Zaur Shiriyev, a non-resident scholar at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, talks to Eilish Hart about the outcome of the negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan in Washington, Trump's role in them, the fate of Trump's Route for International Peace and Prosperity, and the unexpected warming of relations between Russia and Azerbaijan.
The transcript was automatically generated and not edited prior to publication.
Eilish Hart. Hello, this is Carnegie Politika from the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center in Berlin. I'm Eilish Hart, and today I'm speaking to Zaur Shiriyev, non-resident scholar at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center whose research focuses on security, conflict resolution, and foreign policy issues in the South Caucasus. Zaur, thank you for joining me.
Zaur Shiriyev. Thank you, Eilish.
Hart. So, today we're going to discuss the ongoing peace process between Azerbaijan and Armenia, as well as geopolitical shifts happening in the South Caucasus region. These are pretty big topics, so I'm going to dive right in. Back in August, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan attended a peace summit in Washington, and they initialed an agreement aimed at ending the decades of conflict between their two countries. They also signed a deal with the United States to create a major transit corridor, which is set to be named the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity. So why was this an important step forward in this peace process?
Shiriyev. Thank you. I think that it's important to start with a clear point, which is actually the Trump administration didn't create a disparate peace process, and it didn't bring the peace, because the negotiation has already advanced mostly in bilateral format over the past two or three years, and the text of agreement was finalized in March. I think that what actually happened was that Azerbaijan and Armenia decided to bring the United States in. Each for their own reasons and also for a few shared interests. The text is initialed, but also not signed yet. Why [is it] important? For context and also text. On the textual side, I think it's important because it brings transparency. For the first time, people can actually see what was negotiated and agreed upon. And that matters because over the last few years, we have seen a lot of unfounded claims and manipulation from both sides about what might or might not be included in the agreement. So, this transparency is important. Also, these rumors, this manipulation actually deepens the lack of trust that already exists between the two sides. So now the text is public. It minimizes the risk of hidden agendas or surprise elements, and everyone can read it. Of course, some parts are still debated in Azerbaijan and Armenia, and not everyone is happy with every article. But at least for now, the discussion is based on facts, not speculation. That's why the text is important, and what they initialed in Washington. But most importantly, the point of the text is the establishment of diplomatic relations. When it's signed, it's going to upgrade state relations to a new level between Azerbaijan and Armenia.
Hart. I'm glad you brought up the fact that this really came together as a result of bilateral engagement, because both Aliyev and Pashinyan really attributed this breakthrough in the peace process to the Trump administration. But it wasn't really clear to me how much of a role the United States really played or if to some extent this was more about Armenia and Azerbaijan trying to build or improve ties with the new U.S.
Shiriyev. Yes, as I said, that both countries have their own reasons for Baku and Armenia to improve their relationship with the United States. They would like to advance this relationship. At the same time, United States involvement is also important for a few reasons. It's lowered political tensions. You know that in the last two years we have [had] the fear, whether imagined or real, that there will be new escalation between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Now I think everyone understands that this is much more politically costly. Both sides agree. And now the United States is guaranteeing this kind of de facto ceasefire. This is also important for the local population on both sides. They will not fear that there will be a new war or escalation. But it's also valuable. It gives both countries space to continue dialogue. It also improved investor confidence in both countries. As you [can] see, bond markets reflected lower perceived risk, and both countries gained some fiscal breathing room. But it also changed the original balance, the original perception. We see right now [that] other countries, also the region, reflect this new reality. We can give a few examples. One is that Armenia established diplomatic relations with Pakistan at the end of August. The same is true for the United Kingdom - [it] actually lifted [its] ban on arms exports to Azerbaijan and Armenia. We will see this kind of reflection by outsiders to the region, which actually shows that there is a lower risk of war and there is much more dialogue [with outsiders to the] region. Western countries would like to advance this peace process.
Hart. I wanted to ask about this transit corridor and the fact that they've put Trump's name on it, and he got to have his moment in front of the camera to say that he had settled this conflict and brokered another peace deal. But I wanted to ask you, is this transit corridor deal a way to ensure sort of sustained U.S. involvement in the peace process going forward? Or are there concerns about the attention span in Washington for actually moving this process forward?
