The Bush administration has abruptly frozen future work to secure Russian nuclear weapons and dismantle nuclear delivery systems, and may refuse to certify that Russia is in compliance with its current arms control obligations. If the administration, in fact, chooses not to certify Russian arms control compliance, the freeze could become permanent. These moves are already casting a negative cloud on the upcoming summit between Presidents Bush and Putin.
The administration's striking move first reported in the New York Times on April 8, 2002, will block the signing of new contracts to secure Russian warheads, dismantle Russian submarines and long-range missiles, and fund new jobs for former Russian chemical and biological weapon scientists. Administration officials claim that the move is meant to protest what it sees as continued evidence that Russia has not made complete and full declarations about past Soviet chemical and biological weapon programs. These declarations are required by two important international treaties banning all such weapons: the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention. Such concerns have been an issue for several years, and have not been fully resolved. The United States has chosen not to pursue these issues through the treaty-defined process, which include the right of challenge inspections, nor has it raised specific issues it wants Russia to resolve.
The US Congress requires the administration to annually certify that Russia is complying with its arms control obligations in order for threat reduction assistance money to be spent. The affected programs are run by the Departments of Defense, State and Agriculture and fund the dismantlement of Russian missiles, submarines and bombers, secure nuclear weapons, redirect chemical and biological weapon scientists to peaceful research, and improve export control implementation. The programs funded through the Department of Energy to secure nuclear materials are not covered under the certification requirement and are not affected by the current dispute.
Administration officials maintain that the current freeze is temporary, and designed to send Russia "a message" that the US is serious about resolving the long-standing compliance issues. The administration is hoping to obtain and implement a congressionally approved waiver of these requirements, so that the administration can continue to press Russia on its compliance without permanently ending these threat reduction efforts. It is unclear if republicans in the House or Senate will be willing or able to gain approval for such a waiver, or do so without having other issues linked to the passage that could further complicate US-Russian threat reduction efforts.
Additional Resources:
- Russia Country Resource Page
- "Nuclear Terrorism and Warhead Control in Russia," by Jon Wolfsthal and Tom Collina, Arms Control Today, April 2002
- "What If the New Strategic Framework Goes Bad?" by Joseph Cirincione and Jon Wolfsthal, Arms Control Today, November 2001
- "Russia's Nuclear Risk," Proliferation Brief, 27 February 2002
- "U.S. Warns Russia Of Need to Verify Treaty Compliance," by Judith Miller, New York Times, 8 April 2002
- Chemical Weapons Convention- Treaty Text (pdf)
- Biological Weapons Converntion- Treaty Text
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