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The Near Future of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime

IN THIS ISSUE: The Near Future of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime, U.S. Cool to, but Does Not Reject, Iran’s Idea on Reviving Nuclear Deal, Experts: Biden Thought Likely to Reverse Trump’s North Korea Policies, DepSecDef Will Run Most Missile Defense, Nuke Modernization; SecDef Recused, Nighttime in Pyongyang: Aesthetics and Deterrence Under Kim Jong Un, Moon, Biden to Map Out ‘Comprehensive’ N. Korea Strategy Together

Published on February 4, 2021

The Near Future of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime

George Perkovich | International Luxembourg Forum on Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe

I have been asked to explore how the collapse of the JCPOA will affect the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. The non-proliferation regime is a very important element of the broader nuclear order (about which I wrote in 2017, The Brittle Nuclear Order). That broader order involves restraint and deterrence in the potential use of nuclear weapons, commitments to preserve strategic stability, cooperation in preventing proliferation. It also obligates nuclear-weapon states to pursue the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals and to offer peaceful nuclear cooperation to states that forego nuclear weapons. My focus in the present paper is more narrowly on nuclear weapons proliferation in the wake of the JCPOA’s collapse.

U.S. Cool to, but Does Not Reject, Iran’s Idea on Reviving Nuclear Deal

Arshad Mohammed and Humeyra Pamuk | Reuters

The U.S. State Department reacted coolly on Tuesday to an Iranian suggestion that Washington and Tehran take synchronized steps to return to the Iran nuclear deal, though a U.S. official said the stance should not be seen as a rejection. On Monday, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif had said one way to bridge the impasse with Washington was for an EU official to choreograph their steps to restore the 2015 pact abandoned in 2018 by then-President Donald Trump. It was the first time Zarif had hinted Iran might relent in its demand that the United States ease economic sanctions before Tehran would resume compliance. The Biden administration has insisted Iran return to compliance before it would do so.

Experts: Biden Thought Likely to Reverse Trump’s North Korea Policies

Christy Lee | Voice of America

The Biden administration is likely to reverse the Trump administration’s North Korea policies, but experts see little hope for significant progress toward denuclearization in the face of Pyongyang’s determination to strengthen its nuclear arsenal. As the new Biden administration gears up to formulate policies toward North Korea, experts think the administration will probably return to the incremental approach to denuclearization that was the norm before former President Donald Trump’s term in office. The U.S. traditionally favored a step-by-step approach where Washington would grant series of small concessions or rewards such as sanctions relief or economic incentives as Pyongyang takes small steps along the trajectory of long-term denuclearization.

DepSecDef Will Run Most Missile Defense, Nuke Modernization; SecDef Recused

Paul McLeary | Breaking Defense

Several of the Pentagon’s biggest missile defense and long-range strike programs will fall under Kathleen Hicks’ portfolio if she’s confirmed as the Pentagon’s No. 2 civilian official. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin has recused himself from dealing with issues involving Raytheon due to his work with the company after retiring from the Army, and Hicks told the Senate Armed Services Committee she would oversee development of the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent, Long Range Stand Off weapon, “and other timely missile defense issues.” Those put Hicks at the center of some of the Pentagon’s largest, most expensive, and controversial modernization efforts as the Biden administration grapples with the massive nuclear modernization of the country’s nuclear triad and building a new generation of missiles.

Nighttime in Pyongyang: Aesthetics and Deterrence Under Kim Jong Un

Megan DuBois | Diplomat

North Korea and its nuclear weapons program are often analyzed through the lens of hard power — the power of coercion, achieved through military, technological, or economic force. Such analysis is important, but it’s incomplete. When North Korea conducts large, publicized demonstrations of its military capabilities — for example, the October 2020 and January 2021 military parades — how and why these capabilities are portrayed are just as important as what they represent. From the opening shots of these events, it was clear that they were not just technical displays of military systems. Instead, they represented a large-scale exercise in aesthetic composition designed to support Pyongyang’s strategic objectives.

Moon, Biden to Map Out ‘Comprehensive’ N. Korea Strategy Together

Lee Chi-dong and Byun Duk-kun | Yonhap News Agency

The leaders of South Korea and the United States agreed Thursday to draw up a joint “comprehensive” strategy on North Korea during their phone talks, Cheong Wa Dae announced. South Korean President Moon Jae-in and his U.S. counterpart Joe Biden also agreed to work together for the shared goal of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula and bringing lasting peace to the region, according to Moon's spokesman Kang Min-seok. Moon proposed that the two sides make joint efforts to advance the denuclearization and peace-building process in the half-hour conversation, according to Kang.

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.