James M. Acton | Arms Control Association
If states behaved like rational adults, China and the United States would sit down and try to negotiate an agreement to head off their emerging nuclear arms race. Unfortunately, that is not going to happen…Yet, even if averting a new arms race will be extremely difficult, the next president still should try to do that by forcing the bureaucracy to consider its costs seriously. Specifically, the next president should require, as part of the next nuclear posture review, a realistic assessment of the feasibility of effective nuclear “counterforce” operations, the U.S. practice of targeting an opponent’s nuclear forces and command-and-control systems, compared to the alternatives.
Nominations for the 2025 Thérèse Delpech Memorial Award
Carnegie’s Nuclear Policy Program is pleased to announce that nominations for the 2025 Thérèse Delpech Memorial Award are now open. The award will be presented at the 2025 Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference. It recognizes exceptional creativity, integrity, humanity, and amity—four qualities embodied by Thérèse Delpech, a long-time strategic adviser to the French Atomic Energy Commission, an author, and a distinguished public intellectual. More information about the award can be found here.
Nominations for the award are warmly welcomed from anyone, based in any country, who is actively engaged in the field of nuclear policy in any capacity. Nominations, which should include a detailed explanation of how the nominee fulfills the criteria set out above, should be sent to James Acton by 12:00pm on Monday October 14, 2024.
Mike Stone, Patricia Zengerle and Gerry Doyle | Reuters
The U.S. is close to an agreement to give Ukraine long-range cruise missiles that could reach deep into Russia, but Kyiv would need to wait several months as the U.S. works through technical issues ahead of any shipment, U.S. officials said. The inclusion of Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles (JASSM) in a weapons package is expected to be announced this autumn, three sources said, though a final decision has not been made. The sources declined to be named because they are not authorized to discuss the topic.
Kim Han-joo | Yonhap News
"If the U.S. were to withdraw its extended deterrence commitment and tell us to handle things on our own, South Korea would naturally need to consider the nuclear option," said Yoon Young-kwan, former foreign minister and chairman of the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, a South Korean think tank. "However, that situation has not yet arrived." Yoon, who served under a liberal administration, added that the option of South Korea going nuclear would have a direct negative impact on the South Korea-U.S. alliance. Nevertheless, Yoon noted that the option could possibly be explored if a Republican candidate wins the upcoming U.S. election, resulting in extreme isolationist policies.
Tracey Honney | Nuclear Engineering
Iran has made significant strides in the construction of the second and third units of the Bushehr NPP, with nearly 6m cubic metres of earthwork completed, according to Project Manager Masoud Nasouri. The development includes the installation of 47,000 piles for foundation reinforcement and the completion of the first two phases of shield installation. He added that all construction contracts have been finalised. Currently, around 4,000 workers are involved in the project, and two recruitment campaigns have already been conducted to hire specialised personnel for future operations. Contracts have also been established with Iranian companies for the supply of domestically manufactured goods, ensuring compliance with safety and nuclear standards.
Stephen Losey | Defense News
The U.S. Air Force “underestimated” the complexity of building a sprawling network of launch centers and other ground infrastructure for its next nuclear missile, which led to severe projected cost overruns, the service’s acquisition chief said Wednesday. Most of the Air Force’s and industry’s attention was initially focused on the missile portion of the LGM-35A Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile, and the program “really neglected the complexity of the ground infrastructure,” Andrew Hunter, the Air Force’s assistant secretary for acquisition, technology and logistics, said at the Defense News Conference in Arlington, Virginia, on Wednesday.
Peter Schroeder | Foreign Affairs
Two and a half years after Russia invaded Ukraine, the United States’ strategy for ending the war remains the same: impose enough costs on Russia that its president, Vladimir Putin, will decide that he has no choice but to halt the conflict. In an effort to change his cost-benefit calculus, Washington has tried to find the sweet spot between supporting Ukraine and punishing Russia on the one hand, and reducing the risks of escalation on the other. As rational as this approach may appear, it rests on a faulty assumption: that Putin’s mind can be changed.