On February 3, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer will join EU leaders for an informal retreat to discuss European security. The meeting will be another step in the UK’s bid to reset ties with the union—a theme that has dominated the British leadership’s foreign policy discourse since the Labour Party’s general election victory on July 4, 2024.
While standing firm that the UK will not rejoin the EU or its single market, the country’s top officials have been sending a clear message: London is ready to wipe the slate clean and build a new relationship with the bloc. Regular structured dialogues on security and trade issues, an EU-UK leaders’ summit, and a wide-ranging defense and security pact are among the proposals that Labour has put on the table.
Despite the challenges, concluding a full-fledged agreement on foreign, security, and defense policy should be a priority for both London and Brussels. With fewer like-minded allies than they once had, the EU and the UK need each other to navigate today’s turbulent geopolitical waters. As neighbors with deep-rooted ties and largely aligned worldviews and values, they are well placed to tackle common challenges together. While achieving a foreign policy pact will take time and patience on both sides, London and Brussels cannot afford to squander this opportunity.
A Difficult but Necessary Task
Establishing a foreign policy partnership with the EU promises to be an uphill struggle for the UK. During the turbulent Brexit negotiations, former prime minister Boris Johnson’s government, eager to pursue its ambition of a “Global Britain,” rejected the idea of formal foreign policy cooperation with Brussels. As a result, the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) that, together with the Brexit withdrawal agreement, governs EU-UK relations omits foreign policy and security issues, except for provisions on cybersecurity, counterterrorism, and weapons of mass destruction.
It was not until Rishi Sunak became prime minister in October 2022 that relations began to thaw, paving the way for pragmatism and opening new avenues for cooperation, albeit mainly ad hoc. A highlight was the conclusion of the Windsor Framework, which simplified trading arrangements between Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the EU’s response to the UK’s recent enthusiasm has so far been rather muted. Soon after the Labour government announced its reset plans, Brussels issued the UK with a list of demands. Ostensibly a test of good faith, it is a checklist for the British government to prove its “real commitment” to adhering to the negotiated post-Brexit agreements. The requirements include a less bureaucratic route for certain EU citizens living in the UK to remain in the country and a youth mobility deal. Brussels is also keen for Britain to rejoin the Erasmus student exchange program—something London has been reluctant to do.
Yet, cooperation is warranted by the challenges facing Europe, which are growing in scale and complexity—from the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East to geopolitical competition with China, and from authoritarian tendencies around the world to the deterioration of the rules-based international order.
Donald Trump’s return as U.S. president should be another factor that accelerates EU-UK talks on a security and defense pact. Trump’s threats to impose tariffs on imports, skepticism toward assistance for Ukraine, and eagerness to negotiate with Russian President Vladimir Putin have raised alarm bells across Europe. Poised to pursue protectionist America First policies and a transactional approach to international relations, the new administration will hardly be the reliable partner London and Brussels wish to see in Washington.
The Case for Closer Foreign Policy Cooperation
While bad blood from the testy Brexit negotiations may still linger between the UK and the EU, there is much more that unites the two sides than divides them. The security of their citizens, the integrity of their democratic systems, and the survival of the rules-based world order are priorities for leaders on both sides of the English Channel. In the coming years, Russia’s revisionist ambitions, illiberal tendencies in Europe and the world, and Trump’s second presidency will test all three priorities.
Albeit in different ways and for different reasons, both Putin and Trump will seek to exploit divisions between the EU and the UK. Rather than give in to these divide-and-rule tactics, Brussels and London need to recognize what is at stake and take decisive action. They should leverage the positive momentum created by the new British leadership to develop joint strategies in pursuit of common foreign policy goals. Three strategically important geographic theaters stand out: Ukraine, the Western Balkans, and China.
Supporting Ukraine Against Russia
Putin’s war on Ukraine has brought the EU and the UK closer together by galvanizing them into punishing Russia’s aggression, supporting Ukraine’s resistance, and defending the European security order. Since February 2022, Brussels and London have cooperated successfully, although primarily on an ad hoc basis.
