Reducing Nuclear Salience: How to Reassure Northeast Asian Allies
Lauren Sukin and Toby Dalton | Washington Quarterly
Growing threats do require renewed US alliance deterrence and assurance initiatives in East Asia. But increasing the prominence of nuclear weapons in US Northeast Asian alliances may backfire by exacerbating concerns that possible rash US action could cause or worsen crises or by increasing allied desire for their own nuclear weapons.
Cooperation Under Asymmetry? The Future of US-China Nuclear Relations
Fiona S. Cunningham | Washington Quarterly
US-China crisis stability and arms race stability are on tenuous ground because of five asymmetries in the bilateral relationship. Despite these asymmetries, leaders on both sides can use three principles, or 3 C’s, to pursue mutual interests in reducing nuclear risks.
Russia, US Will Launch Arms Control Talks to Avoid ‘Accidental War’
Jacqueline Feldscher | Defense One
U.S. and Russian officials agreed Wednesday to open the lines of communication regarding the two nations’ nuclear stockpiles to reduce the risk of an accident, President Joe Biden told reporters. The bilateral strategic stability dialogue is “diplomatic-speak for getting our military experts and our diplomats together to work on a mechanism that can lead to the control of new and dangerous and sophisticated weapons that are coming on the scene now that reduce the times of response, that raise the prospects of accidental war,” Biden said at a press conference in Geneva, where he appeared relaxed after a week of foreign engagements.
Iran Nuclear Deal Hangs in Balance as Islamic Republic Votes
Jon Gambrell | Associated Press
Iran’s tattered nuclear deal with world powers hangs in the balance as the country prepares to vote on Friday for a new president and diplomats press on with efforts to get both the U.S. and Tehran to reenter the accord. The deal represents the signature accomplishment of the relatively moderate President Hassan Rouhani’s eight years in office: suspending crushing sanctions in exchange for the strict monitoring and limiting of Iran’s uranium stockpile.
Acting SECNAV Says Memo Doesn’t Mean He’s Canceling Nuclear Sea-Launched Cruise Missile
John M. Doyle | Seapower Magazine
Acting Navy Secretary Thomas Harker says he is not planning to scrap the Nuclear Sea-Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM-N) despite a memo that appears to indicate otherwise. “The program is in our FY22 (fiscal year 2022) budget,” Harker told a House Armed Services Committee hearing June 15. Some Republican lawmakers were outraged after news outlets reported earlier this month that Harker directed the Navy in a June 4 memo to “defund” the sea-launched cruise missile in fiscal 2023. The memo surfaced after the Pentagon released the fiscal 2022 defense budget but before the start of a Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), a statement by the senior Republicans on the House and Senate armed services committees noted. The NPR is an appraisal of U.S. nuclear policy conducted when a new administration takes office.
New GBSD Will Fly in 2023; No Margin Left for Minuteman
John A. Tirpak | Air Force Magazine
The first example of the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent missile will fly by the end of calendar year 2023 from Vandenberg Space Force Base, Calif., program officials revealed, while emphasizing that there’s no further margin to extend the Minuteman III system without risking the credibility of the intercontinental ballistic missile force. “We’re … already in critical design review for the subsystems, and we’re months away from first flight,” Air Force GBSD program manager Col. Jason Bartolomei said in an AFA Doolittle Leadership Center virtual forum June 14. The GBSD is being developed by Northrop Grumman.
U.S. Nuclear Regulator Approves Fuel for Next-Generation Reactors
Reuters
The U.S. nuclear power regulator has approved production of uranium fuel that is far more enriched than fuel for conventional nuclear power plants, the company aiming to make the material said on Monday. The fuel is known as high-assay, low-enriched uranium, or HALEU. Nonproliferation experts are concerned about the fuel as it is easier to convert into fissile material, the key component of nuclear weapons, than conventional reactor fuel.