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Pentagon Study Finds Agencies Ill Equipped to Detect Foreign Nuclear Efforts

IN THIS ISSUE: Agencies ill equipped to detect foreign nuclear efforts, extension of Korean nuclear agreement, talks on Iran nuclear deal expected in NY in February, don't undermine the Iran deal, US: return arms-grade plutonium, Hagel suggests nuclear proficiency tests may be too difficult.

Published on January 28, 2014

Pentagon Study Finds Agencies Ill Equipped to Detect Foreign Nuclear Efforts

David E. Sanger and William J. Broad | New York Times

A three-year study by the Pentagon has concluded that American intelligence agencies are “not yet organized or fully equipped” to detect when foreign powers are developing nuclear weapons or ramping up their existing arsenals, and calls for using some of the same techniques that the National Security Agency has developed against terrorists.

Senate Passes Bill Allowing Extension of Korean Nuclear Agreement

Ramsey Cox | Hill

The Senate passed a bill Monday that would allow President Obama to extend a nuclear energy deal with South Korea for more than two years. 

Talks on Iran Nuclear Deal Expected in NY in February

Louis Charbonneau and Justyna Pawlak | Reuters

The opening round of talks between Iran and six world powers on a long-term deal is expected to take place next month in New York, a U.S. official said on Monday.

Don't Undermine the Iran Deal

Carl M. Levin and Angus S. King Jr. | New York Times

There are only two ways to keep Iran from developing a nuclear weapon: negotiations or military action.

Return Arms-Grade Plutonium: U.S.

Japan Times

Washington has been pressing Tokyo to return over 300 kg of mostly weapons-grade plutonium given to Japan for research purposes during the Cold War era.

Hagel Suggests Nuclear Proficiency Tests May Be Too Difficult

Jon Harper | Stars and Stripes

Proficiency tests for nuclear launch officers might be too difficult, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel said Friday.

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