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Trump’s Diplomacy with Kim Dims as Both Sides Return to Hard-Line Positions

IN THIS ISSUE: Trump’s Diplomacy with Kim Dims as Both Sides Return to Hard-Line Positions, U.S. Plans Tests This Year of Long-Banned Types of Missiles, Russia Says U.S. is Hiding Nuclear Weapons, Smith: Trim Budget Fat in America’s Nuclear Triad, Are the Rules Which Have Stopped Nuclear War Broken?, Written Evidence Submitted to House of Lords Select Committee on International Relations

Published on March 14, 2019

Trump’s Diplomacy with Kim Dims as Both Sides Return to Hard-Line Positions

John Hudson | Washington Post

The Trump administration has taken a harder-line approach to denuclearizing North Korea since the summit in Vietnam last month, raising doubts about whether the two sides will reach a deal on the centerpiece of President Trump’s foreign policy. In remarks Monday, a top U.S. envoy said the United States would not lift sanctions on North Korea until it completely dismantles its nuclear and ballistic missiles. The United States is also seeking an end to Pyongyang’s chemical and biological weapons, he said. “We are not going to do de¬nuclearization incrementally. The president has been clear on that,” Stephen Biegun, the special U.S. envoy for North Korea, said at a forum hosted by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington. Biegun added that there was “complete unity” inside the Trump administration on that approach.

U.S. Plans Tests This Year of Long-Banned Types of Missiles

Robert Burns | Associated Press

The Pentagon plans to begin flight tests this year of two types of missiles that have been banned for more than 30 years by a treaty from which both the United States and Russia are expected to withdraw in August, defense officials said Wednesday. By moving forward with these missile projects, the Pentagon is not excluding the possibility that the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty could still survive, although it likely will be terminated in August. At that point, Washington and Moscow would no longer face legal constraints on deploying land-based cruise or ballistic missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers (310 to 3,410 miles). The INF treaty has been in effect since 1987. The INF treaty was an arms control landmark in the final years of the Cold War, but it began unraveling several years ago when Washington accused Russia of developing, testing and, more recently, deploying a cruise missile that U.S. officials say violates the treaty. Russia denies the violation and contends the U.S. accusation is a ploy to destroy the treaty. Intermediate-range weapons are regarded as particularly destabilizing because of the short time they take to reach a target.

Russia Says U.S. is Hiding Nuclear Weapons: ‘That is a Serious Problem’

Tom O’Connor | Newsweek

Russia has accused the United States of quietly reclassifying nuclear weapons systems in a potential bid to hide the true scale of its strategic arsenal, which is limited by a treaty between the two leading powers. Speaking at the 2019 Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference, Under Secretary of State Andrea Thompson countered on Monday the notion that President Donald Trump was "disinterested" in extending the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)—an agreement expanding the original 1991 START I designed to reduce the U.S. and Soviet nuclear stockpiles. She argued, however, that "we have two years to make the decision on the extension." The Russian Foreign Ministry, which has accused the U.S. of deflecting efforts to renew the treaty that expires in 2021, reacted Wednesday to these remarks in a statement "to remind our American colleagues that the extension of the New START Treaty is not a mere formality that will take several weeks or even days, as they want the public to believe" and that "the United States must fulfill all its obligations under the treaty" before entering into talks.

Smith: Trim Budget Fat in America’s Nuclear Triad

Joe Gould | Defense News

A powerful skeptic of U.S. nuclear weapons spending, House Armed Services Committee chairman Adam Smith said Tuesday he was open to cutting back quantities of nuclear arms instead of one leg of the nation’s nuclear triad. The comments, at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s annual nuclear arms forum, came days after Smith, D-Wash., triggered Republican pushback when he said publicly that the intercontinental ballistic missile leg of the triad is not necessary to deter Russia and China. On Tuesday, Smith seemed to soften on that argument, conceding he believes nuclear weapon systems ought to be modernized but maintaining his stance the U.S. needs fewer nuclear weapons. “I think a deterrent policy, having enough nuclear weapons to ensure that nobody launches a nuclear weapon at you because you have sufficient deterrent, I think we can do that with fewer warheads,” Smith said. “I’m not sure whether that means getting rid of one leg of the triad or simply reducing the amount in each leg.”

Are the Rules Which Have Stopped Nuclear War Broken?

Jonathan Marcus | BBC News

“We are moving in a minefield, and we don't know from where the explosion will come.” A warning from former Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov delivered at this week's influential Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference in Washington DC. Former U.S. senator and long-time arms control activist Sam Nunn echoed the sentiment. “If the U.S., Russia and China don't work together,” he argued, “it is going to be a nightmare for our children and grandchildren.”

Written Evidence Submitted to House of Lords Select Committee on International Relations

Tong Zhao | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

The overall risk of nuclear use is still very low. However, at least two factors are making that risk greater. One is the growing nuclear competition among some nuclear weapons states, especially the United States, Russia, and China. The United States believes that Russia and China have moved toward a policy of using nuclear weapons first and early in a conventional war. There are reasons why the United States believes so, but Russia and China view this as a major U.S. misunderstanding of their policies, or worse, a deliberate U.S. effort to misportray their policies.

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.