For the EU, the war was a reminder that even outside the union, Britain remains a major security player: It is one of the largest bilateral donors to Ukraine, having pledged £7.8 billion ($9.8 billion) of military assistance so far. Since Trump’s victory, Starmer has repeatedly called on allies to ramp up support for Ukraine, and in December, he stressed the need to place the country “in the strongest possible position for negotiations.”
In the realm of defense, London and Brussels have worked together on training Ukraine’s armed forces, despite having separate training missions in the country. Britain also sent personnel to a Brussels-based clearinghouse for military equipment destined for Ukraine. Perhaps most significantly in the defense field, in November 2022 Britain signed up for the military mobility project of the EU’s Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). Falling under the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy, the project aims to enable the cross-border movement of military personnel and equipment in Europe.
But while the UK has stepped up its engagement with the EU, much of the pair’s coordination has taken place through multilateral forums like the G7, NATO, or the U.S.-led Ukraine Defense Contact Group, also known as the Ramstein group. Formal structures that would enable regular bilateral exchanges at different levels are lacking. Even the UK’s participation in the PESCO military mobility project has been a subject of controversy, with alleged resistance from Spain and concerns from the UK about the EU’s stringent requirements for third-country participants.
The same can be said about EU-UK sanctions coordination. With no formal structures through which to collaborate, London and Brussels have primarily used the G7 to align their strategies. While this approach has proved effective and allowed the two to join forces with like-minded partners, a regular working arrangement on sanctions policy would be beneficial, as a recent House of Lords report pointed out. The British government has signaled an openness to exploring new models for longer-term cooperation.
Historically opposed to defense integration within the EU, Britain continues to focus on NATO as the quintessential framework of transatlantic security. London is wary of any European structures or efforts that could undermine or duplicate the alliance. Although Labour has identified a security pact with the EU as a foreign policy priority, Starmer has underscored the move’s complementarity with NATO and Britain’s “NATO first” approach.
A related sensitive issue is defense procurement. Russia’s aggression and uncertainty about the United States’ commitment to European security have prompted the EU to boost its defense-industrial readiness. Through initiatives like the European Defense Fund and the European Defense Industrial Program (EDIP), Brussels is encouraging greater intra-EU collaboration on defense procurement, research, and development. However, this move risks excluding British defense firms from EU procurement, thereby hampering EU-UK defense-industrial cooperation. Other non-EU countries could also be sidelined, which has caused NATO officials to ring alarm bells over Brussels’s plans. France’s decision in late 2024 to stop opposing the participation of third countries like the UK and the United States in EDIP, however, suggests that the EU’s policy on defense-industrial partnerships could soon become more flexible.
While the UK now recognizes the need for stronger direct cooperation with the EU institutions, London has continued to strengthen bilateral ties with individual EU countries, notably in Europe’s East and North. For Baltic and Nordic countries, Britain remains a key security partner in the face of Russian aggression. In addition to contributing to NATO’s Baltic Air Policing mission and Enhanced Forward Presence, since 2018 the UK has headed the Joint Expeditionary Force, a military partnership between Britain, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, and Sweden. It is notable that in its 2024 election manifesto, Labour promised to seek “new bilateral agreements and closer working with Joint Expeditionary Force partners” to “strengthen NATO and keep Britain safe.”
The UK’s weight as a diplomatic and military actor—including in the context of Russia’s war against Ukraine—should be a significant incentive for the EU to pursue a closer security and defense relationship with Britain. As for London, strengthening ties with EU member states should be seen as a complement to—and not a replacement for—direct engagement with Brussels. In practice, bilateral agreements cannot make up for formal cooperation with the union: They tend to be nonbinding and aspirational, and they cannot cover areas in which the EU has exclusive competence or issues covered by the withdrawal agreement or the TCA, unless specifically authorized.