Shiriyev. That's a great question, actually. I will say that the risk is not involvement, but the US role in this process. I think the first risk actually comes from uncertainty about the US's commitment. Because so far, we see that the United States sees this as a political project. This is the first serious risk. The second, related risk is that both Azerbaijan and Armenia advanced the bilateral track and also it gave them room for improving their relationship. And now they're actually investing a lot of political energy in a partner that has historically shown brief attention to the Caucasus, sometimes discovering it and then forgetting it again. That's [also part of] why [the U.S.'s commitment] is uncertain. Most important is that we have a post-declaration about this transit route, but we don't know many questions related to this transit route. Security, who's going to finance it, and what kind of modality we will see. Whether there is an element of reciprocity. Whether it will also leave space for, let's say, Armenians on also engaging with regional countries. It's not only about these transit routes through Armenian territory between mainland Azerbaijan and its exclaves. If the U.S. commits seriously but also engages with other actors like the European Union and Turkey, which are the key actors, and if they somehow can create a consortium to involve these partners, and then there will be much more stability and predictability. This is going to make the U.S. position stronger in that process. Since August, we haven't gotten answers to these questions. But if these questions are going to be answered, we will see that bigger benefit to Azerbaijan and Armenia is going to de-isolate Nakhchivan, Azerbaijan’s exclave, reconnect Armenia to regional connectivity, and link this connectivity to much broader connectivity projects.
Hart. I want to come back to what you were saying about the other regional players in a minute. But before we get too far ahead of ourselves, I know it's only been two months since the peace summit in Washington. But has there been any kind of tangible progress or steps forward on Azerbaijan and Armenia's side in terms of moving towards a place where they could start implementing this peace agreement? Or should we be talking about this more as like a normalization process?
Shiriyev. The signature on the peace agreement is lacking, so it's not signed yet. That's why we cannot talk about any implementation of the peace agreement. When someone reads the peace agreement, they will see that it's purely legal language and what's implementable among it is only the subject of diplomatic relations. But in the meantime, this is a good question because we have two extremes of thinking about the peace agreement. On the one hand, there are those who believe that signing the peace agreement will solve every problem immediately, which is unrealistic. On the other hand, there are people who think that it's changed nothing, which is equally untrue. Reality is somewhere in between. The agreement itself is not the solution for every problem. It's important, but it's only a milestone in a much longer process. What we need right now is a clear roadmap. And we don't have this clear roadmap. [There won't be a] clear roadmap until the Armenian parliamentary election next June, and after signing the peace agreement. So, right now it is much more [about] improving state-to-state relations. Part of the answer to your question about what has changed after August: First of all, rhetoric has changed. Both sides are talking about peace. And also, practically, the Border Commission's work has advanced a little bit. It might be that not all of the elements are in public. At the same time, as many of our listeners and watchers know, just yesterday, Azerbaijan announced that it actually takes back its veto [of] any transit move through Azerbaijani territory, which means that Armenia can receive cargo transit from Azerbaijani territory through Azerbaijan going to Georgia and connecting to Armenia. Why is this important? Because it's the first sign that Armenians [are] reconnecting to these regional integration projects. And also, Kazakhstan is going to produce wheat for Armenia. Russia has dominated the Armenian market, and Armenia needs diversification. In a way, this process is helping Armenia to diversify its policy, whether it's about energy or food security, from Russia.
Hart. Yeah, and for Armenia, it would also open up the possibility of reopening the border with Turkey as well, right? Correct?
Shiriyev. That was probably the hope of the Armenian government when they signed the declaration in Washington in August - that they could immediately move to opening the border with Turkey. It's now clear that right now, Baku sees this [happening] only after signing the peace agreement. Turkey also [holds] the same position. In the meantime, Turkey and Armenia are talking about how to improve their relationship, how to advance, how to not only focus on opening the border - confidence-building measures can be various - but also preparing the stage [at which] borders are going to open. But for now, my understanding is that the Turkish-Armenia land border is not going to open too soon. At the same time, there will be many more flights between Yerevan and Turkish cities, and Turkish Airlines have also announced that they will also start flying to and from Armenia. We will probably see more people-to-people contact, journalistic exchange, and exchange of other people just to prepare to advance the Turkish-Armenian dialogue. What I forgot [to say is that] similar things are also happening in Armenia. We will probably see more people-to-people contact. Just a month ago, Azerbaijani experts visited Armenia. We will probably see this kind of exchange more, which is going to normalize this as a confidence building measure. I think the time should come when we shouldn't see this exchange - Azerbaijanis going to Yerevan or Armenians coming to Baku - as a surprising element or a big issue. It should be normalized. It should become less than news. Which means that there should be more of this kind of discussion.
