On December 8, 2024, armed militias toppled the brutal dictatorship of the Assad family, ending a nearly fourteen-year civil war in Syria. Back in March 2011, pro-democracy protests erupted in the city of Daraa. The regime of Bashar al-Assad deployed violent means to quell the dissent, a strategy that ultimately escalated the conflict as armed clashes spread throughout the country. As Syria fractured into different embattled areas, a constellation of rebel militias and groups emerged.
Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)—one of the rebel militias which was previously affiliated with Al Qaeda and Islamic State terrorist groups and adhered to a Salafi-jihadist ideology—led the successful two-week campaign to depose Assad. The jubilation of many in Syria and the sense of relief in various regional and international contexts have been met with hesitation elsewhere. In the multi-denominational, multi-ethnic Syrian state, tension has been commonplace. An early reminder came about on December 24 when protests broke out when foreign fighters allegedly set a Christmas tree on fire in Suqaylabiyah, a town in western Syria. Sporadic clashes between HTS fighters and loyalists of the Assad regime were also reported in several locations. On the other hand, military incursions by Israeli forces in the south and Turkish forces in the north increased the levels of instability and threats of territorial disintegration in the first weeks following the collapse of the old regime.
Regional and international actors are expressing anxiety over the potential for Damascus to succumb to instability and violence, ultimately leading to another violent conflict. With a complex security arrangement that has failed time and time again, the Middle East is anxious about the future of the “new” Syria, anxiety spurred by a lack of consensus on what the right path forward will be. For their part, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, though they have long opposed popular uprisings and regime changes, are switching course in Syria, embracing, alongside Qatar, the new leadership and power realities in Syria.
Syrian Domestic Scene
The question of who composes the Syrian domestic political scene is essential to clarify. The primary organization in the regional and global lens preceding and following the fall of the Assad regime is Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, led by Ahmed al-Sharaa who was formerly known as Abu Mohammad al-Jolani. In 2016, HTS broke ties with al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, turning its attention squarely to the fight against Assad. After consolidating power in the north of Syria in 2017, HTS forces began operating less like guerilla insurgents and more like a police force, carrying out operations against the Islamic State among others. Reports indicate, however, a record of human rights abuses at the hands of HTS in Idlib, especially pertaining to torture in HTS-run prisons. After Russia and Türkiye signed a ceasefire in 2020 to end fighting between the groups they respectively backed in Syria, HTS was able to capitalize on the relative peace to establish stronger governance structures for its area of control in Idlib. Since 2024, the area controlled by HTS has been led by Mohammed al-Bashir as prime minister. Today, the group’s role is being reshaped in profound ways.
Alongside HTS, several other militias were involved in the final push to oust Assad. The most significant militias in that effort were the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the Syrian National Army (SNA), and the Druze militia. The SDF is a Kurdish group supported by the United States in the fight against the Islamic State. They are one facet of the constellation of Kurdish militias who, for the purpose of deposing Assad, ultimately worked together during the offensive. The SNA is a Turkish-backed armed opposition group who worked on behalf of the Syrian Interim Government, which was formed during the civil war by opposition groups. Composed of smaller militias strongly aligned with Türkiye, the SNA is notorious for the abuses it has committed against the native Kurdish population in Syria. The Druze militia only recently emerged, operating under the name Southern Operations Room. In coordination with the other militias, it launched an offensive in Daraa in early December. It’s worth noting that the Islamic State, which did not contribute to the military campaign to topple Assad, has been operating in the shadows of Syria since they lost the territory that they controlled in 2014 and 2015 in both Iraq and Syria but has been active in the wake of Assad’s exit.
With different groups controlling different areas, Syria’s current administration is rather uneven. HTS has gradually transitioned from a militia fighting for a cause to a governing body. When it took Aleppo, for example, the militia immediately began providing governmental services, even paying overdue salaries to government employees. The government agencies in Aleppo have been swift to cooperate with the new leadership, bringing employees back to work, which is a trend seen expanding around the country.
In Damascus, the airport reopened in early January 2025, and the state news agency has started producing television shows that detail, among other things, central bank exchange rates, signaling a resumption of normal governmental services. Al-Sharaa announced on HTS’s Telegram channel on December 17 that all armed opposition groups—including Kurdish and Druze militias—would be disbanded, and the fighters would come under the authority of the Defense Ministry, implying the continuation of the former defense sector but with a newly incorporated group of fighters.
Outside of the main cities, the picture is different, as local actors are needed to instill order amid the transition. Militant groups are in dialogue with local leaders as the two sides seek coordination in the development of new forms of governance and continuation of governmental institutions.
