On December 26, 2022, Omani and international news agencies reported that the Omani Shura Council was discussing the prospect of amending the 1972 Israel boycott law which bans contact with any Israeli entity or person. This surprising news came as information about an imminent rapprochement between the two countries was leaked, and only a few years after Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visited Muscat and met with the late Sultan Qaboos bin Said in 2018.

The Deputy Chairman of the Omani Consultative Assembly, Yaqoob al-Harthi, said in a statement that seven members of the Shura Council proposed amending Article 1 of the aforementioned law to expand the scope of the boycott. Specifically, they proposed “an expansion of criminalization, and an expansion of boycotting this entity.” They requested that the boycott be expanded to include technical, cultural, economic, and sports relations, and that it prohibit all types of interactions—whether physical, virtual, or through any other means.  

Although the suggested amendment details the areas of prohibition, it does not change the comprehensive nature of criminalization under the 1972 provision which prohibited all Omani natural or legal persons from entering into an agreement with a body or a person residing in, or acting on behalf of, Israel. This applied regardless of whether the agreements involved “commercial transactions, financial operations, or any other transaction of any nature.” However, the press leak did not mention whether the proposed amendments would lead to an intensification of the penalties stipulated in Article 7 of the law, which imposes fines and prison sentences of three to ten years for those who violate the law.

The proposal is still being discussed in the corridors of the Council. To fulfill the procedural requirements of the Shura Council, a draft law was referred to the legislative committee. It will then be sent to the State Council, the Council of Ministers, and finally, the Oman Council, after which it will ultimately be submitted to the Sultan to approve through a royal decree.

The news received significant local and international attention. The Grand Mufti of the Sultanate, for example, issued a statement supporting the initiative, and Sayyid Badr Albusaidi, Foreign Minister of Oman, made a remarkable statement to the official Iranian news agency (IRNA) in which he welcomed the Shura Council’s vote. He described the move as “an embodiment of the aspirations of the Omani people and other regional countries to reach a just and comprehensive solution to the Palestinian cause, in accordance with international standards and the Arab Peace Initiative.” Various Palestinian actors, such as Hamas, praised the move as well.

Media hype aside, observers must bear in mind that the political scene in the Sultanate is highly centralized and cannot accommodate the legal maneuverings of multiple players, even in the case of an elected body such as the Shura Council. The space created for the Shura Council and the amount of freedom it is allowed reflect the will and desire of Omani decision-makers to use the body in the game of regional political bargaining. Furthermore, the symbolism, timing, and connotations of the proposed amendments, as well as the media clamor that accompanied it, indicate that there is more to it beyond its direct legislative repercussions.

However, despite the 1972 law which enshrines an official boycott of Israel, Oman and Israel have had covert relations since the seventies when the Omani government used Israeli expertise to put down the Marxist revolution in the southern Dhofar region, and high-level security visits were exchanged between the two countries. The Sultanate also supported the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement and refused to sever diplomatic ties with Egypt in the agreement’s aftermath even though many countries of the Arab League did so at the time. Cooperation extended to other areas such as irrigation, agriculture, and trade, and relations between the two countries became public after the Madrid Conference in 1991 and the Oslo Peace Accords in 1993. Following these events, the countries opened commercial offices in Muscat and Tel Aviv and exchanged official visits. Furthermore, although the Sultanate did not join the Abraham Accords, it supported them unreservedly.

Moreover, although, in July 2022, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia announced that it would open its airspace to Israeli commercial aviation, Riyadh’s decision remained of little use to Israel unless Omani airspace was opened as well. Without Omani airspace, the Israeli flights would have to continue to take the Red Sea line through to the Indian Ocean, extending the length and cost of flights to Asia and Australia

According to frequent Israeli statements, Israel obtained an early and explicit approval regarding airspace from Sultan Qaboos in 2018 following his meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Muscat. This was confirmed by the participation of the Israeli Minister of Transport and Intelligence, Israel Katz, in the International Transport Conference in Muscat in 2018. In August 2022, Dina Ben Tal, CEO of El Al Israel Airlines, announced—shortly after the Saudi approval—that permission for El Al to fly over Oman was expected in “a matter of days.” 

However, despite American pressure, Oman decided, a week after this statement, to keep its airspace closed to Israeli flights. It is likely that the primary reason behind Oman’s hesitation to accommodate Israel on this matter is its caution about jeopardizing its significant relations with Tehran, especially considering that this decision was announced on the same day that Omani and Iranian officials held a conversation by phone to discuss bilateral relations. Although Israeli and American officials met the Omani foreign minister in Muscat and Washington in November 2022 and offered the Sultanate economic incentives to follow in Saudi Arabia's footsteps, Oman still decided to reject the Israeli-American request.

Oman’s refusal appears to have considered the Iranian diplomatic pressure, the attack on the Israeli oil tanker off the coast of Oman in November 2022, and the fear that the IRGC could export Iran’s internal problems by fabricating a wider conflict in the Gulf of Oman.

To strengthen its political position and give it a popular cover, the Omani regime borrowed from regional political practices to push the Omani Shura Council to propose an expansion of the Israel boycott law. Specifically, these precedents include the Kuwaiti National Assembly’s May 2021 approval of amendments expanding its Israel Boycott Law, and the Iraqi parliament's May 2022 approval of a draft law that criminalizes relations with Israel and imposes penalties—including the death penalty in some cases—on violators. 

Despite this move by the Shura Council, it is certain that Omani-Israeli relations will continue to be calm and unofficial, and that the Sultanate will maintain its regional role as a neutral player in mediation. However, it will not be surprising if Oman decides, at any minute in the foreseeable future, to open its airspace to Israeli commercial aviation. However, this decision hinges on a number of complex factors that take into account regional and internal dynamics, both political and economic. 

Hamed Al-Ghaithi is a writer and translator from Oman. Follow him on Twitter: @HamedAlGhaithi. 

Note: 

On Thursday, February 23, 2023, Oman announced that it was opening its airspace to all carriers. This article was written before the news was announced.