Hart. Okay, so let's talk about regional players. One regional player that was noticeably absent in all of this is Russia. Despite the fact that Moscow had acted as a mediator between Azerbaijan and Armenia for decades, what should we make of Moscow's absence from this process?
Shiriyev. I think the Russian absence from this current peace process is one of the clear signs of just how the South Caucasus has changed. Back in 2020, when the ceasefire was signed after the second Karabakh war between Azerbaijan and Armenia, Moscow had what we can call a hegemonic moment. It deployed peacekeepers to Karabakh and positioned itself as central mediator between Azerbaijan and Armenia. At the same time, the goal wasn't only to stop the fighting, but also to secure a long-term military presence, not just five years written into an agreement. Almost every discussion about borders, transport and humanitarian issues went through Moscow. But this dominance started to erode by the end of 2021, when the European Union got involved in mediation between Azerbaijan and Armenia. But it has changed after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. From that point, Armenia began to look elsewhere for mediation, and serious talks on the peace agreement started to move forward without Russia. So basically, for Armenia, real discussion on the peace agreement started only after Russia [became] preoccupied with the invasion of Ukraine. But Moscow also tried to push its own version of the peace agreement. It was rejected mainly by Baku, but also I think Russia tried to use the agreement as a very leveraged tool. The ability to play Armenia and Azerbaijan against each other. This was the main thing that Russia actually did, not only after the 2020 war, but before that, over the course of this conflict. When something goes wrong with Armenia, they are looking to warm relations with Azerbaijan or vice versa. Now this tool is not working anymore, because there is much more trust, much more discussion, much more dialogue and much more contact between Azerbaijan and Armenia. So, I think that's why both countries are acting more independently, and Russia's ability to impose itself as a sole power broker has collapsed. I don't think that there is a way for Russia to introduce itself into the peace process. And the last element was the Trump route. As we know, since the 2020 ceasefire, as a part of it, Russia wanted to deploy its border control, also to manage security of the route between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Now we see that the United States is involved in this process. That means that right now, both Baku and Yerevan don't want Russia to play any role, even in this transformation.
Hart. So, do you think what we're looking at here is sort of the beginning of a longer-term geopolitical shift? Or is there some way that Russia could come back and try to re-engage in the region or get itself involved with this transport route, for example? Or like I said, do you think this is a longer-term geopolitical shift?
Shiriyev. That is a good question. I think the Caucasus region looks like a competitive marketplace of influence involving the EU, Turkey, Iran, the Gulf States, the United States and Russia. So, when we talk about this, it's no longer a one-player game. It's not anymore a dominance of Russia. This is actually true. But it doesn't mean that Russia is gone completely. It still has economic and security influence, particularly in the Armenian energy sector and also through its role in unresolved conflicts in Georgia. Economically, outside oil and gas sales, much of the region still trades through or with Russia. So, Russia still has a kind of economic dominance. But also, there is another layer to this story, and it's psychological as much as political, I would say. Even though Russian influence is declining, the fear of Russia remains. In many contexts, invoking the threat of Russia has become a kind of reflex, a political habit in Azerbaijan and Armenia, also in Georgia. Also, the media and analysts often use Russia as a reference point or convenient explanation when they need to justify a certain direction, a certain decision, adjust their position or mobilize public opinion. So, the Russian footprint is basically smaller, but the shadow of Russia is still present emotionally, historically and rhetorically. That's why we cannot talk about Russia as [being] completely out of the region. It will stay there but it's not going to dominate. For this, the time has passed, I would say.