Overview of Regional and International Responses
Regionally, akin to the domestic situation, there are different opinions as to how the Syrian situation should be treated. Two approaches exist: interventionist and diplomatic. Türkiye, Israel, and Iran have evidenced an interventionist approach.
Israel, perhaps most obviously, is demonstrating a highly interventionist approach. Between December 8 and 11, Israel struck Syria more than 400 times and has invaded and occupied the demilitarized zone between the two states. Israeli strikes have destroyed at least 80 percent of Syria’s military capabilities. To bolster Israel’s strength in the contested area, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu committed on December 15 to double the Israeli population in the occupied Golan Heights.
Iran is scrambling to affirm its relations with various actors in the country since losing its primary ally in Syria, Assad. Immediately after Assad’s departure, Iran reached out to HTS officials hoping to maintain strong relations to the Syrian government. However, Tehran’s outreach has been rebuffed by the new rulers in Damascus who have gone as far as to ban Iranians from traveling to Syria. Iran’s Axis of Resistance has become severely weakened since the October 7 attacks by Hamas on Israel and subsequent war in Gaza; the loss of Tehran’s client-regime in Syria diminished its reach and abilities to rearm its client in Lebanon, Hezbollah, even further. Iran has pledged to continue its involvement in any future Syria, with its Foreign Affairs Ministry releasing a statement: “We will spare no effort to help establish security and stability in Syria, and to this end, we will continue consultations with all influential parties, especially in the region.”
Certain countries are using diplomacy to have a say in the Syrian situation. Jordan hosted a meeting of the Arab League that included Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Lebanon, Egypt, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Qatar on December 14 that resulted in a joint statement where the eight countries stated their support for an all-inclusive, Syrian-led transition.
No actor is more involved in Syrian rebuilding post Assad than Türkiye, which has long fluctuated between working with Assad and seeking to overthrow his regime. At a meeting in Cairo to discuss Syria on December 20, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan proclaimed Türkiye would help the new Syrian government write a new, inclusive constitution, affirming that Türkiye has been in communication with HTS officials. Türkiye has supported domestic military operations as well as threatened to deploy its own military within Syrian territory. Syria’s domestic alignment is strategic to Türkiye’s domestic and international objectives particularly as it relates to the Kurdish question. Türkiye wants to see the SDF demilitarized and cross-border Kurdish separatist military operations stopped.
Cairo, for its part, is working with Ankara to create conditions for stability in Syria, made possible by Türkiye and Egypt’s recent reconciliation. Türkiye is spearheading the initiative, though, as Egypt remains hesitant to fully accept an HTS-governed Syria. Given President Abdel Fatah al-Sisi’s strong anti-Islamist stance, Assad’s toppling by HTS and other militias has sparked unease in Egypt over the potential for the reemergence of radical Islamist politics in the Middle East.
These regional actors are, above all, seeking stability in Syria. As such, they are scrambling to offer support for a peaceful transition in the new Syria.
International actors are responding similarly to the regional diplomatic actors. Calls for inclusive governance have underscored the reactions of diplomats globally. The international response must be understood in the context of Syria’s relations prior to Assad’s exit. Russia, Iran, and Türkiye, among other nations, launched the UN-aligned Astana Process in January 2017 with the goal of deescalating the conflict in Syria. Syria was set to be divided into four zones that would all agree to a ceasefire long enough to negotiate an end to the civil war. The Astana Process dragged on for years. By 2023, Syria had regained some political momentum regionally, and Kazakhstan, host of the talks, proposed ending the process; yet as recently as November 2024, those involved in Astana affirmed their “leading role” in the “lasting settlement of the Syrian crisis.”
China did not play a significant role in Syria over the past decade, but it did enjoy close relations with Assad particularly in recent years. A spokesperson for China’s Foreign Affairs Ministry said following the Assad regime’s collapse, “The future and destiny of Syria should be decided by the Syrian people, and we hope that all the relevant parties will find a political solution to restore stability and order as soon as possible.” So far China has not evidenced any desire to be significantly involved in the Syrian reconstruction.
The United States, conversely, is already involved in the new Syria. In the weeks since Assad was toppled, the United States has increased the number of strikes on Islamic State targets in Syria, aiming ultimately to prevent the group from filling the power vacuum. Beyond military interventionism, former U.S. secretary of state Antony Blinken engaged diplomatically with the new Syrian interim government, confirming U.S. officials had directly contacted the HTS and agreeing to lift the $10-million bounty on Ahmed al-Sharaa’s head, signaling U.S. willingness to work with Syria’s new leadership.
