Edition

Time for a Nuclear Intervention With Japan

IN THIS ISSUE: Time for a Nuclear Intervention With Japan, Will South Korea’s New President Foil Trump’s Attempt to Pressure North Korea?, North Korea’s Latest Missile Test: Advancing Towards an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) While Avoiding US Military Action, Japan Favors Aegis Ashore Over THAAD to Boost Missile Defense: Sources, Tejas Successfully Test Fires Missile With Beyond Visual Range Capability, What Would the Government Do After a WMD Attack? We Have No Idea

Published on May 16, 2017

Time for a Nuclear Intervention With Japan

James Acton

In international friendships as in personal ones, interventions are sometimes necessary to prevent self-destructive behavior. Japan’s nuclear policy, which calls for the U.S. to help Tokyo help itself before it’s too late, is a case in point. Japan already has enough plutonium to build at least 1,300 nuclear warheads. Officially, this material is to be used to fuel nuclear reactors, but almost all of Japan’s reactors have been offline since the 2011 Fukushima accident, and efforts to restart them are moving at a glacial pace. As a result, Japan has almost no capacity to consume plutonium.

Will South Korea’s New President Foil Trump’s Attempt to Pressure North Korea?

Jon Wolfsthal and Abraham Denmark

 President Donald Trump has identified North Korea as an urgent threat from whom nobody is safe, but efforts to maximize pressure and convince Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear weapons program have always been a long shot. The only chance of ending North Korea’s nuclear obsession is for the United States, South Korea, Japan, and China to collectively put enough pressure on Pyongyang to convince Kim Jong Un that a deal has to be made.

North Korea’s Latest Missile Test: Advancing Towards an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) While Avoiding US Military Action

John Schilling | 38 North

 North Korea’s latest successful missile test represents a level of performance never before seen from a North Korean missile. The missile would have flown a distance of some 4,5oo kilometers if launched on a maximum trajectory. It appears to have not only demonstrated an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) that might enable them to reliably strike the US base at Guam, but more importantly, may represent a substantial advance to developing an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). Given speculation over the past months about the possibility of military action by the Trump administration to prevent Pyongyang from acquiring such a weapons, the possible testing of ICBM subsystems in this low-key manner may be a North Korean hedge against the possibility of such action.

Japan Favors Aegis Ashore Over THAAD to Boost Missile Defense: Sources

Reuters

Japan is leaning towards choosing the Aegis Ashore missile-defense system over another advanced system called Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), government and ruling party sources said. Faced with North Korea's rapid missile and nuclear development, and its threats, Japan has been looking into introducing a new missile-defense layer - either the THAAD or the Aegis Ashore, a land-based version of the Aegis system developed for war ships.

Tejas Successfully Test Fires Missile With Beyond Visual Range Capability

Hindustan Times

Light combat aircraft Tejas on Friday “successfully” test fired an air-to-air missile, paving the way for powering the indigenously-built aircraft with missiles having beyond visual range capabilities (BVR). The test-firing was conducted on a manoeuvrable aerial target at the interim test range in Chandipur in Odisha.

What Would the Government Do After a WMD Attack? We Have No Idea

Garrett M. Graff | Washington Post

If North Korea launches a nuclear-armed ballistic missile, one of the only things we know for sure about what will happen next is that the news will race around the world on classified networks using the designation reserved for the Pentagon’s highest-level alert, an “OPREP-3 PINNACLE NUCFLASH,” which signals a possible imminent nuclear war. 

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.