Ensuring Stability in the Western Balkans
In light of Russia’s destabilizing actions and the significant footprint it already has in the region, the Western Balkans are becoming increasingly volatile. Currently, five of the six Western Balkan nations—Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia—have EU candidate country status, while Kosovo is recognized as a potential candidate. However, regional conflicts, state capture, and Russian influence are reversing the democratic progress these countries have achieved in past decades and pushing them away from the EU. With Brexit, the Western Balkans lost a prominent voice in the union that advocated for their accession. While some EU member states had become disillusioned with enlargement, the UK, perhaps paradoxically in hindsight, championed it.
As an immediate neighbor of several Western Balkan nations, the EU has high stakes in the region and a clear incentive to help maintain stability there. However, NATO still anchors Britain in the Western Balkans, where the alliance’s Kosovo Force (KFOR) peacekeeping mission continues to operate. Significantly, UK Defense Minister John Healey has also identified EU-led peacekeeping missions in the Western Balkans as an “obvious [area] of cooperation.” Just like the EU, the UK has an interest in advancing democracy and economic prosperity in the region. Cooperation on this matter should be relatively easy to attain since both parties seek stability and, ultimately, the Western Balkan countries’ accession to the EU.
To contribute to peace and stability in the Western Balkans, the EU and the UK must engage with the region’s governments and citizens to reverse its democratic decline, build its resilience to foreign—notably, Russian and Chinese—influence, and defuse regional tensions.
One opportunity to do so is through the Berlin Process, a platform initiated by Germany in 2014 that fosters high-level cooperation between the six Western Balkan countries, the EU, nine of its member states, and the UK. Despite Brexit, the UK has remained committed to this initiative and hosted its fifth annual summit in 2018. The platform’s October 2024 meeting in Berlin made breakthroughs on regional cooperation, underscoring the format’s potential to drive positive change.
Meeting China’s Challenge
Another theater of common geopolitical interest is China. Starmer is pushing ahead with the UK’s goal of a “long-term grown-up relationship” with Beijing. This approach includes a comprehensive audit of Britain’s current relationship with China. While this review has yet to materialize, Labour is led by a three-pronged strategy toward the country: compete, cooperate, and challenge. The EU has taken a similar line, treating Beijing as both a “partner for cooperation” and a systemic rival, preferring to “de-risk” rather than “de-couple” from China. In short, both Brussels and London have chosen to be pragmatic and walk a fine line with the country.
As such, the EU and the UK can and should look to each other for support in pursuing shared goals in regard to Beijing. Most obviously, London and Brussels are both committed to curbing Chinese support for Russia’s war against Ukraine. Through the G7, the EU and the UK have been united in pressuring China to stop “the transfer of dual-use materials, including weapons components and equipment, that are inputs for Russia’s defense sector.” In February 2024, Brussels and London sanctioned Chinese companies that were linked to the Russian defense industry.
The EU and the UK have taken similar steps to mitigate the security risks of overexposure to Chinese technology. One glaring shared challenge is the need to limit the influence of Chinese technology titans Huawei and ZTE in the European and British telecommunications industries. The European Commission has also made public its intention to prohibit these firms from accessing EU research funding and restrict the use of these companies’ equipment. Similarly, the UK is intent on replacing Huawei technology in its 5G networks by the end of 2027.
There will, however, be divergences between the EU’s and the UK’s foreign policies toward China. For example, the EU has decided to raise tariffs on Chinese-manufactured electric vehicles from 10 to 45 percent in an effort to address distorted competition from Chinese government subsidies. The UK, by contrast, has decided against this, despite the fact that its auto industry faces similar challenges. By adopting a softer approach, the UK risks ruffling feathers across the Channel.
