Edition

Proliferation News 7/18/24

IN THIS ISSUE: Political Drivers of China’s Changing Nuclear Policy: Implications for U.S.-China Nuclear Relations and International Security, China Suspends Nuclear Talks With US Over Arms Sales to Taiwan, U.S. Privately Warned Iran Over Suspicious Nuclear Activities, Washington-Seoul Alliance is a ‘Nuclear Alliance,’ US Official Says, More South Koreans Want Seoul to Have its Own Nuclear Weapons, North Korean Nuclear Weapons, 2024

Published on July 18, 2024

Tong Zhao | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Considering the potentially catastrophic consequences of a significant U.S.-China military conflict—which could involve nuclear escalation—the most impactful approach for reducing nuclear risks requires serious efforts from the United States, China, and other countries and civil society actors in the global community to truly comprehend and address the root political issues between the two major powers…This report provides a comprehensive examination of China’s prevailing nuclear perspectives and policymaking mechanisms, shedding light on the underlying political challenges and potential strategies for managing them. To strive for an objective examination, the report presents and evaluates Chinese perspectives and, to the extent possible, refrains from injecting the author’s personal judgments about them.

Andrew Roth | The Guardian 

China has suspended talks over arms control and nuclear proliferation with the US in protest against arms sales to Taiwan, the democratically governed island aligned with Washington that China claims as its own territory. The decision, announced by China’s foreign ministry on Wednesday, halts the early nuclear-arms talks in a period of growing tensions between China and the US, with both US presidential candidates calling for increased trade restrictions and efforts to contain Chinese influence in east Asia.

Barak Ravid | Axios 

The Biden administration sent a private warning to Iran last month expressing serious concerns about Iranian research and development activities that could be used for the production of a nuclear weapon, three U.S. and Israeli officials told Axios. The U.S. and Israel have both detected suspicious nuclear activities by Iranian scientists in recent months. Officials fear they could be part of a covert Iranian effort to use the period around the U.S. presidential election to make progress toward nuclear weaponization.

Eunjung Cho and Young Gyo Kim | VoA

A high-ranking U.S. official stressed Tuesday that the U.S.-South Korea alliance is a “nuclear alliance,” reinforcing the South Korean government’s description of the two allies, after the United States and South Korea signed new deterrence guidelines last week. Vipin Narang, U.S. acting assistant secretary of defense for Space Policy, told VOA’s Korean Service in an exclusive interview that “when we formally extend nuclear deterrence to our allies, it is a nuclear alliance, and South Korea is an example of that.”

Christian Davies | Financial Times

Public support is growing in South Korea for the country to develop its own nuclear arsenal, amid rising concerns about deepening defence co-operation between North Korea and Russia and the possibility of a second Donald Trump presidency…“The resurfacing of the pro-nuclear weapons discussion in South Korea is driven by justifiable concerns about the threat from North Korea and the potential for political change in the US,” said Dalton. “But placing one’s security in the hands of another party is inherently an exercise in trust; an ally can never be fully and perpetually reassured.”

Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda, Eliana Johns, Mackenzie Knight 

North Korea continues to modernize and grow its nuclear weapons arsenal. In this Nuclear Notebook, the authors cautiously estimate that North Korea may have produced enough fissile material to hypothetically build up to 90 nuclear warheads, but has likely assembled fewer than that—potentially around 50. To deliver the warheads, North Korea is enhancing and diversifying its missile force, most recently with new solid-fuel long-range strategic missiles, short-range tactical missiles, and sea-based missiles.


Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.