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Why Do We Need 'Hypersonic' Strike Weapons, Exactly?

IN THIS ISSUE: Why Do We Need 'hypersonic' weapons?, Russia and West at odds over Syria, Defense Ministry mulls SM-3 interceptor missiles, Japan's plutonium stockpile jumped to 47 tons in 2013, India to deploy defence against mallistic missiles by 2016, India, China to talk nuclear cooperation.

Published on September 18, 2014

Why Do We Need 'Hypersonic' Strike Weapons, Exactly?

James Acton | Defense One

It's hard to dispute the notion that before spending billions of dollars on a new weapon, the Pentagon ought to be able to explain what it’s for. So it’s surprising how often this rule isn’t followed. Take the Advanced Hypersonic Weapon.

Russia and West at Odds Over Syria at U.N. Nuclear Meeting

Fredrik Dahl | Reuters

Russia is pushing for the issue of Syria's alleged past nuclear activities to be removed from the agenda of the U.N. atomic agency's board, diplomats said on Wednesday.

Defense Ministry Mulls Introducing Ground-Based SM-3 Interceptor Missiles

Mainichi

The Defense Ministry is considering introducing a new ground-based type of interceptor missile that the United States is developing, in an effort to bolster Japan's ballistic missile defense system, ministry sources said.

Japan's Plutonium Stockpile Jumped to 47 Tons in 2013

Japan Times

Japan had about 47.1 tons of plutonium in and outside the country at the end of 2013, about 2.9 tons more than the year before, the Cabinet Office said on Tuesday.

India to Deploy Defence Against Ballistic Missiles by 2016, Says DRDO Chief

Rahul Singh | Hindustan Times 

Pursuing its ballistic missile defence programme aggressively, India will carry out at least eight more tests to knock out incoming missiles before the capability is ready for deployment by the end of 2016.

India, China to Start Talks on Civil Nuclear Cooperation

Indian Express

India and China on Thursday decided to begin the process of discussion for cooperation in civil nuclear energy sector, an important component of their respective national energy security programme.

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