Russia, NATO, and the INF Treaty
Ulrich Kühn and Anna Peczali
Since 2014, the United States has publicly accused Russia of violating the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, a landmark Cold War nuclear arms control agreement. On February 14, 2017 the New York Times reported that Russia has already deployed a significant number of prohibited missiles. In light of these developments, the Trump administration will face the tough decision about whether or not to remain committed to the treaty. This article recounts the history of the INF treaty and assesses Russian and US interests related to the treaty. It develops three possible future scenarios for Russian actions and their impact on, as well as possible responses by, the United States and its NATO allies. The conclusion is that NATO allies will most likely face an ambiguous Russian stance with respect to INF weapons, which will make it difficult to find a balanced response strategy, bringing together diplomatic and economic pressure as well as military means to respond to Russia’s INF violation.
North Korea Evades Sanctions With Network of Overseas Companies: U.N. Report
James Pearson | Reuters
North Korea is evading international sanctions with a sophisticated network of overseas companies, enabled partly by its continued access to the international banking system, says a forthcoming United Nations report seen by Reuters. North Korea is under heavy U.N. sanctions and a strict arms embargo designed to impede the development of its banned nuclear and missile programs. The U.N. panel of experts, which produced the 100-page draft report, was created to investigate reported infringements of those sanctions.
Trump Wants to Make Sure U.S. Nuclear Arsenal at 'Top of the Pack'
Steve Holland | Reuters
President Donald Trump said on Thursday he wants to ensure the U.S. nuclear arsenal is at the "top of the pack." In his first comments about the U.S. nuclear arsenal since taking office on Jan. 20, Trump said in an interview he would like to see a world with no nuclear weapons but expressed concern that the United States has "fallen behind on nuclear weapon capacity."
Russia’s Army Retrofitted With New Nuclear-Capable Ballistic Missile System
Franz-Stefen Gady | Diplomat
The majority of missile units within the Russian Ground Forces (RGF) have been retrofitted with the short-range nuclear-capable road-mobile 9K720 Iskander-M (NATO reporting name SS-26 Stone) ballistic missile system as the obsolete Soviet-era OTR-21 tactical missiles are being phased out, the head of the RGF, Colonel-General Oleg Salyukov, told reporters on February 22, TASS news agency reports. “Work continues in the ground forces to rearm military units and formations with the modern types of armament and military hardware. The ground forces’ missile formations are switching over in a planned procedure from the Tochka-U tactical missile complex to the Iskander-M system. As of today, over 80 percent of missile formations have received the new missile systems,” Salyukov said.
Land Swap Clears Way for THAAD Missile System in South Korea
Ed Adamczyk | UPI
A company in South Korea has agree to a land swap to allow the U.S.-made THAAD anti-missile system to be placed on what is now a golf resort, South Korea's defense ministry announced. The U.S. Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD, battery will be installed on the property as early as this summer to counter a threat of attack from North Korea.
Is Three-Dimessional (3D) Printing a Nuclear Proliferation Tool?
Robert Kelley | EU Non-Proliferation Consortium
Popular press and more serious analysts have speculated that a complete nuclear weapon or gas centrifuge could be built using a 3D printer, detailed and accurate computer drawings, and appropriate materials. However, very specialized starting materials such as plutonium powder or high explosives would be required and are not readily available. In fact, there are many barriers to successfully manufacturing a complete nuclear weapon and in most cases 3D printing gives no advantage to a non-state proliferator, or even a state, trying to clandestinely build a weapon. This paper examines the technical limitations of the technology and makes suggestions for how European export regimes can build up and maintain an awareness of cases where it could enable the bypassing of nuclear proliferation barriers.