Trump’s return to the White House could make it more difficult for the EU and the UK to maintain their middle-of-the-road approach to China. For the new U.S. administration, tackling the challenges China poses is a priority. To this end, Trump has announced his intention to levy an additional 10 percent tariff on Chinese goods, decrease U.S. reliance on Beijing in critical areas, and revoke China’s “most favored nation” status, which would effectively end any U.S. trade privileges China has enjoyed so far.
Going forward, it is likely that both the EU and the UK will face pressure to align with the United States’ more confrontational policies toward Beijing. Anticipating this, Starmer has already stated firmly that the UK will not need to sideline the EU for the United States and intends to work with both partners. Indeed, London and Brussels would be wise not to let Trump drive a wedge between them and to remain focused on the issues where their interests overlap.
Labour’s Foreign Policy Positions
To pursue their common interests in critical thematic and geographic areas, the EU and the UK need more structured, regular interactions—and, ultimately, a pact on foreign, security, and defense policy. Recognizing this, the Labour government has set out a range of foreign policy positions.
First, the UK has welcomed the prospect of regular bilateral summits, such as those the EU holds with many third countries. These meetings would allow for regular strategic discussions at the highest level. Starmer and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen have agreed to hold the inaugural EU-UK summit in early 2025.
Second, UK Minister for EU Relations Nick Thomas-Symonds has expressed a desire to institutionalize relations by setting up structured dialogues. These would enable ministers and officials from both sides to regularly meet and discuss issues including security, trade, energy, and migration. This may be a more difficult sell, as an EU diplomat admitted that the commission was not very receptive to the idea. However, the October 2024 agreement between UK Foreign Secretary David Lammy and former EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell to establish a six-monthly foreign policy dialogue suggests Brussels could yet be persuaded.
Third, Lammy accepted the union’s invitation to attend its October 2024 Foreign Affairs Council meeting—something the previous Conservative government had refused to do. Labour is eager to secure regular access to this forum as a way of formalizing foreign policy cooperation. However, as no other third country attends EU ministerial meetings, Brussels is wary of giving the UK special treatment. EU diplomats have thus ruled out a standing invitation as “unthinkable.”
Finally, Labour has suggested a wide-ranging security agreement with the EU. While it remains unclear what such a pact would entail, Lammy hopes the deal would allow for frank and regular exchanges of ideas. Healey envisages possible ad hoc contributions to EU missions, such as those in the Western Balkans or off the Horn of Africa, and a “bespoke” defense relationship. The UK’s Strategic Defense Review, due in the first half of 2025, is likely to provide more clarity as to what London hopes to achieve in this area.
Hurdles to Securing a Deal
While the rationale for an EU-UK foreign policy pact may seem straightforward, the path to one is likely to be fraught with obstacles. Several factors risk complicating negotiations.
Wary of allowing Britain to cherry-pick the parts of the relationship it wants to improve, the European Commission has made clear that it is open to expanding cooperation only if Britain implements the withdrawal agreement, the TCA, and the Windsor Framework. This is something von der Leyen reiterated during her first meeting with Starmer. As the form and substance of a possible agreement come under discussion, the EU is likely to take a transactional approach and focus on its own interests in talks with British counterparts.
Topping the EU’s wish list is a youth mobility scheme with the UK. After a clumsy start to talks on the matter, Brussels is working on an updated proposal to present to London. Meanwhile, the Starmer government remains divided on the issue: While some officials recognize the economic and cultural benefits of youth mobility, others fear such a scheme would mark a return to the free movement of people—one of the redlines Starmer communicated during his election campaign. Considering the UK has youth mobility schemes with Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and South Korea, this may be an avenue in which patience and a constructive approach on both sides yield results.
The EU is also keen to see Britain rejoin the Erasmus student exchange program. The Starmer government has so far rejected the idea, quoting financial concerns. This is despite 51 percent of the British public supporting the idea, according to a poll commissioned by Politico. The UK’s reluctance has frustrated its EU counterparts, which see both the exchange program and a youth mobility scheme as low-hanging fruit to be pursued before expanding cooperation to the realm of security and defense.
