Programs
Asia
The Asia Program in Washington studies disruptive security, governance, and technological risks that threaten peace, growth, and opportunity in the Asia-Pacific region, including a focus on China, Japan, and the Korean peninsula.
The Carnegie Asia Program’s “Alliance Future” project aims to ensure that Canberra and Washington are working to operationalize and integrate their alliance in new ways. The project explores how to undertake difficult reforms, forge new modes of cooperation, harmonize outdated regulations, better align national strategies, address sovereignty concerns and risk thresholds, and ultimately reform the alliance for a more competitive era.
The Asia Program in Washington studies disruptive security, governance, and technological risks that threaten peace, growth, and opportunity in the Asia-Pacific region, including a focus on China, Japan, and the Korean peninsula.
Evan A. Feigenbaum
Vice President for Studies, Acting Director, Carnegie China
Evan A. Feigenbaum is vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, where he oversees its work in Washington, Beijing, New Delhi, and Singapore on a dynamic region encompassing both East Asia and South Asia. He served twice as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State and advised two Secretaries of State and a former Treasury Secretary on Asia.
Too many people in Washington and Canberra presume that the strategic challenge from China alone will make defense coordination within the alliance easy. The reality is that it could sharpen contradictions around the kind of operational planning that will be needed to enhance deterrence. Australian and American defense strategies, while closely aligned, are not identical. To build the alliance will require aligning resources, building complementary regional relationships, and investing in resilience.
China’s expanding military strength poses serious questions for the United States, Australia, and their allies. The increasing assertiveness in the region by China necessitates serious preparation on the part of Washington and Canberra in the advent of Chinese coercive action. This paper lays out three hypothetical scenarios of Chinese aggression and proposes ways the U.S. and Australia can strengthen their collective response.
Evolving security architecture in the Indo-Pacific reflects a growing desire for collective approaches. Yet, this diffuse framework lacks the structural coherence required to fully integrate disparate components into a cohesive, coordinated, and integrated combined deterrence force.
U.S. and Australian defense strategies, while closely aligned, are not identical. Investing effort across resources, relationships, and resilience will facilitate more coherence.
A confluence of factors has made Australia less reluctant to increase the scope for U.S. forces to operate in and from Australian territory, but U.S. and Australian national defense postures are not yet in closer alignment. Practical steps are needed that reflect Australia’s current policy realities.
Maintaining an edge in defense science and technology is one part of the U.S. and Australian strategy to deter war or increase the likelihood of victory in war.