The G7 released a statement calling for an inclusive, nonsectarian government and offered support for such rule, demonstrating alignment in the diplomatic objectives of several powerful countries. The EU cares greatly about what transpires in Syria, primarily due to the significant population of Syrian refugees in Europe. In the wake of Assad’s fall, several European countries announced the suspension of their asylum applications for Syrians. The EU’s top diplomat Kaja Kallas wrote on X, “Our priority is to ensure security in the region. I will work with all the constructive partners, in Syria and the region.” Europe hopes for a stable Syria so that the EU does not continue to face significant influxes of Syrian refugees while the debates regarding refugees become an icy topic in Europe.
Geir O. Pedersen, UN Special Envoy for Syria, said on December 10, “I don’t need to repeat it, but it’s extremely important, it needs to be inclusive arrangements. That is, ensuring the representation of the broadest possible spectrum of Syrians, of the Syrian society and the Syrian parties. And let me say that if this is not happening, then we risk new conflict in Syria.” His words evidence the fear everyone is feeling over Syria, that a new conflict will emerge without consensus.
The powerful actors of the Gulf—Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—are keenly aware of the potential for renewed violence and instability and are also anxious to quell Iran’s reach in their neighborhood. Their responses reflect such sensibilities.
Qatari, Saudi, and Emirati Responses to Syria
The collapse of the Bashar al-Assad regime and the ascendancy of Islamists to power in Syria on December 8, 2024, have sparked some expected and many unexpected reactions from the Arab Gulf states.
Qatar, a proactive foreign policy powerhouse in the Middle East and a regional champion of Islamist movements since the 2011 Arab Spring, has swiftly embraced the change and promised the new rulers in Damascus financial and diplomatic aid. Coming from a country that refused to normalize its relations with Assad when his regime was readmitted to the Arab League in 2023, such a reaction has corresponded with the broad policy priorities of the Doha government and reiterated its long-standing support for Islamists. There has been nothing unexpected about the position of Qatar.
But Saudi Arabia’s and the UAE’s similar embrace of change in Syria has been far from expected.
Unlike Qatari support for Islamists in the aftermath of the Arab Spring—as exemplified in Doha’s endorsement of the ousting of former Tunisian and Egyptian presidents, Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak, respectively, the Saudi and UAE governments firmly rooted their policies in a holistic rejection of the popular uprisings and of the regime change they brought. Both Riyadh and Abu Dhabi opposed Islamist-led governments, which they mistrusted and classified as posing grave risks to their stability and national security because of the Islamist inclination to destabilize existing governments and to assume power.
Saudi Arabia led a Gulf military force to crush a Shi’a-inspired uprising in Bahrain and to stabilize the existing monarchy. Neither Saudi Arabia nor the UAE ever warmed up to short-lived Islamist governments in Tunisia and Egypt and did not normalize their relations with them. The domestic developments that removed Islamists from power in Egypt in 2013 and Tunisia in 2019 were evaluated positively by the two most important Arab Gulf states.
The 2011 Syrian uprising against the regime of Bashar al-Assad threatened stability in the Levant, pushing both Riyadh and Abu Dhabi to endorse some of Assad’s opponents, especially as Iran’s patronage of the Assad regime was growing. Saudi Arabia and the UAE were eyeing the expanding Iranian influence near the Gulf, stretching from Iraq to Syria and Lebanon. The proliferation of violence between radical Islamist groups and the Syrian regime, however, provoked the Saudi and Emirati governments to eventually limit their involvement in the Syrian scene. Qatar, alongside Türkiye, persisted in its support for opposition groups.
In May 2023, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, along with other Arab countries such as Egypt, Iraq, and Algeria, granted Assad’s regime readmission to the League of Arab States (LAS). The atrocities and mass human rights violations committed by the regime against the civilian population had led to the suspension of Syria’s membership in LAS in November 2011. Although Qatar remained unwilling to normalize relations with Assad’s regime, it did not want to be an “obstacle” to “Arab consensus” on readmission. Saudi Arabi and the UAE, conversely, embraced normalization with Assad. He was warmly received at a LAS summit held in Jeddah that same month. Assad was also received in the summer of 2023 for a state visit to Abu Dhabi by top UAE officials who promised humanitarian and financial aid.
The December 2024 events in Syria took everyone by surprise. Gulf governments scrambled to respond. The Qatari response, as previously noted, has been in line with previous Doha policies toward the Assad regime, Islamist movements, and other moments of regime change elsewhere. Qatar has also viewed its Syria policy as a matter of holistic coordination with Türkiye and, therefore, endorsed the Türkiye-sponsored HTS.
