Edition

West Fears Possible Iran-North Korea Nuclear Links

IN THIS ISSUE: West fears possible Iran-N. Korea nuclear links, changing the direction of U.S.-Pakistan relations, Koreas set for nuke talks, India, US urged to prepare for 'worst case Pakistan scenarios,' Parsing Seoul's nuclear debate, masses turn out to protest nuclear power.

Published on September 20, 2011
 

West fears possible Iran-North Korea nuclear links

Fredrik Dahl | Reuters

Bushehr

It is one of the West's biggest nuclear proliferation nightmares -- that increasingly isolated Iran and North Korea might covertly trade know-how, material or technology that could be put to developing atomic bombs.

"Such a relationship would be logical and beneficial to both North Korea and Iran," said Mark Hibbs, an expert of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Last year, a U.N. report suggested that impoverished, reclusive North Korea might have supplied Iran as well as Syria and Myanmar with banned atomic technology.

In what could be a sign of this, a German newspaper last month reported that North Korea had provided Iran with a computer program as part of intensified cooperation that could help the Islamic state build nuclear weapons.

"There are reports and rumors, which governments and the IAEA (the U.N. International Atomic Energy Agency) have not denied, indicating that there may be a track record of bilateral nuclear cooperation between North Korea and Iran," Hibbs said

But while this could make sense for two states facing tightening sanctions -- and potentially earn Pyongyang some badly needed funds -- the extent and nature of any such dealings, if they take place at all, remain shrouded in mystery.     Full Article



Follow the Nuclear Policy Program
 RSS News Feed Twitter
Footer information begins here

More from Proliferation News


 
 
Related
George Perkovich | LA Times
As the United States begins to scale back its fighting role in Afghanistan, it needs to confront the more important question of Pakistans future. The United States has been a major player there for 60 years — more intensely so since the Sept. 11 attacks. If Pakistan is dangerously dysfunctional, Washington helped it get that way.     Full Article

Kim Young-jin | Korea Times
Working-level officials from the two Koreas met Tuesday in Beijing to set the table for the second round of rare bilateral denuclearization talks, slated for today, amid cautious hopes for the eventual resumption of multilateral negotiations. Wi Sung-lac, Seoul’s chief nuclear envoy is slated to meet his North Korean counterpart, Ri Yong-ho in Beijing for the second time since July as regional players try to seize on a recent warming trend and resume the long-stalled six-party talks.     Full Article

Anwar Iqbal | Dawn
The United States and India should begin classified exchanges on multiple Pakistan contingencies, including the collapse of the Pakistan state and the spectre of the Pakistani military losing control of its nuclear arsenal, says a joint US-India study. The 53-page report, co-sponsored by the US Council on Foreign Relations and the Aspen Institute India, urges New Delhi to open channels of communication with the Pakistan military while advising the United States to do everything possible to assist Pakistan in protecting its nuclear arsenal.     Full Article

Ellie Immerman | Carnegie Proliferation Analysis
Spurred in great measure by North Korea’s sinking of the South Korean naval vessel Cheonan and shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in 2010, calls for Seoul to seek deployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea or to develop a domestic nuclear weapons program have become frequent in recent months.     Full Article

 
 
Related
Kazuaki Nagata | Japan Times
Tens of thousands of people including musicians, a Nobel laureate and Fukushima residents converged on Meiji Park in Tokyo to vent their anger about the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear plant crisis and demand the abolition of atomic power.     Full Article
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.