The Politics of Gaza Disengagement: A Paradigm Change in Israeli Politics

Speaker:
Shlomo Avineri, Hebrew University

Commentator:
Martin Indyk, Brookings Institution

Moderator:
Thomas Carothers, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Avineri began the discussion by analyzing the historical context that gave rise to Ariel Sharon’s policy of Gaza disengagement, arguing that it was the product of two sets of failed Israeli policies, and a complementary failure on the part of the international community.  Since 1967, there were broadly two Israeli positions toward the Palestinians.  One policy, associated with the moderate left-wing Labor party was based on the notion of an “outstretched hand”—believing that when the Palestinians were ready for negotiations, they would eventually engage in an agreement with the Israelis. According to Avineri, this school of thought was essentially dismissed as a tactic after the failed 2000 Camp David negotiations; the Palestinians reverted to violence, and reiterated their claims for the “right to return” as a matter of principle.  The other policy, associated with the right-wing Likud, was based on the "iron fist" concept, which involved hardline acts of aggression by Israel to enforce stability.  However, this second policy also failed to break Palestinian resistance.  According to Avineri,  Sharon realized that neither negotiations nor military aggression would be successful in mitigating unrest, and he eventually adopted unilateral actions, including disengagement, under the rubric of “painful concessions.”

Avineri then turned the discussion to the future of Israeli and Palestine after disengagement.  While he predicts that the process will be peaceful, he disagrees with the conventional wisdom of returning to negotiations after disengagement, believing that “going back to the mantras of the Roadmap will be an exercise in futility.”  Rather, Avineri advocates further unilateral steps on both sides.  The Israelis  should continue disengagement to include withdrawal from the isolated settlements on the West Bank (which Ehud Barak referred to during the Camp David negotiations).  The Palestinians will need to institutionalize one army that has a  monopoly over the legitimate use of force. Moreover, the Palestinian leadership will need to stop speaking of the “right to return” as sacred, and push acceptance of the post-1967 reality.  In his concluding remarks, Avineri argued that it is necessary to move from the hope of conflict resolution to the practical business of conflict management.

While Indyk agreed with much of Avineri’s analysis on the failure of Israeli policies, he fundamentally disagreed with Avineri’s prescription of unilateralist actions over negotiations.  Indyk first noted that Sharon’s unilateralist doctrine emerged not only as a product of failed policies of the past, but also in response to the demand of Israelis to separate from Palestinians, which was strengthened after the failure of the Oslo agreement.  Second, Indyk argued that Sharon chose to pursue unilateralist policies because Sharon did not believe it was  possible to reach an agreement on the questions of refugees and Jerusalem.  As a result, the Israeli leader is currently pursing three objectives to ensure the longevity of the Israeli state: (1) ensuring a Jewish majority, which is abetted by the process of disengagement; (2) ensuring that an individual Jerusalem remain permanently under Israeli sovereignty; and (3) incorporating the three large settlement blocks in the West Bank into Israel. 

Indyk argues that whatever the motives were for unilateralism, whether they were the product of despair or whether they were strategic, they will prove to be a failed policy.  First, by definition, unilateralism means the exchange of territories for nothing.  There are no commitments being made by the Palestinians or the international community concerning future steps.  Second, if unilateralist actions are adopted without negotiations, Hamas can claim disengagement as a victory for violence and terrorism.  Indyk concludes therefore, that if peace negotiations are not adopted after disengagement, the Israeli-Palestinian peace situation will deteriorate, and the contested areas will be subject to increased violence and instability.

A question and answer session followed.

Synopsis prepared by Hania Kronfol, Junior Fellow in the Democracy and Rule of Law Project.