U.S.-Russia Strategic Partnership against Nuclear Proliferation

Goldschmidt, Pierre

Report

U.S.-Russia Strategic Partnership against Nuclear Proliferation

The United States and Russia should agree on concrete actions to strengthen the nonproliferation regime as a follow-up to the April 2008 Strategic Framework Declaration.

By Pierre Goldschmidt

Published on Jul 1, 2008

Source: CSIS/IFRI Report

There are presently clear indications that we are about to see a revival of nuclear energy worldwide. It is important to make this expansion of nuclear energy for the production of electricity and desalinated water as safe and secure as possible. In the coming decade, however, the rate of this expansion will be limited by several factors: in recipient states, by the lack of an adequate industrial infrastructure or an insufficient nuclear safety culture with a truly independent control organization; and in supplier states, by a limited capacity to produce certain types of nuclear equipment, such as reactor vessels. Since there is no rush, we have time to “do” nuclear right. Doing it right means, in particular, putting stronger barriers to proliferation in place before, not after, new nuclear capabilities spread.

The present analysis has identified five areas (among many others) where the United States, Russia, and the European Union should closely cooperate in order to strengthen the nonproliferation regime: enforcing UN Security Council resolutions on Iran; addressing cases of noncompliance; improving security of supply and discouraging the spread of sensitive technologies; strengthening export criteria for the Nuclear Suppliers Group; and preparing the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty review conference.

This study is part of a series being published by the joint CSIS/IFRI project “Europe, Russia, and the United States: Finding a New Balance,” which seeks to reframe the trilateral relationship for the relevant policymaking communities.

About the Author

Pierre Goldschmidt

Former Nonresident Senior Associate, Nuclear Policy Program

Goldschmidt was a nonresident senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment.

Recent Work

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North America United States Caucasus Russia Nuclear Policy Nuclear Energy

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.

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