Another item on the EU’s list is securing access to the UK’s fishing waters after current arrangements expire in June 2026. Although London and Brussels have agreed on catch quotas for 2025, fisheries remain a sensitive topic. The EU faces the challenge of safeguarding the interests of its fishing sector while delivering on its environmental ambitions to protect marine ecosystems. Meanwhile, some UK government officials fear that the EU will be open to renegotiating parts of the Brexit trade agreement only if Britain grants EU fishermen full access to its seas after 2026.
The UK, for its part, is approaching the EU with its own list of priorities. The most notable of these is a veterinary—or sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS)—agreement. Since January 2021, agricultural and agrifood goods coming into the EU from Britain face border controls to ensure compliance with EU standards. These checks take time and impose a considerable burden on UK businesses. A veterinary agreement would reduce such barriers to trade by harmonizing rules or recognizing them as equivalent. While many EU businesses would benefit from such a deal, Brussels is likely to take a more nuanced negotiating position and demand dynamic alignment, whereby Britain would commit to adopt future changes in EU law as they occur. The UK may thus need to consider whether it is ready to concede autonomy over SPS rules for better market access.
London also wants more mutual recognition of professional qualifications and conformity assessments—the processes used to confirm that products comply with all legislative requirements. While the EU has made deals with third countries in both areas, Brussels may be hesitant to sign a pact on conformity assessments with a competitor like Britain, which refuses to join the single market or accept the European Court of Justice’s jurisdiction. The union’s most wide-reaching agreements on professional qualifications are with countries that accept free movement, such as Norway and Switzerland.
Finally, Labour wants the EU to ease restrictions on touring British artists. Because the TCA lacks provisions on creative professionals’ short-term travel, UK artists touring the EU since January 2021 must comply with the immigration requirements of each EU country they visit. Although EU artists must, in turn, comply with UK rules, London perceives an asymmetry, as those coming from the union face only one set of requirements.
Given this constellation of interests, the EU and the UK will inevitably run into difficulties as talks on a closer partnership accelerate. Taking a constructive approach that acknowledges the other side’s priorities and seeks mutual benefits will be essential to broaden the zone of possible agreement and ensure progress on the EU-UK reset.
Conclusion
Amid pressing domestic and global challenges, the EU and the UK are hardly at the top of each other’s agendas. From economic stagnation and the rise of extremist political forces to the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, both Brussels and London have their plates full. Yet, it is precisely because many of these issues require collective solutions that the EU and the UK should prioritize the reset they have embarked on.
As security challenges mount and with U.S.-Europe relations likely to take a downward turn, Brussels and London have much to gain from closer, more strategic relations. Under Starmer, the UK has been actively strengthening its bilateral relations with EU member states, and the German federal election to be held in February 2025 could provide new momentum to both the London-Berlin relationship and, by extension, the UK-EU reset. Now is the time for London and Brussels to elevate their foreign policy and security relationship from reactive, ad hoc cooperation to a proactive partnership.
A full-fledged security and defense agreement would make it easier to pursue joint goals in critical geographic theaters, including Ukraine, the Western Balkans, and China. Lammy and Borrell acknowledged the importance of these regions in their October 2024 decision to hold regular consultations on these issues. But there is still a long way to go to reach a comprehensive pact. Doing so will require Britain to prove its commitment to implementing existing arrangements and a readiness from the EU to seize the opportunities presented by Starmer’s government and take a constructive approach in future talks. By taking steps toward more regular, formalized cooperation, the EU and the UK can advance common interests, strengthen European security, and prepare to face the challenges of tomorrow.
Indre Krivaite is a communications manager at Carnegie Europe.
Pavi Prakash Nair is a development coordinator and research assistant at Carnegie Europe.
The authors are grateful to Rosa Balfour, Sophia Besch, Peter Kellner, and Pierre Vimont for their feedback on earlier drafts of this article.
