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Why the United States Should Discuss Mutual Nuclear Vulnerability With China

IN THIS ISSUE: Why the United States Should Discuss Mutual Nuclear Vulnerability With China, Iran Used Secret U.N. Records to Evade Nuclear Probes, The Odds Are Against Reviving Iran Nuclear Deal, U.S. Envoy Says, As N.Korea Gears Up for Potential Nuclear Test, Missiles Get Little Domestic Fanfare, Documents Shed Light on Secret U.S. Plans for Apocalyptic Scenarios, A Current Security Imperative:

Published on May 26, 2022

Why the United States Should Discuss Mutual Nuclear Vulnerability With China

Tong Zhao | Pacific Forum  

Against the background of a more competitive US-China nuclear relationship, the need to defuse the emerging nuclear race is growing. This chapter begins by analyzing one potential driver of China’s nuclear expansion genuine anxiety over US strategic intent and explains why the US acknowledgement of the de facto existence of a mutual nuclear vulnerability relationship with China could help reduce Beijing’s perceived need to invest in nuclear forces. The chapter then examines additional driving forces behind China’s recent acceleration of nuclear buildup and illustrates why US acknowledgement of mutual vulnerability may not address fully China’s threat perception, therefore making it unlikely that such a measure would stabilize the bilateral nuclear relationship by itself. Unclear Chinese expectations of what mutual vulnerability means and how to sustain it at the practical level present challenges for the United States to accept mutual vulnerability formally. Finally, the chapter argues for a dialogue between Washington and Beijing on mutual vulnerability to manage the bilateral nuclear relationship.

Iran Used Secret U.N. Records to Evade Nuclear Probes

Laurence Norman and Sune Engel Rasmussen | Wall Street Journal

Iran secured access to secret U.N. atomic agency reports almost two decades ago and circulated the documents among top officials who prepared cover stories and falsified a record to conceal suspected past work on nuclear weapons, according to Middle East intelligence officials and documents reviewed by The Wall Street Journal. The International Atomic Energy Agency documents and accompanying Persian-language Iranian records reveal some of the tactics Tehran used with the agency, which is tasked with monitoring compliance with nuclear nonproliferation treaties and the later 2015 nuclear deal. The U.S. and the IAEA have said for years that Iran has failed to answer questions about its past nuclear work in a cat-and-mouse game that continues to this day and now complicates a revival of the nuclear deal, which lifted most international sanctions on Iran in exchange for limits on Iran’s nuclear activities.

The Odds Are Against Reviving Iran Nuclear Deal, U.S. Envoy Says

Dan De Luce and Abigail Williams | NBC News

President Joe Biden’s envoy for Iran said Wednesday the prospects of reviving the 2015 Iran nuclear deal were “tenuous” at best as lawmakers demanded the White House come up with a new plan to prevent Tehran from acquiring an atomic bomb. The envoy, Robert Malley, the lead U.S. negotiator for the revival of the nuclear accord, told members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that “as I sit here today, the odds of a successful negotiation are lower than the odds of failure,” adding, “And that is because of the excessive Iranian demands and ... to which we will not succumb.” “We do not have a deal with Iran, and prospects for reaching one are, at best, tenuous,” Malley said.

As N.Korea Gears Up for Potential Nuclear Test, Missiles Get Little Domestic Fanfare 

Hyonhee Shin | Reuters

North Korean state media has kept quiet about a recent flurry of missile tests amid an unprecedented coronavirus wave - perhaps to avoid overshadowing a potential nuclear test, analysts say. North Korea launched three missiles on Wednesday, including its largest intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), the HS-17, prompting live-fire drills by the United States and South Korea and a renewed push for fresh U.N. sanctions. The rare near-simultaneous launch of multiple types of missiles came amid the country’s first confirmed COVID-19 outbreak, which U.N. agencies say might bring a devastating crisis for its 25 million people.

Documents Shed Light on Secret U.S. Plans for Apocalyptic Scenarios

Charlie Savage | New York Times

Newly disclosed documents have shed a crack of light on secret executive branch plans for apocalyptic scenarios — like the aftermath of a nuclear attack — when the president may activate wartime powers for national security emergencies. Until now, public knowledge of what the government put into those classified directives, which invoke emergency and wartime powers granted by Congress or otherwise claimed by presidents, has been limited to declassified descriptions of those developed in the early Cold War. In that era, they included steps like imposing martial law, rounding up people deemed dangerous and censoring news from abroad.

A Current Security Imperative: The US Role in the Marshall Islands

Rose Gottemoeller | Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

Eight years ago, I traveled as undersecretary of state for arms control and international security to the Marshall Islands, a remote place in the central Pacific. I was there to commemorate the 60th anniversary of Castle Bravo, the largest and most catastrophic of the 67 nuclear weapons tests that the United States conducted in the Marshalls during the Cold War. Because of a design error that led to a larger-than-expected blast, radioactive fallout from the test—at Bikini Atoll, which had been evacuated—spread over more than 4,000 square miles of the Pacific Ocean and contaminated nearby populated atolls. I visited the islands to advocate for a total ban on explosive nuclear weapons testing, which modern science makes unnecessary. By contrast, when the US nuclear testing program began in the Marshall Islands in 1946, it was imperative to our national security.

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