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New ‘Strategic Weapon?’: What to Expect at North Korea’s October Military Parade

IN THIS ISSUE: New ‘Strategic Weapon?’: What to Expect at North Korea’s October Military Parade, 2. U.S., Russia Move Toward Outline of Nuclear Deal, Administration Says, Government Okays Induction of Nuke-Capable Shaurya Missile Amid Ladakh Standoff, Japan Hopes to Have Alternative to Aegis Ashore Missile-Defense System by Year’s End, CTBTO Begins Leadership Selection Process, Guterres: Only way to Remove Nuclear Risk, ‘Completely Eliminate Nuclear Weapons’

Published on October 6, 2020

New ‘Strategic Weapon?’: What to Expect at North Korea’s October Military Parade

Ankit Panda | NK News

Numerous North Korean transporter-erector-launchers and new conventional weapons may enjoy the limelight on Oct. 10.

U.S., Russia Move Toward Outline of Nuclear Deal, Administration Says

Michael R. Gordon | Wall Street Journal

U.S. and Russian negotiators made progress Monday on a new framework accord that would freeze each side’s nuclear arsenal and outline the parameters for a detailed treaty that would be negotiated next year, a senior Trump administration official said. The accord, if it comes together in the coming month, would give each side something it has sought. President Trump would have a demonstration that his diplomacy toward Moscow has borne fruit, arriving before the November election. Russia would get an extension of the New START treaty, which cuts long-range arms and is due to expire in early February. “This is the first time the U.S. has heard concrete proposals from the Russian Federation,” said the administration official. “We have an agreement on the way forward in terms of form. Where we have a lot of work to do is in terms of substance.”

Government Okays Induction of Nuke-Capable Shaurya Missile Amid Ladakh Standoff

Shishir Gupta | Hindustan Times

The Narendra Modi government has quietly approved induction and deployment of 700-km range surface-to-surface supersonic Shaurya strategic missile even as forward movement has been recorded in development of 5,000 km range K-5 submarine-launched ballistic missile. Shaurya is the land version of the submarine-launched BA-05 missile and has been developed by the Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO). The land version was discreetly tested for the final time before induction as part of user trials in Odisha’s Balasore on October 3. According to top missile experts, Shaurya is a delivery system stored in a composite canister for rapid deployment and minimum interaction with the elements for a long period. The strategic missile flies at a supersonic speed of Mach 7, or 2.4 km per second, at a height of 50 km (within atmosphere) and hits the designated target at Mach 4. The missile will be soon deployed at locations identified by the Indian Strategic Forces Command under guidance from National Security Council. The missile has a warhead weighing around 160 kg.

Japan Hopes to Have Alternative to Aegis Ashore Missile-Defense System by Year’s End

Seth Robson and Hana Kusumoto | Stars and Stripes

The Japanese government has ordered officials to quickly come up with an alternative to the rejected U.S.-made Aegis Ashore missile-defense system, possibly one that can float on a platform at sea. The U.S. ally scrapped plans to deploy the U.S. system in Yamaguchi and Akita prefectures in June due to the cost and a projected 10-year delay to ensure that interceptor missile boosters fell safely on unpopulated areas. The system was intended to provide all of Japan with seamless, 24/7 protection against North Korean ballistic missiles. Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga has instructed Defense Minister Nobuo Kishi to come up with an alternative plan by the end of the year, according to Japan’s Defense Ministry. Research on the plan, which would involve a floating platform, will start soon, a ministry spokesman said Tuesday.

CTBTO Begins Leadership Selection Process

Daryl G. Kimball | Arms Control Today

Divisions among states-parties to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) are creating uncertainty as nations work to select the next leader of the treaty’s implementing body. Lassina Zerbo of Burkina Faso is in the final nine months of his second four-year term at the helm of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), and treaty members intend to select the organization’s next executive secretary at their semiannual meeting on Nov. 25-27. Normally a delicate political undertaking, this year’s selection process is further complicated by questions over which states-parties are eligible to vote, given that many are behind in paying their CTBTO financial dues. The process for formal nomination of candidates began Sept. 16 and will close Oct. 9. So far, one candidate, from Australia, has formally been nominated to lead the organization. Additional candidates are expected to come forward before the October deadline, according to diplomats in Vienna.

Guterres: Only way to Remove Nuclear Risk, ‘Completely Eliminate Nuclear Weapons’

UN News

Secretary-General António Guterres told delegates gathered to commemorate the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, it was the only way “to completely eliminate nuclear risk.” And although nuclear disarmament has been a UN priority since its founding 75 years ago, he reminded the plenary meeting that “the world continues to live in the shadow of nuclear catastrophe”. Progress towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons has “stalled and is at risk of backsliding”, the UN chief warned. Against the backdrop of growing distrust and tension between Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) - and programmes that modernize arsenals for faster, stealthier and more accurate weapons, with costs Mr. Guterres called “simply staggering” - he said, pointedly, that the only treaty restricting the size of the world’s largest nuclear arsenals is set to expire early next year – threatening a return to “unconstrained strategic competition”.

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