Many national security experts, including this one, warned that if the United States withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty there would be an international storm of protest. On June 13, President Bush withdrew from the treaty, and the world went on without a hiccup. There is concern but no outrage. The United States and Russia have just negotiated a new treaty continuing reductions in long-range nuclear weapons but without any limits on future missile defense systems. Relations with Russia have never been better.

Is this a complete vindication of the president's policies, as White House officials claim?

There are four reasons why the withdrawal from this particular treaty is of less consequence then it seemed it would be just one year ago.

The first place to start is the obvious and dominant characteristic of our era: the United States is the most powerful nation in the history of the world. Persia, Rome, and China ruled powerful empires, but their influence was continental or regional. The United States dominates the world militarily, economically, politically, diplomatically and even culturally. This does not mean the United States can rule by fiat, but that in most instances it has the single greatest influence. Few nations will pick a fight with such a power. Nor is there a peer competitor on the horizon.

Still, there would have been a more severe reaction to US withdrawal but for the second factor: we were at war. President Bush announced his decision to withdraw on December 13. There was great international sympathy and support for the United States after the horrific strikes of September 11. Our allies are loyal. Few were willing to criticize the president while American troops were in combat. Domestically, Democratic leaders in the Senate had already withdrawn their legislation cutting the missile defense budget by $1 billion and preventing tests that would violate the ABM treaty. They wanted to show national unity during the crisis. President Bush showed no such compunction. He used the moment to advance his agenda of missile defense and defense budget increases.

Still, there might have been more criticism, but for the third factor: the Russians agreed. President Vladimir Putin said it was a mistake, but clearly indicated his willingness to go along with President Bush's decision. As one French colleague told me: "We couldn't be more Russian than the Russians." In late September, Putin conducted a thorough review of his relations with the United States and came to the fundamental conclusion that Russia's future lay with the West. He has an ambitious agenda of integrating Russia with the West economically, politically and even militarily. He is not going to let disagreements about arms control treaties stand in the way of this larger historic agenda.

Still, there were strong voices of opposition within the Russian security establishment and these critics might have prevailed but for the final and deciding factor: there is no missile defense. Russia, China and Europe realize that we may have to live in a world without the ABM treaty, but it may well be a world without missile defenses as well. They see what President Bush's national security advisors have slowly come to accept. For all the rhetoric, all the posturing, the hard reality is that President Bush will not and cannot deploy any meaningful missile defense anytime this decade. The president cannot deploy any system that has any significant impact on either regional or global military balances. Therefore, there is no panic, no rush to develop and deploy counter systems, no anxiety over an imminent new American military advantage. As Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov said in Moscow as his country withdrawal from the START II treaty, "The national defense system exists in virtual space, not in reality. So, there is no need for retaliation."

The missile defense myth

Missile defense is like a cargo cult. Just as South Pacific islanders marveled and then worshipped the airplanes that came from the sky like gods, missile defense proponents worship the idea of missile defense. They revel in the cartoon drawings that comprise most program briefings and television depictions of possible systems. They believe that if they have sufficient enthusiasm, they can will a protective shield into existence. The difference between missile defense and a cargo cult is that the planes really did deliver the goods. But we do not, today, have a missile defense system. And it is unlikely that we will, anytime this decade or perhaps ever. The missile defense myth depends on ignoring technological realities. It is only by denying the bleak experience of the past 40 years of effort and the dim prospects for current programs that one can keep the faith.

Ironically, it looks like all the Bush administration will have for its $8 billion annual budgets is the system its officials so harshly criticized as inadequate when President Clinton proposed it: a system of rockets based in Alaska. Averaging one or two tests per year since 1997, this system has been able to demonstrate an ability to "hit a bullet with a bullet." That is, in recent tests it has successfully intercepted a mock warhead. So, missile defense works, right?

It depends what you mean by "works." The tests show that under ideal conditions, if we can find a warhead in space, we can usually hit it. But the really difficult part is finding the warhead in the first place. The tests are much more like two missiles intercepting each other. That is, the warhead is sent at a predetermined time to a predetermined point in space. The interceptor is launched to the same point. It is aided by a transponder on the warhead that signals its position. Once it gets there, it opens up its "eyes," or sensors, and looks out. It is programmed with the exact characteristics of the warhead: its size, shape and temperature. It knows that a decoy warhead is drifting through space with the real warhead but that it is dramatically different in shape and temperature. It knows the exact characteristics of the decoy and is programmed to pick out the correct object and hit it.

This is a remarkable technical achievement, but what happens if we don't know when where and how an enemy warhead will strike? What if the warhead is accompanied by a dozen objects that look exactly like it? For any known missile defense system, there are many things even a technologically unsophisticated nation can do to thwart and overcome the defense. The Pentagon has not scheduled any tests against realistic countermeasures. Much as the Patriot performed very well in its test before the Gulf War but hit few if any Scuds during the war, the Alaska system could look great on paper and be a complete failure the first and only time it is used.

The power of the myth

If the prospects are so bleak, though, why is this still the largest single weapons program in the defense budget and a top Bush priority? The simple answer is politics. Missile defense plays well for the Republicans. It shows that President Bush is keeping the faith with the Reagan revolution and it remains an applause line for his core conservative constituency. Republican strategists also think it works well against Democrats. For twenty years, they have used it as a wedge issue to "expose" the Democrats as weak on defense. They position their strong defense of steel and rockets against the liberal treaties, deriding them as mere "pieces of paper."

Missile defense is also an integral part of the conservative strategic vision. The myth that missile defense can work allows conservatives to comfortably believe that the United States can go it alone in the world, rallying allies where and when necessary, but relying fundamentally on the nation's own resources for defense. It fits in with the Hobbesian view of an increasingly dangerous world where national security rests ultimately on brute force.

Conclusion

With the main ideological target of missile defense - the ABM Treaty - now destroyed, the programs are likely to be treated increasingly more like other weapons programs. They will be judged on schedule, cost and performance, and their value weighed against other defense needs. They may not fare well.

President Bush would like to deploy a few silos in Alaska in time for the 2004 elections and he may just make it. At most, we will end up in 2010 with silos in Alaska, Patriots with troops around the world, and one or two ships or planes with developmental defense systems. Hardly the stuff of an arms race, or of an effective defense.

This piece was adapted by an Op-Ed in the Friday Times by Joseph Cirincione

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