Democracy and Russia: Will the Hide-and-Seek Ever End?

Twentieth century Russia has had two brushes with democracy. The first stint occurred under the short-lived government of Alexander Kerensky, which ended with the October Revolution, the Russian civil war, and finally the establishment of the Soviet Union. Another brief period took place between 1985-1991, when Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev introduced several reforms aimed at opening Russian society, including allowing the press to criticize the Communist Party and even permitting foreign travel. Neither attempt lasted long, nor does it seem that the Russian society misses these brief encounters with democracy. As Dmitri Trenin wrote, the “demand for democracy” isn’t mature enough yet.

Russian Reactions to the Egyptian Revolution

Commenting on the protests in the Middle East that ousted former Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak—and plunged Libya into a civil war—Gorbachev said, “If things continue the way they are [in Russia], I think the probability of the Egyptian scenario will grow.”¹ He added that he was “ashamed”² of the way Russia is run.

Soon after Gorbachev’s statements, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s deputy, Igor Sechin, added Google to the list of “external influences”³ —which includes the United States⁴ —which the Kremlin usually blames for any democratic “unrest” in the world. While Sechin did not detail his allegations, his reaction shows that events have raised concerns inside the Kremlin. The Egyptian newspaper Al-Ahram noted, “In contrast to state television, Russia’s Internet is remarkably free and the home to often scathing criticism of Putin, President Dmitry Medvedev and the entire Russian elite. Russia has so far resisted placing restrictions on the Internet, but analysts say there are a group of hardliners close to Putin who would like to impose controls similar to China’s.”⁵

The events in the Middle East also exposed the rifts inside the Kremlin. Even as Sechin blamed Google and other social media, Medvedev—whom Reuters describes as an “ardent Twitter fan”⁶ —said the Egyptian government’s decision to shut down the Internet “was a road to nowhere, moreover a crime.”⁷ Daniel Treisman, professor at the University of California, Los Angeles, and author of The Return: Russia’s Journey from Gorbachev to Medvedev, calls this difference of opinion between Medvedev and Putin the result not of friction between the two leaders but part of a “well-considered strategy” to reach different audiences in Russia.

Speaking at the Carnegie Moscow Center, Treisman explained that the two men appeal to different segments of the Russian population. Medvedev reaches out to the international community and the urban Russian elite, while Putin appeals to mainstream Russians from the provinces. Medvedev focuses on modernization and has even spoken about the urgent need to fight corruption and reform the political system. Putin, on the other hand, works to keep the existing power structures in place. Ultimately, they work as an effective team, serving the same goal of modernizing Russia without threatening their own or their allies’ political security.⁸

From Tahrir Square to Red Square?

What, therefore, seems like a positional row in the Kremlin in favor of openness and a move towards democracy—where the president favors openness and the prime minister rejects it—this is merely a smokescreen to enable their two different roles and serve the real purpose of preserving the tandem’s powers. This means that not only does the Kremlin outrightly reject elementary democratic principles, such as freedom of speech, press, and assembly,⁹ but it goes one step further to put on a show to stress that these freedoms are important—even respected—as the tandem seeks to move toward modernization and fight corruption. The reality, however, could not be more different. While summing up the Egyptian Revolution, U.S. television host Rachel Maddow called post-Soviet Russia “one of the most corrupt nations in the world,”¹⁰ ranking it “worse than” Haiti, Zimbabwe, and Pakistan.

As policy makers and commentators draw distinctions between Egypt and Russia, people are beginning to wonder whether the Russians could do at Red Square what the Egyptians did at Tahrir Square? The signs seem promising at first. Although Russian television is firmly in the Kremlin’s grip, the Internet and many “independent” (i.e., opposition-run) newspapers exist, which give citizens access to information beyond the government’s propaganda. People can also use resources like social networking to organize peaceful protests to at least force the government to make reforms, even if they probably cannot completely bring down Putin’s bureaucratic regime.

However, the idea of an Egypt-style revolution in Russia is highly unlikely. Even something as “low-key” as hunger strikes—a method often used by Venezuelan students to successfully negotiate the release of President Hugo Chavez’s political opponents, among other causes¹¹ —hasn’t captured Russians’ fancy.

This leads to another set of questions: Why was the Russian public’s reaction to journalist Anna Politkovskaya’s murder “delayed, lukewarm or non-existent?”¹² Why were there no mass protests when oil magnate Mikhail Khodorkovsky’s sentence was unfairly extended in December 2010? And why have even the Article 31 protests—peaceful protests aimed at fighting for the right of assembly guaranteed under Article 31 of the Russian constitution⁹ —come to an end?¹³ Does this mean that Putin is a more effective dictator than Mubarak, Ben Ali, Chavez, or even Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi? Or does this mean that the Russian appetite for democracy is simply missing?