As for Saudi Arabia and the UAE, after a brief initial period in which Riyadh signaled its openness toward the new rulers in Damascus and Abu Dhabi was hesitant, in line with its long-seated doubts about Islamists, the two governments moved to drop their long-standing anti-Islamist policy and embraced the HTS-led government. Signs of this new policy have accumulated in the last weeks. Saudi Arabia convened a Syria meeting in Riyadh, inviting foreign ministers from key Arab countries, Türkiye, and the European Union. The president of the UAE, Mohamed Bin Zayed, spoke over the phone with Ahmed al-Sharaa. The newly appointed Syrian foreign minister, Asa’d al-Shibani, visited both Riyadh and Abu Dhabi as well as other Gulf capitals. At the 2025 meeting of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, al-Shibani referred to the “new Syria” as being inspired by the Saudi Vision 2030. The Saudi foreign minister, Faisal Bin Farhan, returned the praise, indicating “cautious optimism” and noting a “great opportunity” to have Syria go a “positive direction.”
Understanding Why UAE and Saudi Arabia Are Embracing HTS
What are the motives behind the Saudi and Emirati embrace of the HTS-led government in Syria?
First, the two countries see the change in Syria as a major opportunity to undermine Iranian influence in the Levant. Although Riyadh resumed its diplomatic relations with Tehran following a successful Chinese mediation, and both Riyadh and Abu Dhabi cooperated with the Iranian government to deescalate in Yemen and end hostilities there, Saudi and UAE foreign policies remained wary of the destructive role of Iran in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen. The fact that Israeli military operations have significantly weakened Hamas and Hezbollah, and therefore Iran, coupled with the loss of Iran’s ally Assad has created hope among the Gulf powers that they can help push Iran out of Syria and cut its pathways between Iraq and Lebanon. In embracing the HTS-led government, the Saudis and Emiratis are hoping that Iran will ultimately never again assume its stronghold in Syria. The HTS government has confirmed Saudi and Emirati hopes by issuing the aforementioned decree banning Iranians from traveling to Syria and embracing good relations with Türkiye and the Gulf states as its strategic choice.
Second, Abu Dhabi and Riyadh have learned valuable lessons from their past mistakes during volatile times in Iraq and Yemen that are guiding their involvement in post-Assad Syria. In Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the UAE decided not to engage after Saddam Hussein’s removal in 2003, which meant that only the Americans and Iranians gained influence in Iraqi politics. In Yemen, the Emiratis and Saudis pursued a policy of ignoring conflict between 2012 and 2015 until the Iran-funded-and-armed Houthi movement took over northern Yemen and went to war against other groups. Riyadh and Abu Dhabi scrambled to lead an Arab coalition to oust the Houthis. The two countries got involved in what grew into a bloody war that expanded beyond Yemen’s borders. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have had to pay a huge political and security price because of their initial hesitation to engage in Yemen. In Syria, the Gulf leaders are seeking a more active role early on than in past regional conflicts.
Third, Syria is at the core of the post-Gaza war geostrategic shifts in the Middle East. Israel’s footprint beyond its territory and the occupied Palestinian territories has expanded whereas Iran’s influence has eroded, opening up a pandora’s box of contentious politics and sovereignty questions in the Levant countries, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. The geographic proximity of the Levant to the Gulf necessitates active Saudi and UAE diplomacy and engagement with the new structure of power and influence in the Levant, in an effort to prevent Israel’s expansive policies and Türkiye’s neo-Ottoman dreams of a hegemonic role in the Middle East. Both Riyadh and Abu Dhabi also want to rule out the possibility of Iran and its proxies regrouping and returning as a patron to Syria.
Fourth, Saudi and UAE engagement with Syria has come at the same time the two countries are attempting to be more assertive in the region. Both countries have come to prioritize engagement in all regional theaters without reluctance and to safeguard their interests in a Middle East characterized by conflict and instability. This assertive foreign policy, which is apparent in Gaza, Lebanon as well as in Syria, can also make both Saudi Arabia and the UAE more prominent in regional security questions and more relevant for the great powers interested in stabilizing the Middle East in collaboration with regional actors.
What’s Next for Syria?
Syria has a long road to stability and success ahead of itself, with or without Gulf support. Decades of brutal authoritarianism, mass displacement, widespread humanitarian crises, and foreign military interventions have left the country in an extremely precarious position. Risks of ethnic and sectarian conflicts as well as of territorial disintegration continue to be imminent. One can hope that with concrete support from Qatar, Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, as well as broad regional and international support for a stable and inclusive Syrian government, Damascus may very well find some light at the end of the tunnel.
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