Hart. We've seen countries in the region react very differently to this long shadow of Russia. I mean, Armenia, for example. More recently, it seems as though they're trying to break off those ties, and there's been movement towards a European Union bid. How would this shift things going forward if Armenia continues in that direction, continues to orient itself towards the European Union?
Shiriyev. I think it depends on how the West is going to react. If the basic line or prism is reducing Russian influence in the region, it's understandable. But also: how ready is the West to provide the necessary support for this endeavor? We don't have [an] answer. That's why the logic in Armenia is also partly realistic. They don't see this as just shifting from Russia completely and leaning towards the European Union. I think they call it a diversification of their foreign policy. In this sense, I think it's important how the West is going to support. The litmus test will be next year, in the parliamentary election in Armenia. And before that, because Russia has many tools [of influence] in the transport and logistics sectors, and through gas sale to Armenia. Blackmail could become a part of Russia's toolbox. Are others ready to support us? In this sense, it's important how not only the West, but also Turkey and Azerbaijan are going to play their role [whatever it is]. I think that only Azerbaijan and Turkey have enough resources, if such a scenario happens, to support Armenia [using] their own resources.
Hart. We've also seen Azerbaijan's relations with Russia deteriorate significantly in the last year, ever since that deadly Azerbaijan's airlines crash last December. But earlier this month, Vladimir Putin acknowledged that Russian air defenses were responsible for causing the plane crash. And we saw Aliyev respond with gratitude. Are we seeing Moscow and Baku starting to warm up to each other again? And what would that mean for the South Caucasus region if they're in heading in the direction of mending ties?
Shiriyev. You're right, I think. Ten months - the crisis actually started in December - and right now we're seeing this early sign of the easing of tensions. The crisis is over, but I wouldn't call this a warming of relations between Moscow and Baku. What we are seeing is a management, not a renewal. I think this diplomacy is designed to control the temperature, not to raise it. This is the basic end of the story. Azerbaijan also knows that it cannot afford open confrontation with Russia, yet it also no longer fears Moscow the way it once did. Baku has much more confidence and a kind of quiet caution, and now Russia is negotiating its position and influence. This is not the first crisis, I would say. Since 2020, we [have] see[n] a period of crisis in Moscow-Baku relations. But always Moscow's reaction was that it wanted to keep relations with many countries as friendly as possible, especially after its isolation because of the invasion of Ukraine. But also, in the mental thinking of Moscow, I think they always see Azerbaijan as a price. They had this thinking that Azerbaijan is a price because, unlike Georgia and Armenia, Azerbaijan has no structural dependence on Russia. It's not a part of Russian security or economic institutions. It has its own economy; it's much more free from Russia. No dependence on oil and gas. I mean, that's energy security. That's why Moscow will see Baku as a kind of price to improve relations. But another part of the story is that Moscow also understands and sees that if there's a crisis between Moscow and Baku, it's also a crisis between Moscow and Ankara. It's a kind of double-edged sword for Moscow, because Turkey is the key ally - I think it proved its capacity back in 2020, not [just in] military support or political support, but it also managed to reduce Russian influence, also the Russian reaction during the 2020 war and afterwards. So that's why I think it's not a warming up; it's just managing relations. But we also mentioned the Armenian question. Next year, might we see a kind of crisis in Baku-Moscow relations if Moscow starts intervening in Armenian domestic politics more openly? It's a basic fact that many people might not like, but only the current Armenian government is actually holding up this peace process. So, any shift in Armenia's domestic politics unfortunately will mean the collapse of the peace process. Because we don't have a signed piece agreement; it's improving, but it's not finalized yet. It's a dynamic process between us and Armenia. We need stability and a partner that will support this process.
Hart. Well, it looks like we're going to have to keep watching to see when they finally put pen to paper and get the peace process signed. I could keep asking you many more questions, but I think we're going to have to leave it there for now. That was Zaur Shiriyev, a non-resident scholar at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center. Zaur, thank you so much for sharing your insight.
Shiriyev. Thank you for inviting us and for talking.
Hart. And thank you to our audience for watching. If you enjoyed this conversation, let us know by liking this video or leaving us a comment. And don't forget to subscribe for more expert interviews like this one. I'm Eilish Hart, and we'll see you next time on Carnegie Politika.