One possible explanation lies in Russia’s history. The last time a serious attempt at democracy was made, it led to the disintegration of the Soviet Union. In the Russian mind, perestroika, glasnost, and democracy may all have come to be wrongly associated with a loss of power and status, as well as economic chaos.

Could a new perestroika mean the potential breakaway of Siberia and the Far East? Is the fear of further disintegration the primary reason for the unwillingness to hold a fair dialogue on Chechnya? Russian society may be afraid that fighting for democracy can plunge it into yet another era of disorder and confusion. Worse, looking at Libya, there is a fear that promoting democracy could lead to another civil war—a likely factor in restricting the actions of protestors in other Arab nations as well.

D for Democracy or D for Disintegration?

Mikhail Vinogradov, director of the Petersburg Political Foundation, notes that the positive feelings many Russians have for Joseph Stalin reflect their nostalgia for a strong country. “This explains why Stalin’s popularity grew markedly in the 1990s, particularly in the aftermath of the 1998 default, a trend that could be seen up to 2004. Another reason, he suggests, is that many people do not see much in Russia’s twentieth century history to be proud of, apart from the victory in World War II and the first manned space flight. Stalin is a real symbol of victory to many people, particularly for elderly voters.”¹⁴

In other words, this indicates that for Russians a World War victory—even if accompanied by concentration camps and repression—is preferable to Gorbachev’s perestroika, which is seen as leading to the disintegration of an empire. For both the Kremlin and the Russian people, reputation on the international stage is far more important than having a “democratic life” if it comes without a real say in world affairs.¹⁵

It is said by some observers that Gorbachev lost three wars: the Cold War; the Second World War, as he lost Eastern Europe; and finally, the First World War, since many people believe that his reforms led to the disintegration of the Great Russian/Soviet Empire¹⁶. But it seems that there was one more adverse effect of those reforms. Quite unwittingly—and rather ironically—Gorbachev may have put the fear of democracy into his people. He may have done this so much, in fact,  that while there is plenty of criticism of the Putin-Medvedev tandem on the Internet and people speak often about how the country should be run, hardly anyone has the will to take to the streets and fight for their rights like the Arabs have.

What Does This Mean for Russia’s Future?

As the United States has experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, and as it is witnessing in the Middle East, democracy cannot be exported. It has to come from within the system to be meaningful or stable. Therefore, it is paramount that the Russians act, if they really believe the effort is worth it. Perhaps another Gorbachev is needed—not just someone with his idealism and drive, but also someone who will follow sounder macroeconomic policies and do more hand-holding of the economy, as in the cases of the South African transition after apartheid or Indian economic reforms after the country’s 1991 bankruptcy. However, such a person has not emerged or, if he or she is present, has not spoken up.

The 2012 presidential elections will, no doubt, be rigged. According to Levada Center Director Alexei Levinson, “the authorities wouldn’t want an honest election even if it were to bring victory to their candidate. After all, the candidate might not win honestly the next time, and that would make for complications. If the people know that all elections are invariably dishonest, such problems simply don’t arise. And as yet they haven’t.”¹⁷ The West’s options on how to respond to the farcical elections are limited: they can either criticize them—as it did with the Belarusian elections that prolonged Alexander Lukashenko’s term—or play along, as with previous elections in Russia. And if history is to repeat itself, it will be the latter.

At the same time, it is important to note that Putin is a very thorough and strong personality, who understands the dangers of running an outright dictatorship with the same face as a president. Though it is widely suggested that he will return as president after the 2012 elections, there is a good chance that he may not. He may not even retain his role as prime minister.¹⁸ But he will most likely remain a very key figure in a high post—perhaps as head of defense, foreign affairs, or internal affairs.

And if Putin doesn’t bring Medvedev back, he will likely choose a head of state who like Medvedev has no KGB background. While this will look like reform as the people in charge will not have a dark KGB past, Putin will continue to act as the puppet master in running the government. Like Medvedev, these people in charge will completely depend on him for any validation of their power because they themselves will have no significant allies to back them in the event of a conflict with Putin.

The West must not impose democracy on Russia. It must also not preach or criticize. The best way to encourage reform in Russia is for the West to use “soft power” and cajole Russia into modernizing and moving closer to democracy by proposing accession to organizations like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, the World Trade Organization, and perhaps become an observer member of the European Union. This may not be Moscow’s equivalent of Tahrir Square, but it will create the same democratic pressures that Russia has needed for so long, and will likely yield results in the right direction.

