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The Dangerous Fallout of Russia’s Anti-Satellite Missile Test

IN THIS ISSUE: The Dangerous Fallout of Russia’s Anti-Satellite Missile Test, U.S. Floats Interim Iran Nuclear Deal, UN Atomic Watchdog: Iran Further Raising Nuclear Stockpile, US and China Agree to Hold Talks on Nuclear Arsenals, Top Military Leader Says China’s Hypersonic Missile Test ‘Went Around the World’, No Use. Period.

Published on November 18, 2021

The Dangerous Fallout of Russia’s Anti-Satellite Missile Test

Ankit Panda | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Russia has tested a direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) missile against a live satellite target, the third test of its kind by a country since 2007. The test, and the resulting orbital debris, have focused international attention on the rapidly declining sustainability of near-Earth space and the need to constrain this kind of weapons testing.

U.S. Floats Interim Iran Nuclear Deal

Barak Ravid | Axios

National security adviser Jake Sullivan raised with his Israeli counterpart the idea of an interim agreement with Iran to buy more time for nuclear negotiations, three Israeli and U.S. sources tell me. Why it matters: The idea is only preliminary, and the Biden administration continues to insist that the full 2015 nuclear deal be restored. But with nuclear talks set to resume in Vienna on Nov. 29, it provides a window into at least some of the thinking inside the administration.

UN Atomic Watchdog: Iran Further Raising Nuclear Stockpile

Kiyoko Metzler | Associated Press

The United Nations’ atomic watchdog says it believes that Iran has further increased its stockpile of highly enriched uranium in breach of a 2015 accord with world powers. The International Atomic Energy Agency told member nations in its confidential quarterly report Wednesday that Iran has an estimated stock of 17.7 kilograms (39 pounds) of uranium enriched to up to 60% fissile purity, an increase of almost 8 kilograms since August. Such highly enriched uranium can be easily refined to make atomic weapons, which is why world powers have sought to contain Tehran’s nuclear program.

US and China Agree to Hold Talks on Nuclear Arsenals

Demetri Sevastopulo and Tom Mitchell | Financial Times

Presidents Joe Biden and Xi Jinping have agreed to hold talks aimed at reducing tensions, as US anxiety grows at China’s expanding nuclear arsenal and its recent test of a hypersonic weapon. Jake Sullivan, US national security adviser, said the US and Chinese leaders had discussed the need for nuclear “strategic stability” talks in their virtual meeting on Monday. China has previously refused to hold nuclear talks, partly because the US has a much larger weapons arsenal.

Top Military Leader Says China’s Hypersonic Missile Test ‘Went Around the World’

Chandelis Duster | CNN

China’s test of a hypersonic missile over the summer “went around the world,” the second most senior US general said in an interview released Tuesday, shedding new details on the test and warning that China might one day be able to launch a surprise nuclear attack on the United States. “They launched a long-range missile,” General John Hyten, the outgoing vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff told CBS News. “It went around the world, dropped off a hypersonic glide vehicle that glided all the way back to China, that impacted a target in China.” When asked if the missile hit the target, Hyten said, “Close enough.”

No Use. Period.

Michael Krepon | Inkstick

There’s a big fight about what the Pentagon’s Nuclear Posture Review will say about when the Biden administration might use nuclear weapons in warfare. Should the “sole purpose” of the US nuclear arsenal be to retaliate against first use by others? Should US declaratory policy be more explicit, embracing “no first use?” Or should Team Biden leave well enough alone, leaving these matters cloaked in ambiguity? After all, the essence of deterrence, as we have been repeatedly told, is that which leaves much to chance.

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.