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What the United States Can do to Stabilize its Nuclear Relationship with China

IN THIS ISSUE: What the United States Can do to Stabilize its Nuclear Relationship with China, New Kalibr-M Cruise Missile with Range of Over 4,500 km in Development in Russia, Kim Jong Un Shows Trump There are Plenty More - or at Least One More – Fish in the Sea, Hints for 2019: Kim Jong Un’s New Year’s Address, Tests Concluded, Iran Prepares for Launching of Satellites

Published on January 8, 2019

What the United States Can do to Stabilize its Nuclear Relationship with China

Tong Zhao | Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

Changes in U.S. nuclear weapons policies introduced by the Trump administration have created new challenges for the U.S.-China nuclear relationship. This is happening at the same time that the bilateral competition is turning increasingly serious and even hostile. As the most important external influencer of China’s nuclear policy, the United States can take a number of steps to prevent this bilateral nuclear relationship from falling into a deeper, more negative cycle of action-and-reaction. Such an effort should include at least five elements: lead by doing (and demonstrate the right values); try to get a more accurate understanding of China; find a common framework for maintaining nuclear stability; start by reducing shared risks; and help China better understand U.S. policy.

New Kalibr-M Cruise Missile with Range of Over 4,500 km in Development in Russia - Source

TASS

New Kalibr-M cruise missile with a range of over 4,500 km is currently under development in Russia for the Russian Navy, a source in the military-industrial complex told TASS on Tuesday. “The newest high-precision ship-based Kalibr-M cruise missile with a maximum firing range of more than 4,500 km is being developed for the Russian Navy. The creation of the rocket is at the stage of scientific research and financed by the Ministry of Defense,” the source told TASS. The source clarified that the development of the missile was included in the state armament program until 2027, and “the rocket must be transferred to the fleet before the end of the program.”

Kim Jong Un Shows Trump There are Plenty More - or at Least One More – Fish in the Sea

Anna Fifield | Washington Post

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has issued a veiled warning to President Trump with his surprise visit to China this week: He has other options for economic and diplomatic normalization if their rapprochement falters. Kim and Trump are planning a follow-up meeting to their historic summit in Singapore in June. But there are misgivings on both sides about each other’s sincerity and commitment to improving their bilateral relations. Against this backdrop, Kim, joined by his wife and an entourage of officials, arrived in Beijing on Tuesday for his fourth summit meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping in less than a year. He will remain here through Thursday, making this the longest of his trips. Analysts, however, saw a deeper significance in Kim’s arrival Tuesday. “Kim Jong Un is not feeling confident about his second summit with Donald Trump, so he is trying to court his Chinese counterpart,” said Zhao Tong of the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center in Beijing. “This sends a message to the U.S. that, even if the U.S. does not cooperate, even if they keep the economic sanctions, North Korea can still do well with China’s support.” 

Hints for 2019: Kim Jong Un’s New Year’s Address

Robert Carlin | 38 North

In his January 1st New Year’s speech, Kim Jong Un was almost relentlessly positive in discussing DPRK-U.S. relations, a topic that took up an unusually large portion of the entire address. Rather than reprise the complaints about the negotiations with the U.S. that had been the focus of numerous Pyongyang commentaries in recent months—almost all of them aimed at the external audience and not replayed on domestic media—Kim instead recounted his upbeat personal experience and almost unalloyed expectations as a result of the June 2018 Singapore summit. By doing so, he has deliberately left himself and President Trump maximum space for conducting negotiations leading up to a second summit. At the same time, Kim emphasized for the internal North Korean audience that he is personally committed to moving ahead with the U.S., and at least guardedly optimistic that progress is possible. This posture was in some ways similar to Kim’s public, personal commitment in January 2018 to engaging ROK President Moon Jae-in, which resulted in rapid progress on the inter-Korean front early in the year.

Tests Concluded, Iran Prepares for Launching of Satellites

Associated Press

Iran’s telecommunications minister said Saturday his country’s three new satellites have successfully passed pre-launch tests. Mohammad Javad Azari Jahromi made the announcement in a tweet but did not mention a launch schedule. Iran usually displays space achievements in February during the anniversary of the 1979 Islamic revolution. On Tuesday, Iran said it plans to send Payam, a 200-pound (90-kilogram) non-military satellite into a 310-mile (500-kilometer) orbit using an Iranian Simorgh satellite-carrier rocket. On Thursday, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said Iran’s plans for sending satellites into orbit demonstrate the country’s defiance of a U.N. Security Council resolution that calls on Iran to undertake no activity related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons. Iran says the launches do not violate the resolution.

India Exploring Sale of BrahMos Cruise Missile to Indonesia

Rezaul Laskar | Hindustan Times

India is exploring the possibility of selling the BrahMos cruise missile to Indonesia, and a team from the Indo-Russian joint venture that makes the weapon system visited a state-run shipyard in Surabaya last year to assess the fitting of the missile on Indonesian warships, people familiar with developments said. Besides the BrahMos, India has offered to supply coastal defence radars and marine grade steel to Indonesia and to service the Russian-made Su-30 combat jets flown by the Indonesian air force as part of efforts to deepen bilateral defence and military cooperation, the people said. 

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