Aanchal Anand is an intern at the Carnegie Moscow Center.

^{1. “Gorbachev Warns of Egypt-Style Russian Revolt,” Wall Street Journal, February 16, 2011. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703961104576148331255681592.html}

^2. ibid.

^{3. “[Medvedev] went to far [sic] as to blame ‘external influences’ for the revolutions, which in Russia is codeword for the US. The rhetoric was reminiscent of the colored revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine, in 2003 and 2004 respectively, which the Kremlin attributed to the same conspiratorial ‘external forces.’” Russia & the Jasmine revolution bug, Financial Times, February 24, 2011. http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2011/02/24/russia-the-jasmine-revolution-bug/http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2011/02/24/russia-the-jasmine-revolution-bug/}

^{4. “Putin blames U.S. for Georgia role,” BBC, August 28, 2008. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7586605.stm}

^{5. “Russia blames Google for stirring Egypt unrest,” Al-Ahram, February 22, 2011. http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/6171/Egypt/Politics-/Russia-blames-Google-for-stirring-Egypt-unrest-.aspx}

^{6. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s Russian Twitter account @MedvedevRussia has over 228,000 followers and his English page @MedvedevRussiaE has more than 92,000 followers.}

^{7. “Arab unrest inspires Russian insurgents: Kremlin,” Reuters, February 22, 2011. http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/22/us-russia-insurgents-kremlin-idUSTRE71L46C20110222}

^{8. The Return: Russia’s Journey from Gorbachev to Medvedev (event), Carnegie Moscow Center, February 2011. http://carnegie.ru/events/?fa=3162}

^{9. Article 31 of the Russian constitution guarantees freedom of assembly. This has been repeatedly abused by the Russian authorities and many peaceful protestors have been frequently detained on false charges.
Freedom House’s response to January protests: http://www.freedomhouse.eu/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=315:freedom-of-assembly-under-attack-in-russia&catid=16;
News of 150 detained in the March protests: http://blogs.voanews.com/breaking-news/tag/protests/}

^{10. “Rachel Maddow Compares Egypt To Post-Soviet Russia In Revolution Recap,” Mediaite, February 12, 2011. http://www.mediaite.com/tv/rachel-maddow-compares-egypt-to-post-soviet-russia-in-revolution-recap/}

^{11. “Union leader released from jail in Venezuela,” Fox News, March 3, 2011.
http://www.foxnews.com/world/2011/03/03/union-leader-released-jail-venezuela/
Also, “Venezuela students end hunger strike,” Atlanta Journal-Constitution, March 26, 2011. http://www.ajc.com/news/nation-world/venezuela-students-end-hunger-886406.html}

^{12. Roudakova, Natalia. Journalism as “Prostitution”: Understanding Russia's Reactions to Anna Politkovskaya's Murder, Political Communication (Volume 26, Issue 4, 2009) http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~content=a916672629~db=all~jumptype=rss}

^{13. Article 31 organizers feel that the protests haves fulfilled their task and they plan to move to a different format under the slogan, “In favor of free elections.” Details of the new format are still unknown. Людмила Алексеева отказалась проводить митинги 31-го числа: «Стратегия-31» выполнила свою задачу (Lyudmila Alekseyeva refuses to hold “31” rallies: “Strategy-31 has fulfilled its task), March 28, 2011. http://www.gazeta.ru/news/lenta/2011/03/28/n_1767269.shtml}

^{14. “Is Stalin getting more popular these days?” Russia Beyond the Headlines, May 12, 2010. http://rbth.ru/questions/12383  Quote based on Levada Center survey results cited in the article}

^{15. Even during the 1998 default, Russia defaulted on public debt (money it could print) rather than external debt to guard its reputation abroad.}

^{16. It was not Gorbachev but Boris Yeltsin, Stanislav Shushkevich, and Leonid Kravchuk (presidents of the Russian, Ukrainian, and Belarussian Soviet Socialist Republics), who—knowing full well that the overwhelming majority of the Soviet people had voted in favor of preserving the USSR with reforms—signed the Belavezha Accords to dissolve the Union.}

^{17. “Russian elections: who needs them?” openDemocracy, March 24, 2011. http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/alexei-levinson/russian-elections-who-needs-them}

^{18. If Putin decides to stay as either president or prime minister, it would mark his fourth full term as the country’s most (or second-most) important figure. He served as president from December 31, 1999 to May 7, 2008, and as prime minister since May 8, 2008. He served as prime minister for the first time under the Boris Yeltsin, from August 9, 1999 to May 7, 2000.}