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U.S. Loses Iran Arms Embargo Bid as Putin Pushes Summit to Avoid Nuclear Deal Showdown

IN THIS ISSUE: U.S. Loses Iran Arms Embargo Bid as Putin Pushes Summit to Avoid Nuclear Deal Showdown, Iran, EU Reject U.S. Plan to Trigger ‘Snapback’ of Sanctions, U.S., Russia Still at Odds Over New Nuclear Arms Treaty, U.S. Considers Midrange Missile Deployment in Asia to Counter China, Japan’s Been Proudly Pacifist for 75 Years. A Missile Proposal Challenges That, Opinion: Iran “Snapback” Isn’t Worth The Risk

Published on August 18, 2020

U.S. Loses Iran Arms Embargo Bid as Putin Pushes Summit to Avoid Nuclear Deal Showdown

Michelle Nichols and Gabrielle Tétrault-Farber | Reuters

The United States lost a bid on Friday to extend a U.N. arms embargo on Iran as Russian President Vladimir Putin proposed a summit of world leaders to avoid “confrontation” over a U.S. threat to trigger a return of all U.N. sanctions on Tehran. In a U.N. Security Council vote, Russia and China opposed extending the weapons ban, which is due to expire in October under a 2015 nuclear deal between Iran and world powers. Eleven members abstained, including France, Germany and Britain, while Washington and the Dominican Republic were the only yes votes. “The Security Council’s failure to act decisively in defense of international peace and security is inexcusable,” U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said in a statement.

Iran, EU Reject U.S. Plan to Trigger ‘Snapback’ of Sanctions

RFE / RL 

Iran and the European Union have rejected U.S. President Donald Trump's plan to trigger a “snapback” of sanctions on Iran at the United Nations under a provision of the Iran nuclear deal. Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, noting that the United States withdrew from the agreement, was quoted by state media on August 16 as saying that the Americans “know very well that the implementation of the snapback is something illegal and therefore absolutely unacceptable.” A spokeswoman for EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell, also speaking on August 16, said that since Washington withdrew from the agreement, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), it could not be considered a part of it.

U.S., Russia Still at Odds Over New Nuclear Arms Treaty

David Rising | Associated Press

The United States and Russia concluded two days of arms control talks Tuesday with the two sides still at odds over the U.S. demand to include China in any new treaty but showing signs of a possible willingness to extend the existing New START deal, which expires next year. U.S. negotiator Marshall Billingslea told reporters after the talks in Vienna ended that “there are some areas of convergence between Russia and the United States, but we do remain far apart on a number of key issues.” The U.S. argues that any new nuclear arms limitation treaty should cover all types of warheads, include better verification protocols and transparency measures, and be extended to include China, which has been increasing its own arsenal. 

U.S. Considers Midrange Missile Deployment in Asia to Counter China

Ryo Nakamura | Nikkei Asian Review

The U.S. will talk with Asian allies about deploying midrange missiles now under development to counter the “immediate threat” of China's nuclear arsenal, Washington's top arms control negotiator told Nikkei in a phone interview Friday. Marshall Billingslea, the special presidential envoy for arms control, said Washington wants to “engage in talks with our friends and allies in Asia over the immediate threat that the Chinese nuclear buildup poses, not just to the United States but to them, and the kinds of capabilities that we will need to defend the alliance in the future.” In particular, Billingslea pointed to a midrange, non-nuclear, ground-launched cruise missile under development in the U.S. Work began in August 2019 after the U.S. withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty with Russia, which banned such weapons.

Japan’s Been Proudly Pacifist for 75 Years. A Missile Proposal Challenges That.

Matoko Rich | New York Times

Shinzo Abe is facing some of the toughest challenges of his record-setting tenure as Japan’s prime minister, with persistent flare-ups of the coronavirus, an economy mired in recession, and a public fed up with his government’s handling of the crises. Yet Mr. Abe’s administration is focusing on a different threat, one that lines up with a long-running preoccupation for the prime minister: the prospect of ballistic missile attacks by North Korea or China. This month, Mr. Abe’s political party began publicly considering whether the country should acquire weapons capable of striking missile launch sites in enemy territory if an attack appeared imminent. Such a capacity would be unremarkable for most world powers. But for Japan, which on Saturday commemorated the 75th anniversary of the end of World War II — and 75 years of renouncing combat — the proposal is fraught. In considering loosening restrictions on Japan’s ability to attack targets in other countries, the party has revived a protracted and politically sensitive debate.

Opinion: Iran “Snapback” Isn’t Worth The Risk

John Bolton | Wall Street Journal

For the U.S., there is one point of high principle worth dying in a ditch for at the United Nations: Never impair the Security Council veto. That’s what President Trump is preparing to do, exacerbating President Obama’s mistakes in negotiating the 2015 Iran nuclear deal. Mr. Trump rightly withdrew from that agreement in May 2018. The attendant renewal of U.S. sanctions, although imperfectly implemented, brought crushing economic pressure against Tehran. Even so, despite Iran’s continuing violations of the agreement and its widespread belligerent and terrorist-supporting activities, this diplomatic zombie still lurks in the minds of its progenitors, threatening a return next year. Iran Deal 2.0 could come in a Biden administration or even in a second Trump term. 

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