forces is largely a response to South Korea and the United States. The advanced capabilities available to that alliance, including an array of long-range, non-nuclear strike options supplemented by U.S. nuclear capabilities, present a threat to the survivability of North Korean nuclear forces. More important, however, is the renewed public emphasis on preemptive disarming attacks and decapitation strikes by the conservative government in Seoul, which was inaugurated in May 2022. Cumulatively, these developments in recent years have contributed to a sharply heightened risk of nuclear war.

UN Watchdog’s Head in Russia to Discuss Safety of Ukrainian Nuclear Plant Caught in Crossfire

Associated Press

The U.N.'s atomic watchdog agency chief is visiting Russia amid concern about a Ukrainian nuclear power plant caught in the crossfire since Moscow sent troops into Ukraine in 2022 and seized the facility shortly after.IAEA Director-General Rafael Mariano Grossi arrived at the Black Sea resort of Sochi on Tuesday evening, according to Russian state news agency RIA Novosti for talks on nuclear safety in Ukraine. Grossi announced the trip on Monday, the first day of a regular meeting of the agency’s 35-nation board of governors in Vienna.

Foreign Ministry Shakes up Bureau Handling N.K. Nuclear Issue Amid Prolonged Impasse in Talks

Kim Seung-yeon | Yonhap News Agency 

The foreign ministry will scale back the bureau handling the North Korean nuclear issue and create a broader strategy department focused on foreign policy intelligence-gathering, officials said Thursday, a major shakeup that mirrors the prolonged impasse in nuclear talks with Pyongyang. The tentatively named Office of Strategy and Intelligence will replace the Office of Korean Peninsula Peace and Security Affairs, with three new units to be set up under its wing -- diplomatic strategy, intelligence, and international security, the ministry said in its 2024 policy plan reported to the presidential office.

Russian Nuclear Weapons, 2024

Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda, Eliana Johns, Mackenzie Knight | Bulltetin of the Atomic Scientists

Russia is nearing the completion of a decades-long effort to replace all of its strategic and non-strategic nuclear-capable systems with newer versions. In December 2023, Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu reported that modern weapons and equipment now make up 95 percent of Russia’s nuclear triad—an increase of 3.7 percent from the previous year (Russian Federation 2023b). These modernization percentage values probably come with significant uncertainty, as it is unclear what methodology Russia is using to make those calculations.

They Stood Sentry Over America's Nuclear Missile Arsenal. Many Worry It Gave Them Cancer

Thomas Novelly | Military.com

For years, it was an open secret among missileers that the Cold War-era missile alert facilities and launch control centers where they'd spend days sleeping, eating and staying on alert in case of nuclear armageddon were filled with things that might get them sick -- carcinogens such as PCBs, lead paint, asbestos and tainted water. And every missileer veteran had at least one close friend who was battling a form of cancer.

Sole Authority 

W.J. Hennigan | The New York Times

The idea that one human should have to make such a consequential decision in 15 minutes or less is nearly beyond comprehension. In reality, as long as nuclear weapons exist, there’s most likely no better option if the United States comes under attack. It is, however, unacceptable for an American president to have the sole authority to launch a nuclear first strike without a requirement for consultation or consensus.

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