- +2
George Perkovich, Jessica Tuchman Mathews, Joseph Cirincione, …
REQUIRED IMAGE
The Consequences of Failure in North Korea
While it is not certain that North Korea would negotiate away their nuclear programs and fully abide by any agreement, such a resolution was and remains a possibility. By refusing to aggressively pursue a negotiated approach, the Bush administration has essentially green-lighted North Korea's nuclear program and may be encouraging the North to take even more drastic steps in the future.
North Korea is on the verge of becoming a nuclear weapon state. Yet, after a decade of concerted effort by Democrats and Republicans to keep the Koreas non-nuclear, the Bush administration has apparently decided either that a nuclear North Korea is not so bad, or that nothing can be done to prevent it. Both assumptions are dangerously wrong and the failure of the Bush administration's policy toward North Korea is a legacy the world will be forced to confront long after Iraq fades from the headlines.
Today, North Korea has enough plutonium-bearing spent fuel to produce 5-6 nuclear weapons. Produced during the early 1990s, this material was previously secured under a 1994 agreement between the United States and North Korea. The collapse of this agreement sparked by North Korea's secret uranium enrichment program and torched by the U.S. decision to cut off oil shipments to the North, has destroyed the freeze over North Korea's more advanced plutonium-based program. The spent fuel may now be on its way to an extraction facility and U.S. government officials suggest that North Korea could possess nuclear weapons within weeks.
U.S. policy toward North Korea since the Bush administration took office has been one of isolation and, with the discovery late last year of the secret uranium program, one of confrontation. The administration has refused to "negotiate" with North Korea, but has reluctantly expressed a willingness to "talk" to North Korea about how the North could re-freeze its nuclear activities. These overtures have produced no positive results, and in the meantime, North Korea has accelerated its efforts to produce nuclear materials and weapons.
In sum, the Bush administration's policies toward North Korea have failed to prevent North Korea from advancing its nuclear weapons capabilities. While the administration's distaste for negotiating with the North under duress can be appreciated, this posture has weakened U.S. security and that of our troops and allies in the region. Leaders in South Korea and Japan are no doubt reconsidering their future plans and nuclear status in light of the United States' inability or refusal to effectively manage the issue of North Korea's nuclear program.
While it is not certain that North Korea would negotiate away their programs and fully abide by any agreement, such a resolution was and remains a possibility. By refusing to aggressively pursue a negotiated approach, this administration has essentially green-lighted North Korea's nuclear program and may be encouraging the North to take even more drastic steps in the future. If North Korea's actions have been designed to grab U.S. attention and extract concessions from the U.S., there may be more to come. At any time, North Korea could provoke a monumental crisis by restarting its missile flight tests, increasing missile and weapon sales abroad and even, in the extreme, conducting a nuclear weapons test. By refusing to deal with the situation in North Korea over the past few months and years, the Bush administration has ensured that when the U.S. is forced to deal with North Korea's actions in the future, Washington will be in a far weaker position to do so.
Additional Resources:
- Background Resources on North Korea's Nuclear Program
- North Korea Chapter- taken from Deadly Arsenals (pdf)
- IAEA Resource Page on North Korea
- Carnegie North Korea Resource Page
About the Author
Former Nonresident Scholar, Nuclear Policy Program
Jon Wolfsthal was a nonresident scholar with the Nuclear Policy Program.
- Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security<br>With 2007 Report Card on ProgressReport
- 10 Plus 10 Doesn’t Add UpArticle
Jon Wolfsthal
Recent Work
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
More Work from Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- At Stake in Armenia’s Election: Peace and Russian InfluenceCommentary
Regardless of the outcome, there’s another path to ensuring that progress doesn’t stall.
Zaur Shiriyev
- Trump and Xi Are Angling for Three Years of StabilityCommentary
But their "principal to principal" model will only be as effective as the political strength of each leader back home.
Damien Ma
- China’s Police and Security Cooperation AgreementsPaper
China’s Ministry of Public Security is often portrayed as a domestic law enforcement agency, but it is also a global security actor. This paper explores how MPS has used international law enforcement and security cooperation agreements—over 200 since 2006—to advance China’s vision of security in a changing global environment.
Sophie Zhuang, Sheena Chestnut Greitens, Cameron Waltz
- Europe Should Not Let Nuclear Nonproliferation DieCommentary
Amid uncertainty caused by the Iran war, the global drive for nonproliferation has stalled. With Europe diplomatically marginalized and countries reassessing their nuclear options, efforts to curb the spread of nuclear weapons risk becoming irrelevant.
Jane Darby Menton
- Post U.S.-China Summit: Managed InstabilityCommentary
The U.S.-China Summit produced a welcome commitment to build a constructive, strategically stable relationship. However, the United States has a full agenda, including the USMCA review beginning this week, that will likely target Chinese practices of concern. If China views these efforts as inconsistent with the agreements reached in Beijing, it may slow or halt progress in response.
Barbara Weisel